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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis concerns the role of recursion in human cognition and natural language, 
especially in syntax, since it is considered to play a crucial role in human language 
ability. Most attention in this field, however, has been drawn towards such sentences 
that contain more than one clause and thus yield hypotaxis. Besides the question 
which role recursion plays in the human ability to process language, this thesis is also 
concerned with the question, what exactly is recursive in natural language syntax, 
since this also is important to the question how, and especially why, language 
evolved in humans and did not in any other species. For this purpose it has to come 
clear in how far language differs from other communication systems and what exactly 
these mechanisms are, how they are processed in the brain, whether and where they 
appear in non-linguistic domains, and in how far other species than humans are 
capable of these mechanisms.  
The 1st chapter introduces the term recursion and the concept that stands behind it, 
and moreover shows its application in different fields. Further, this chapter presents 
and discusses possible differences between recursion and other types of repetition, 
such as iteration. 
Chapter 2 presents recursion in linguistic theory, particularly generative theories as 
phrase structure grammar and the Minimalist Program. Moreover, within this chapter, 
it is discussed, what the mechanism is, that makes syntax recursive, and whether 
there is good reason to believe that all sentences yield recursion, or if there are 
special properties that make only sentences recursive that contain subordinated 
clauses. 
In Chapter 3, brain structures that are considered to represent the activation pattern 
during syntactic and recursive processing, within and outside the linguistic domain, 
are looked at more closely. Additionally, it is investigated which role has to be 
dedicated to working-memory, concerning this issue. 
Chapter 4 is about recursion within human cognition and the cognition of non-human 
species. More particular, the first part of this chapter is concerned with the role 
recursion plays within domains outside language, and what this means for recursion
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in linguistic syntax and for the human language ability as a whole. Moreover, this part 
of the chapter also discusses the need for recursion in human language on the 
example of the language Pirahã, which had been considered by Daniel Everett to be 
a non-recursive language.  
The second part of the 4th chapter is concerned with probable language-like 
processing and general cognition in non-human species. As an example for this, 
songbirds and non-human primates are looked at in particular. Songbirds are looked 
at on the one hand, since they are considered to have syntax-like dependencies 
within their songs, and also share some crucial features of human language faculty in 
terms of acquisition, and non-human primates are considered on the other hand, 
since they are the closest relatives to humans. Moreover, genetic differences that are 
related to human language ability are considered, as well. 
The last chapter investigates recursion within the framework of language evolution 
and especially the evolution of syntax. For this purpose, different theories on 
language evolution are discussed as well as the evolution of the human brain with 
respect to syntax. Moreover, the role of recursion for the human language ability is 
looked at more closely. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHAT IS RECURSION? 
 
 
1.1 THE GENERAL CONCEPT BEHIND THE TERM RECURSION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give an introduction and a first idea about what recursion 
is, and about the debate which unfolded after Hauser et al. had published their paper 
in 2002. Before coming to specific examples, a general description about what is 
behind this term is given. 
The term recursion comes from mathematical logic and number theory and describes 
the concept of repeating itself in a self-similar way. To repeat itself in a self-similar 
way means that a recursive function calls up itself by using its output as the next 
input. Roughly speaking, this means, a function which is recursive, defines its values 
via itself (Luuk et al. 2011:2). 
One of the characteristics of recursion is its complexity, because of the fact that the 
usage of one output as the next input can theoretically go on ad infinitum. A special 
feature of recursion is that it can compute infinite structures by using a set of finite 
properties or rules: Recursive functions are able to describe infinite sets by a finitely 
definable set of properties (Luuk et al. 2011). However, recursion is not only present 
in mathematics, but also in a variety of fields including plant growth (Prusinkiewicz et 
al. 1990) and preeminently in human behavior and thinking (e.g. Corballis 2011). A 
good working example for recursion in human thought is theory of mind, holding 
thinking of thinking. Processing recursion in every-day life includes multistage 
problem solving like using tools to reach a certain goal, e.g. using a ladder to reach 
an item which is out of reach, or even action planning like making coffee. Which role 
recursion plays in human cognition shall be discussed in Chapter 4.  
However, concerning cognition and linguistics in particular, there is a debate going 
on about what recursion exactly is. This debate led partly to some confusion about 
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certain terms, like hierarchy, recursion and embedding, which are associated with the 
concept of self-similar repetition. Hence, the most frequent terms concerning this 
topic are looked at more closely to be able to find out, whether there is a proper 
assumption in distinguishing between different types of recursion with respect to 
syntax and cognition. 
First, we will take a look at the concept of recursion in different fields to get a better 
idea of what it is all about. After that, some of the problems concerning the probable 
differentiation between recursion and other types of repetition are considered. 
 
 
1.2 RECURSION IN DIFFERENT FIELDS 
 
The first field, we are looking at in particular, is mathematics. Recursion plays an 
important role in the superordinate domain of logics as well as within different 
subfields of mathematics, like geometry, for example.  
A perhaps rather plain example for recursion in mathematics is factorials: 5! equals 
120, because 5! is 5*4*3*2*1, which is 120. A defining equation for this looks like 
that: 
 
 (1)  0! = 1 
  n! = n * (n–1)!   [where n > 0] 
          (Corballis 2011:5) 
 
The recursive step here falls into the point where the outcome of e.g. 5*4 is used as 
the input for the following multiplication with the number 3. 
Another example is Fibonacci numbers, which were used by Fibonacci, an Italian 
mathematician, to predict the growth of a hypothetical population of rabbits. (Corballis 
2011:5)  
 
(2)  1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,…  
   
 (3) fibonacci (0) = 1 
  fibonacci (1) = 1 
  fibonacci (n) = fibonacci (n – 1) + fibonacci (n – 2) [where n > 1] 
Chapter 1   What is recursion? 
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Indeed, these numbers do not just reflect something theoretical, but are also present 
in the structural composition of a sunflower’s flower head, to give only one of multiple 
examples. 
Also, recursive functions deal with the problem of computability of algorithms. An 
algorithm, in terms of mathematics, is a problem which can be defined through a set 
of rules. Furthermore, recursive functions in a mathematical sense are characterized 
through their property of describing a solution to a problem rather than the individual 
steps towards a solution (Erk 2008). A problem in this thematic environment is the 
question, whether a particular feature is true for a particular object or not. For this 
purpose, objects o from a universal set O are considered. Solving a problem in 
mathematics by recursion is a method by which the main problem is divided into 
smaller sub-problems to get solved (Erk 2008). 
Recursive definitions, in general, consist of two computational steps, which refer to 
each other: The first one determines the condition, which ends the recursive process, 
while the second forms the recursive step. Formally speaking, this looks like the 
following, taken from Tomalin (2006): 
 
 (4) 1) f(0) = q 
  2) f(y’) = (x(yf(y)) [where  q,y,y’ ⋲ N] 
 
The first equation in (4) determines the termination condition defining that if 0 is the 
input to the function it will return to the natural number q. Returning to the natural 
number q ends the computation because no further recursive step follows. The 
second equation in (4) shows the recursive step, since, if the natural number y’ is 
used, the value of y’ is computed by calling up the function x, which needs two 
arguments: First the natural number y (y = y’ – 1) and second the function f(y) 
(Tomalin 2006:80). 
The following example, also taken from Tomalin (2006), illustrates counting, which is 
also recursive, as formal definition: 
 
(5)  add(4,1)=add(3,1)+1 
  add(3,1)=add(2,1)+1 
  add(2,1)=add(1,1)+1 
  add(0,1)=1 
Chapter 1   What is recursion? 
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Another very common example for recursion in mathematics is the inductive function. 
Mathematical proofs are often defined through induction. For example, to show that 
all natural numbers have a particular property, it is sufficient to show that 0 has this 
property and if a number n has this property, to show that n+1 has this property, too 
(Erk 2008:6). 
The logical formula for induction, taken from Erk (2008), looks like that: 
 
 (6) P(0)˄ ∀n(P(n) => P(n+1)) => ∀n P(n) 
 
The first part in (6) before the conjunction means that, in order to fulfill the proof, it 
has to be shown that 0 has a particular property, since P(0) equals 0. The second 
part after the conjunction says that in order to show that all other numbers show this 
property, it has to be shown that first, P(n), which resembles any integer, let’s take 5, 
has this property, and then it additionally has to be shown that P(n+1), which means 
5+1, which equals 6, has this property, too. The last part of the equation after the 
arrow shows that, if it has been proven that, both 0, n, which is in our case 5, and 
n+1, which is in our case 6, all have this particular property, every natural number 
must have this property. The recursive step within this equation is that, if I want to 
show something by taking any number and then proof that this property is true for 
n+1, n+1 is recursive, since it uses the last output, namely 5 as the next input, which 
is a property of recursion. 
 
Moreover, in geometry, recursive structures can be very fascinating. Fractals are 
geometric objects with a structure that consists of an increasingly smaller copy of 
itself which makes it recursive, since the former output retains and as the more steps 
are added, the object gets bigger and more complex. Thus, the individual figures 
within a fractal have hierarchical relationships to each other. Fractals have decimal 
numbers as dimension, such that they have neither the dimension 1, nor the 
dimension 2, and thus suggest a different thinking about the term dimension than 
classically assumed (Haftendorn 2009:80). 
One example for fractals is the Sierpinski triangle, which is named after the 
mathematician Waclaw Sierpinski who imagined this triangle like the following: 
To create such a triangle in thought, one has to take an equilateral triangle and pull 
out a similar triangle with the half of the side length of the initial triangle. This 
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procedure has to be repeated with the triangles which now appear outside the new 
triangle. After this, the procedure, theoretically, has to be repeated infinitely 
(Haftendorn 2009). 
An even more complicated but a very much fascinating example is the Mandelbrot 
set. Mandelbrot sets result from a recursive formula with certain properties. The 
Mandelbrot recursion looks like this (Haftendorn 2009): 
 
(7) zn = z
2
n-1 +c 
 
And has the carrier function: 
 
 (8) f(z) = z2 + c  
 
The variable z is a complex number and c is a constant, namely a coordinate in a 
circle, from where the Mandelbrot set is started. If a point is within the circle it gets 
the color black, if it doesn’t belong to the circle, it gets colored. The color represents 
the number of steps which were needed until the function broke out of the circle. 
Once the function breaks out, it never comes back into the circle and runs to infinity. 
All points c which are not within the circle actually do not belong to the Mandelbrot 
set (Haftendorn 2009:102).  
In computer science, recursion is an important element for the description of 
computational models. Recursion needs more computational power, which 
distinguishes it from an iterative process. But generally, every recursive function can 
be converted into an iterative one and vice versa (e.g. Lobina 2011). Concerning 
computational operations in computer science, to stop a recursive operation, a 
termination condition is needed. It is checked first, if such a condition is available and 
in the case of not applying, the function goes through with self-reference (Erk 2008). 
In botany, recursion has its place, too. Here, growth of plants can be simulated by 
recursive functions. One possibility to do this is by using the Lindenmayer system, 
which is named after the Dutch biologist Aristid Lindenmayer, who invented this 
system to model natural plants. This concept of modeling can be put in context with 
fractals in general.  By using computer simulation, natural growth of plants can be 
shown (Haftendorn 2009). 
 
Chapter 1   What is recursion? 
8 
 
 
(9) 
      http://blog.ralfw.de/2010/12/maschinen-bauen-aber-software.html 
 
To create a fractal tree, a trunk (n) is needed, of which in a y-shape, two trunks (n-1) 
arise, which looks like this: 
 
 
(10) 
 
      http://blog.rki-home.de/2008/04/09/fraktale-spielereien 
 
 
Another way to create natural growth is via iterated function system as used for the 
Sierpinski triangle. A very important feature concerning IFS is its self-similarity 
(Haftendorn 2009:99). 
Recursive structures is not only something that can be modeled by using computer 
graphics, it is also a phenomenon, occurring in natural environments. For example, 
the cone of a pine has a recursive structure, which resembles Fibonacci numbers 
and looks like follows: 
 
 
Chapter 1   What is recursion? 
9 
 
(11) 
 
                                
http://www.mat.uc.pt/~mat1164/WebFibonacci.html 
http://www.casioschulrechner.de/de/teilnehmervektoria2008/erben_des_pyhtagoras/seite%202.html 
 
So forth, it has been shown the general properties of recursion and some fields it 
belongs to. The next section is about some controversy and uncertainty concerning 
recursion in syntax.  
 
 
1.3 CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE TERM RECURSION 
 
After Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) had published their paper on recursion, 
some criticized, that it has not been clear, whether the explanations had been done 
on recursion or iteration. van der Hulst (2009), for example, argued that it is important 
to distinguish between these two ways of repetition, and Luuk et al. (2011) suggested 
that recursion has to be distinguished not only from iteration but also from “simple” 
embedding, which does not have the same computational demands as iteration or 
recursion. Corballis (2011) on the other hand argued that a distinction has to be 
made between recursion, iteration and “simple” repetition. We now take a look at this 
controversy to get an idea of what is argued about. 
 
 
1.3.1 Recursion versus iteration and “simple” repetition 
 
As Corballis pointed out, recursion is not the only device which can create sequences 
or structures of potentially infinite length or size (Corballis 2011:9). According to him, 
besides simple repetition, iteration is one of such devices. Considering simple 
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repetition, a sentence like “It rained and it rained and it rained and it rained” (Corballis 
2011:19) can be continued infinitely, but according to Corballis, is neither recursive 
nor iterative, since the second element of the sentence has not necessarily to refer to 
the first one etc. Furthermore, this sentence is also considered to lack hierarchical 
embedding which is one of the main features of recursive structures (Corballis 2011).  
Another type of repetition is iteration, which differentiates from simple repetition: 
Iteration compared with simple repetition and aggregation needs its output as the 
next input and therefore seems to be much closer to recursion than repetition in the 
manner described above. In fact, iteration is treated as kind of recursion by 
mathematicians by belonging to the general recursive functions (Corballis 2011:11). 
What doesn’t qualify this type of repeated structure processing for recursion is the 
fact that each output is discarded after it has served as the next input, which leads to 
missing complexity that can be seen in recursive structures (Corballis 2011). This 
argumentation by Corballis, however, seems not to hold for syntax in natural 
language, since even in coordination, which is often considered iterative, the 
beginning of the sentence has to be kept in mind to understand the whole sentence’s 
meaning, such that nothing is discarded.  
Another view is that differences between recursion and iteration include that iteration 
does not involve self-reference, such that the last output is not used as the next 
input, but that every input has to be defined explicitly (Luuk et al. 2011:2). 
To illustrate the difference between recursion and iteration, a repeated process like 
going down a road can be written as a recursive instruction and as an iterative 
instruction.  
 
 
(13)ITERATION 
 
Def going along a road (): 
  from the first step to the last step: 
  take a step forward 
 DONE  
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(14) RECURSION 
 
Def going along a road (): 
 If goal is reached: DONE 
 else: 
  take a step forward 
  going along a road () 
 
(Idea taken from: http://www.hib-
wien.at/leute/wurban/informatik/Rekursion.pdf) 
 
 
In (13) the process is repeated by using a loop and in (14) the process is repeated by 
the function calling up itself again and again and doesn’t need a loop to do so: Here, 
an ending definition and the recursive definition are given. 
Iteration other than recursion, does not lead to added complexity (Corballis 2011). 
However, a recursive instruction can seemingly be written by means of recursion as 
well as iteration. Luuk et al. (2011) point out that, in terms of computation, a clear 
difference between these two devices can be observed: Recursive functions need 
more time and computational power, because they need to store information in some 
kind of memory device, but are a more elegant solution in solving problems. In terms 
of computing problems in a mathematical sense, recursion and iteration are the only 
devices that can handle repetition (Luuk et al. 2011). 
Although iterative functions are sometimes handled as general recursive functions, 
for natural language, it probably is important to differentiate between recursion and 
iteration because of the computational demands which are behind these two devices, 
although there are existing views which claim that there is no need for language to 
use recursive processes, since these can also be described in an iterative manner 
(Luuk et al. 2011). 
Karlsson (2010) brings it to the point that the main common feature of recursion and 
iteration is plain structural repetition in the way of “emitting instances of the current 
structure or stop”, while their main difference is that recursion builds up structure by 
increasing embedding depth. In contrast, iteration always has a flat output because 
no depth of embedding occurs (Karlsson 2010:43). 
Harley (2007) claims that concerning syntax, iteration is the ability to carry on 
repeating the same rule, potentially forever, while recursion is to divide a bigger 
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problem into smaller ones, meaning analyzing phrase structure rules. Furthermore, 
he claims that iteration can be done without recursion (Harley 2007:40) 
However, the question arises, if it is really necessary to distinguish between recursion 
and iteration, particularly in the field of recursion in syntax and cognition and more 
importantly, how, or rather in which terms such a differentiation has to be made.  
 
 
1.3.2 Recursion versus “simple” embedding 
 
The difference between “simple” embedding, how Luuk et al. (2011) called the idea 
that embedding does not always refer to recursion, and recursion itself, is partly 
determined by the scientific field it is used for, if a difference is made, anyway. In 
computer science, as Luuk et al. point out, for example, that recursion is related to 
the concept that a procedure definition refers to the procedure itself. In Chomsky’s 
phrase structure grammar, recursion is a property of rewrite rules, which resembles 
that what is on the left side of the arrow repeats on the right side of this arrow, e.g. 
A⟶AB, where the recursive step is as follows: A⟶AB⟶ABA⟶ABABA and so on 
(Luuk et al. 2011). 
Another view of recursion is that it is a structural property, where an instance of an 
item is embedded in another instance of the same item (Luuk et al. 2011:4). Thus, 
Luuk et al. argue that recursion can be defined as the procedure of self-embedding 
and self-embedding in turn is the structure of the procedure that led to a structure 
with self-embeddings. Furthermore, he argues that embedding and recursion can 
apply independently from each other (Luuk 2011:4). This independence goes back to 
the difference between recursion as a procedure and recursion as structure (Luuk et 
al. 2011). However, to take Luuk et al.’s example, a self-embedded structure doesn’t 
have to be generated recursively, since, taking their example, a box within another 
box is self-embedding, but not recursive, since to recognize an object within the 
same object does not need recursive abilities. The same, according to them, applies 
for an NP which is located within an NP. Take the following phrase as an example for 
this: 
 
(15) The book and the pen 
[NP[NP The book]and[NP the pen]] 
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Here, two NPs are located within another NP, but this, according to Luuk et al., 
makes neither the structure nor the process that generates it recursive (Luuk et al. 
2011). Although Jackendoff and Pinker (2005) took a picture of a particular form 
within the same form to illustrate recursion on a visual level, Luuk et al. argue that 
this is not what is behind the idea of recursion, and that the ability to process 
recursive structures is not needed to understand such visual stimuli, like it is not 
needed for recognizing a box within a box (Luuk et al. 2011:4). The same thing, 
according to Luuk et al., holds for some syntactic structures, like NPs within NPs, 
which have embedded items, but are obviously to them not recursive and come from 
syntactic rewriting in phrase structure rules: These rewrite rules do not have to be 
generated recursively, but can also be generated iteratively (Luuk et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, Luuk et al. postulate that, considering the rewrite rule from phrase 
structure grammar, AB⟶AABB, which generate the strings AAABBB, AAAABBBB 
and so on, it is impossible to tell whether these strings were generated by a recursive 
or iterative process, or by neither of it (Luuk et al. 2011:5).   
I suggest that the example given by Luuk et al. is not helpful to constrict what is 
behind the idea of recursion. It is true that a box in a box does not yield a recursive 
structure, but also, it cannot be compared neither with the example by Pinker and 
Jackendoff, nor with a box within a box. The reasons for this are that if an object is 
located within another object it does not play any role, if the object is the same object 
but smaller or a completely other object and small enough to fit into the first object. 
For example, a ball within a box is the same as a box within a box and both examples 
do not have anything to do with recursion or iteration for the reason that the smaller 
object is not structurally, nor computationally related to the bigger object. In the case 
of recursion or iteration, the part that is repeated, is somehow related to the first part 
of the whole structure. Concerning a box within a box, the former output is not used 
as the next input, if there is something like a former output and a next input, at all. 
 
It has also been suggested that there are different types both of recursion and 
iteration which are considered to have different properties. To get a better impression 
about this, we take a look at what is referred to as “different types of recursion”. 
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1.3.3 Different types of recursive and iterative structures 
 
Karlsson, among others, proposed that there are different types both of recursion and 
iteration (Karlsson 2010). 
Iteration occurs in six different types: coordination, apposition, reduplication, 
repetition, listing and succession (Karlsson 2010:46). 
Coordination is the most frequent subtype of iteration, which can occur with or 
without explicit conjunction. Here, a further instance of the same structural type is 
added. The types that can be iterated in this way are all maximal projections like NPs 
and VPs, grammatical functions, like subject and object and clause types, like relative 
clause, and if-clause, for example, but mostly, clauses, or NPs in clauses are 
coordinated. Although clauses can be repeated by coordination, there occurs no 
increasing depth within the utterance (Karlsson 2010:46). In the following, the C-1, C-
2 and so forth, stand for coordination-1, coordination-2 and so on. 
 
(16) [C-1The man] and[C-2the woman] and [C-3the two children] went to the 
theater. 
 
The next type of iterative repetition is apposition, by which typically, NPs are 
repeated. What distinguishes this kind of repetition from coordination is that 
apposition is semantically motivated and thus the number of cycles that can occur 
with this type are constrained (Karlsson 2010:47). 
Another type of iteration, according to Karlsson, is reduplication, which is also often 
called repetition.  
 
(17) a.  It is a long long way. 
 b. It is much much better.  
(Karlsson 2010:48) 
 
Reduplication has no limits on the number of cycles. 
The next type of iteration can be named as non-content repetition, since it occurs, 
often involuntarily, when speakers repeat certain part of a sentence in order to gain 
time to complete planning the message they want to utter and occur logically only in 
spoken language. Mostly, words belonging to closed grammatical classes are part of 
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this kind of repetition, but the outcome of this type is always ungrammatical (Karlsson 
2010:49).  
 
(18) And and if if if you know they had none at all.  
 
(British National Corpus, FMD 321 via Karlsson 2010:49) 
 
Listing is an iterative way of enumeration and mostly used in “restricted lexical 
taxonomies” (Karlsson 2010:49). 
 
 (19) Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday 
 
As a special kind of listing, Karlsson names succession, which contains numerosity 
and can be paraphrased with the formula n+1, and is what we know as counting. At 
this point, I doubtlessly disagree with Karlsson, because if there is a meaningful 
distinction between recursion and iteration, counting belongs to recursion because 
the output is not discarded before the next cycle begins, since the next cycle embeds 
the last output, and that is the way numbers grow bigger. 
In the superordinate field of recursion, Karlsson distinguishes the types of recursion 
in the following ways: Direct and indirect recursion, counting recursion and mirror 
recursion, and simple and productive recursion. To get a picture of the structural 
form, let’s take a look at the phrase structure rule and the actual structure of each of 
these types. 
First, the types of recursive structures can be divided into two subtypes of the 
directness of application, which is reflected in the form of the rewriting rule 
(Karlsson2010): 
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(20) a. Direct recursion 
 A ⟶ AB 
 
A 
 
   A       B 
 
  A              B 
   
 
 A        B 
        
     
 
  b. Indirect recursion 
  A⟶B, B⟶A 
 
            A 
 
  B          B 
 
    A            A    A            B 
 
Second, the types of recursion can be divided into the kinds of strings, they generate, 
and the rewriting rules they need to be generated (Karlsson 2010): 
 
(21)   
 
a. Counting recursion (AB, AABB, AAABBB) with the rewrite rules  
  
X⟶ aXa 
 X⟶ {} 
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When applying the formal type of counting recursion to natural language, the 
following right branching sentence gives an example of what this type of recursion 
looks like. 
  
(22) [[A1If the sun is shining] [B1if the sun rises]], [[A2then the sun is upon the 
sky], [B2then I like to go out]]. 
 
 b. Mirror recursion (ABBA), which follows the rewrite rule   
 
X⟶aXa 
X⟶bXb 
 X⟶ {} 
 
This type of recursion in natural language resembles what is called center 
embedding: 
 
(23) [[[A1The cat] [A2the dog]] [[B2bit] [B1ran away]]] 
         
          (Christiansen 1999) 
 
Christiansen et al. (1999) also distinguishes a third formal type of recursive structure, 
namely identity recursion, which generates strings of the form aa, bb, abab, aaaa, 
bbbb, aabaab, abbabb and is generated by the following rewrite rules:  
 
S⟶WiWi   X⟶bX 
W⟶X   X⟶{} 
X⟶aX   
The third type of formal recursion is called cross-dependency recursion in linguistics 
and can be illustrated by this sentence, which is ungrammatical in English: 
 
 (24) [[A1The boy] [B1[A2girls]] [B2runs] like]. 
         (Christiansen 1999) 
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And finally, besides the already mentioned criteria, recursive structures can be 
determined by how many cycles of application they produce: 
 
a. Simple recursion only has one cycle of application: 
 
(25) I like to go out, because the sun is shining. 
 
 b. Productive recursion has more than one cycle of application: 
 
(26) I like to go out because the weather is good, because the sun is shining, 
because there are no clouds at the sky. 
 
More particular, the following types or sub-types, if you will, can be distinguished like 
follows: Left-recursion, which, in linguistic terms, is called left-branching or initial 
embedding, right-recursion, or rather right-branching or final embedding and nested 
recursion which, in linguistics, is often paraphrased with the term center-embedding 
(Karlsson 2010:50). According to Karlsson, the two types of tail recursion, namely 
left- and right-recursion, can be converted into iteration, because these two types do 
not create increasing embedding depth, which means no further memory device is 
needed (Karlsson 2010).  
So far, the most crucial factor that seems to distinguish iteration from recursion is the 
additional memory device that is needed for the increasing depth of embedding. A 
question, coming up at this point, is whether the two recursive types that can be 
converted into iteration, need less memory capacity, since the beginning of the 
sentence has to be kept in memory, anyway. 
According to Karlsson, all the subtypes just mentioned, can be assigned to the two 
upper groups of general and specific recursion. All the types of recursive structures 
that do not create increasing embedding depth, in the sense of center-embedding, 
fall under the term of general recursion, and all types of recursion that do create 
increasing depth in this sense, are what is called specific recursion. This means that 
center-embedding is the only identified type of so called true, or rather specific 
recursion and all types of iteration and both types of tail recursion belong to the group 
of general recursion (Karlsson 2010). 
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1.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
Summarizing the properties of recursion, it can be said that this is the mechanism 
that makes it possible to create infinite structures or sequences by finite means. 
Thus, it seems to be a hallmark of natural language, particularly in syntax. 
Concerning recursion in language, there is an ongoing debate, or rather some 
uncertainty about the term recursion and what it exactly is with respect to natural 
language. While Corballis (2011) claims that there is a difference between simple 
repetition, iteration and recursion, Luuk (2011) claims that a difference has to be 
drawn between iteration, recursion and simple embedding. This, however, seems 
rather unlikely, at least for the reason that a recursive process can always be 
reduced to an iterative one (Lobina 2011).  
I suggest that the idea behind what is referred to as simple repetition by Corballis 
(2011) is not given in any sentence in natural language, because it is never the case 
that constituents of a sentence are “only attached” to the former constituent. 
Concerning a possible difference between iteration and recursion, where Corballis 
(2011) argues that both recursion and iteration use their former output as the next 
input, while Luuk argues that using iteration, each input has to be formulated 
independently, it can be said that if there really is a crucial difference between 
recursion and iteration, this would be fact that the output of an iterative function 
seems to be always flat, while the output from a recursive function yields hierarchical 
structures. If this is the case, nevertheless, language more likely would be recursive, 
since it forms hierarchical dependencies. 
Furthermore, Luuk distinguishes between recursion and simple embedding, using a 
picture of a box within a box as example for the independence of recursive structures 
and recursive processes, or rather that embedding can exist without recursion. A box 
within a box really doesn’t need an understanding of recursion to be processed, but 
to compare this to an NP within an NP and thus to recursion in general is not 
reasonable for at least two reasons: First, the two NPs are linked to each other which 
clearly differentiates them from two objects which are placed into each other, and 
second, the two boxes are neither a recursive structure nor formed by a recursive 
process, which also clearly disqualifies them as an example for the supposedly 
independence of recursive structures and recursive processes: A visual scene of two 
objects, whereof one is located within the other one, do not yield embedding. And 
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this, of course, is the same with a box within another box. The term embedding, 
needs to be more than the location of objects within other objects to be worth being 
noted in a discussion about recursion. Further, this example with only two boxes 
appears to be a bad one, because if one can imagine this structure of boxes within 
boxes to go ad infinitum, this person seems to understand what recursion is; one box 
within another single box really doesn’t show that recursive structures and processes 
possibly do not depend on each other. 
Furthermore, Karlsson’s classification and division of recursive and iterative 
structures by only accepting center-embedded structures as truly recursive cannot be 
correct, since in the case that center-embedded structures are recursive, while others 
are not, or only to a limited extend, there would have to be a specific rule that creates 
center-embedded structures, a specific rule for tail-recursion, and so forth. This has, 
as Lobina points it out, nothing to do with recursion in language and in all other 
domains (Lobina 2011:160). Furthermore, this also neglects the fact that recursion 
can always be converted into iteration and vice versa. More on this is discussed 
throughout the next chapter.  
Moreover, how recursion is related to syntax, the Faculty of Language, to cognition, 
the brain, linguistic theory and language evolution is discussed throughout this thesis, 
beginning with recursion in linguistic theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
  
RECURSION IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 
 
 
In the following, recursion is examined in terms of linguistic theory, based on 
structuralist theories such as Generative Grammar and the Minimalist Program.  
Before looking at these topics, we will take a brief look at formal language theory to 
get an idea of the terms and concepts behind it, because some of these terms are 
used throughout the chapter and are also referred to during the whole thesis. 
 
 
2.1 FORMAL LANGUAGE THEORY WITH RESPECT TO LINGUISTIC THEORY 
 
As Fitch pointed out, concerning formal languages, the term formal describes a 
system in which algorithmically specifiable notions, which delineate representations, 
rules and links between them are included (Fitch 2010:111). 
In computer science, a language is a set of symbols which is distinct from any other 
set by having non-atomic units. To describe such a language, a grammar can be 
used. Just like in natural language theory, in computer science, languages are 
describes by a grammar (Schöning 2009). These grammars consist of rules which 
generate a particular language. A language in computer science exists always over 
an alphabet. Formal languages in contrast to natural languages do not generate 
whole sentences, but instead generate words, which are in terms of formal 
languages, elements of syntax (Schöning 2009). Formal language theory makes use 
of the same terms as linguistics, but at some points in a slightly different way (Fitch 
2010): First, by the term grammar, a finite system of rules is meant, that can generate 
a set of sentences, which in some languages can be infinitely large. Second, a 
sentence other than in natural language, is a string made up by symbols that are 
contained in a finite set, the alphabet. Third, the sentences that can be made up by
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 such a grammar is named language (Fitch 2010:111). To generate a language by 
using a certain grammar, a starting symbol is always used at the beginning, mostly 
named S. With respect to certain rules of the particular grammar, S is replaced by 
another unit, which can contain a variable that can be replaced again until it is 
replaced by a terminal symbol. This replacement stops as all variables are replaced 
by terminal symbols and a word is obtained (Erk 2008:54). 
Accordingly, a language consists of the set of all words that can be generated from 
the starting symbol using the rules of the particular language (Erk 2008). Roughly 
speaking, a formal language is generated by an algorithm. The particular algorithms 
by which the associated language can be generated differ with respect to the 
particular language (Fitch 2010:107). In contrast to natural language, a sentence in 
formal languages is finite and thus constrained. It can be compared with integers, 
where the whole set of these is infinite, but every single integer is generated by a 
finite set of particular symbols (Fitch 2010:111). For example, the abstract idea of the 
set {4} is generated by a particular symbol and its rewrite rule: 
 
(1) 4⟶3+1 
3⟶2+1 
2⟶1+1 
1⟶1 
         
No natural language has been formalized in the way shown in (1) yet (Fitch 
2010:111). Thus, natural language differs at least in its complexity from formal 
languages. But nevertheless, formal languages and particularly the automata that 
can or cannot process a certain kind of formal language are useful for the 
understanding of natural language and what is needed to process it. 
 
 
2.1.1 Finite-state grammar versus natural language 
 
A finite-state grammar has the following properties that characterize it: It can 
generate any of a finite number of states and it has no memory device, or at least a 
very limited one (Isac et al. 2008). A finite state grammar that is able to process two 
sentences looks like this: 
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(2) 
  (see Isac et al. 2008) 
       
This grammar can process the sentences “The man comes” and “The men came”.  
Such a grammar can perform a language like AnBm, where n and m stand for different 
numbers, but it cannot perform a language like AnBn, because here, A and B have to 
appear both n times, and thus the number of Bs depends on the number of As and 
vice versa. A finite state grammar, which as mentioned above, has no memory 
device, cannot remember the number of As, such that the number of Bs could equal 
the number of As. Because of that, a finite state grammar is not sufficient for a 
natural language, like English, for instance (Isac et al. 2008). 
Because of the lacking memory device, in a finite state grammar, for every sentence, 
there has to be a separate path, such that a finite state grammar, that can perform 
two sentences, has to look like in (1). This leads to the fact that a finite state grammar 
can generate all and only the sentences of a finite set, like a certain book, or a 
certain newspaper (Isac et al. 2008). When a language needs a path for every 
sentence, it will require lots of redundancy, where words and even identical strings of 
words have to be repeated (Isac et al. 2008:96). 
Natural language, in contrast, needs a memory device, such that it is not necessary 
that each and every sentence has to be stored explicitly, but can be generated by a 
finite set of rules. 
 
 
2.2 RECURSION AND GENERATIVITY 
 
Recursion is considered to have played a significant role in the development of 
linguistic theory, which is especially true for Generative Grammar. This is the case, 
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because recursion bears an elegant possibility of generating strings of infinite length 
by using only a finite memory space (Sauerland et al. 2011). 
Chomsky, not yet talking about recursion in particular, defined the human property of 
using this mechanism under the term of self-embedding as follows: 
 
(1) A language L is self-embedding if it contains an A  
such that for some φ, ψ (φ ≠ I ≠ ψ), A ⟹ φ A ψ   
(Chomsky 1959) 
        
In a paper from 1959, Chomsky showed that the concept of self-embedding sets 
apart context-free grammars from less powerful grammars like a finite state grammar, 
which means that the languages, produced by a context-free grammar, cannot be 
analyzed by less complex models of grammar. Chomsky furthermore showed that 
English is self-embedding and satisfies the definition given in (1), what he showed by 
this formal example: 
 
 (2)  a. S ⟹ If S, then it’s true. 
  b. S ⟹ Either S or not. 
(Chomsky 1959) 
 
In contrast to natural language, a finite state grammar is not capable of the long-
distance dependency between if and then in the first case and either and or in the 
other case. This is, because a machine, that can process a finite state grammar, 
lacks a memory device by which it could keep track of the if while going through the 
rest of the sentence until reaching the then (Chomsky 1959).  
The concept of recursion was important for generative theory in so far, that Chomsky 
could show with its help that a behaviorist model of language was not sufficient, and 
henceforth was crucial in the development of phrase structure based approaches to 
language description (Sauerland et al. 2011). 
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2.3 RECURSION WITHIN THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM 
 
Roughly speaking, the Minimalist Program aimed to show, why the language 
principles captured within the term ‘Universal Grammar’ are what they are and 
nothing else. By doing this, the computational mechanisms that are needed to 
produce and comprehend language, can be summarized within two basic syntactic 
operations called Merge and Move (Di Sciullo et al. 2010). 
Merge is considered to be the operation by which recursive structures are built up in 
syntax, and by which the infinity of natural language is achieved. 
Merge within the Minimalist Program is a structure building device that uses a 
combinatorial operation that takes two syntactic objects to form a new object. 
Syntactic objects that can be merged together are for example lexical items or 
previously composed pieces of syntactic structure (Di Sciullo et al. 2010). The 
important thing about Merge in human syntax is that by using two distinct items a 
new one with altered meaning emerges: 
 
(3)  a. The bird sings a song. 
 b. The man sings a song. 
 
The sentence has another meaning than the single words in it. Furthermore, the two 
sentences in (3a) and (3b) have different meanings since different lexical items are 
merged together. Through the operation Merge we get the meaning from a sentence 
as a whole, if you will: A whole that is built up from small single items, but then gets a 
new meaning as the whole it builds. Another important fact here is that the merged 
sentence contains a truth value which the single words lack.  But not only the use of 
different lexical items gives the sentence another meaning, also the merging of 
different functional categories like tense can alter the meaning of a merged clause or 
a sentence: 
 
 (4) a. The bird sings a song. 
  b. The bird sang a song. 
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Formally speaking, Merge looks like that: 
 
 (5) {A,B} = C 
            
       
Since the operation Merge can take two lexical items and combine to form another 
one, and then use the new lexical item to form in turn another, even bigger item, this 
syntactic operation is recursive, using its last output as the next input.  
 
 (6) a. {A,B} = C 
  b. {D,C} = {{A,B}D} = E 
 
Merge is an operation, which occurs binary, always combining two items together to 
bigger outputs (Lasnik 2002). Another property of Merge is that it is asymmetric by 
either projecting A or B within the operation Merge {A,B} (Lasnik 2002).  
A differentiation can be made between internal and external Merge. While external 
Merge combines lexical items and phrases, internal Merge contains the other 
syntactic operation that occurs in the Minimalist Program, namely Move.  
 
 (7) Internal Merge 
 Whati do they eat ti ? 
 
With respect to the operation Merge, natural language is recursive, because every 
lexical item is combined with another one to build up a bigger structure that can be 
combined with another lexical item or a previously merged phrase to build up an even 
bigger item, which definitely corresponds to the definition of recursion. This structural 
combining operation goes on until the structure, needed for a grammatical utterance, 
is reached. Internal Merge is recursive in the sense that it determines how 
constituents are merged and put together before spell-out (Carnie 2008). 
However, Progovac (2009) argues that there is a type of sentence that is not 
recursive, namely sentences that she calls Root Small Clauses of the type 
“Everybody out!” or “Case closed”. She claims that since these clauses cannot be 
embedded into each other, they refuse to be recursive (Progovac 2009:193). 
Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that Progovac uses the term recursion 
synonymously to subordination. I argue that Root Small Clauses, though being 
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ungrammatical when embedded within each other, show recursion, since they are 
Merged like all other sentences, since I can produce and understand new and never 
heard ones, and further, they also can yield infinity using a conjunction like and, 
which is also recursive. Furthermore, though being ungrammatical in English, Root 
Small Clauses perhaps can yield multiple center-embedding in other languages. 
Moreover, Progovac argues that Root Small Clauses are fossils from an earlier 
grammatical stage of language evolution that formed the basis for a more complex 
grammar to evolve (Progovac 2009:206). I argue that even if these clauses display a 
kind of earlier grammatical stage in humans, which indeed seems rather plausible, 
the computational mechanisms for language that humans use today compute these 
sentences as it does for all other sentences and these clauses thus belong to today’s 
complex grammar and not to any earlier, simpler grammar. From her argumentation, 
she further comes to the conclusion that Merge is not the only computational 
breakthrough in human language evolution and that Merge does not automatically 
mean recursion, which Root Small Clauses are, according to her, evidence for 
(Progovac 2009).  Of course it is questionable, why such clauses as Root Small 
Clauses cannot be embedded into each other, but I find it rather unlikely that this is 
due to something like a lack of recursion.  
Summarizing this, it can be said that clauses that cannot be embedded within each 
other are nevertheless recursive, using Merge and showing a hierarchical structure, 
in terms  of X’-Theory. Furthermore, the terms recursion and subordination may not 
be confused, since they describe different things. Subordination means the 
embedding of whole clauses within each other, while recursion does not focus on 
CPs, but also applies on other phrases. The connection between these two concepts 
is that though recursion does not necessarily yield subordination, subordination is 
achieved by recursive means. 
Since Merge, though showing properties of recursion, does not necessarily yield 
center-embedding, which is considered to be the only truly recursive device in natural 
language syntax, the possibility of having different, more or less recursive “types” of 
recursion in natural language has to be looked at more closely throughout this 
chapter. 
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2.4 RECURSION AND PHRASE STRUCTURES  
 
Phrase structures show, by means of their recursive rewrite rules, how recursion is 
applied on the structure of natural language. 
In phrase structure grammar, a constituent of the same type can stand on both sides 
of the rule, yielding infinity: 
 
VP⟶DP, V, VP 
 
However, the appearance of the same constituent on both sides isn’t even necessary 
to create infinity: 
 
NP⟶ Det, N, PP 
 
PP⟶ P, NP  
 
According to these rewrite rules, a phrase, generated by these rules, can go on 
forever, which can be illustrated by a sentence like this one: 
 
(7) The girl at the table in the garden in the town at the lake in the mountains 
at the boarder […] 
 
Tree representations provide a powerful and at least useful method of applying 
phrase structures to a visually hierarchical representation. While the terminal 
branches represent individual words, the non-terminal branches represent abstract 
grammatical constructs (Russo et al. 2011:139). These abstract constructs do not 
appear overtly in language, but are nevertheless thought to have a neuronal 
representation (Russo et al. 2011). 
According to Stabler (2011) the deeper a recursive structure is, the more it can reveal 
about it. Depth in this sense is measured in terms of steps it takes to get from the 
root of a structure tree to its leaf. This in turn means that the recursive definition of 
phrase structure building is used the time of steps it needs (Stabler 2011). 
For example the sentence “I like apples” has a depth of three since it needs three 
steps to get from the top to the bottom: 
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 (9)  
 
  I  
                     
       like 
    apples 
 
Concerning such a simple sentence, one might think to find no recursion according to 
the view that only center-embedded sentences, like shown in Chapter 1, are 
recursive, since they have a structurally complex hierarchical structure.  
According to Stabler (2011), the view of whether a sentence is recursive depends on 
the underlying structure it has. Consider the sentence “Drink, drive, go to jail”: Here, 
the sentence can be defined in a flat structure which has the depth of 1 or with a 
hierarchical structure which leads to a structure showing a depth of 3: 
 
(10)  a. 
           S  
    
 
 Drink  drive  go to jail      (Stabler 2011) 
            
 
       b. 
 
                     
       drink 
   drive  
 
    go to jail 
           (Stabler 2011) 
 
A grammar, which can produce structures of different depth, can produce 
complementizer clauses like “who I saw yesterday”. These CPs can produce 
Chapter 2  Recursion in linguistic theory 
30 
 
countable infinite recursion by embedding one CP into another one again and again 
(Stabler 2011). 
However, it had been suggested that every sentence in a natural language is 
represented in a structure with hierarchical dependencies, (Carnie 2011) such that a 
sentence that would look like (11a) in flat structure, is considered to rather be 
represented like in (11b). 
 
(11) Mary eats apples. 
a.    S  
     
 
 Mary  eats  apples. 
 
 
b. 
 
 
The tree structure of a simple sentence as in (11) shows that, according to X’-Theory, 
every sentence yields hierarchical dependencies in the form of nodes that dominate 
other nodes. A structure like that in turn is generated by recursive rules, and 
combined by Merge or another recursive combining process to gain meaning. This 
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suggests that it cannot be the case that only center-embedded sentences are 
recursive. 
Lobina (2011) argues that recursive structures and recursive rewrite rules in form of 
phrase structure rules have to be separated, since he argues that PSRs are linear, 
while a recursive (self-embedding) structure is hierarchical. However, this argument 
seems weak, because the output of PSR can, as we have already seen, also be 
arranged hierarchical. Furthermore, phrase structure rules themselves show a 
hierarchy, since one constituent contains another one (Ullman 2004), which yields 
hierarchy, even without any hierarchical tree structure. Thus, the question of the 
relation between phrase structure rules and overt hierarchy seems to be a matter of 
visual representation, only. 
 
 
2.5 RECURSION IN ITS ,WEAK’ AND ITS ,STRONG’ FORM 
 
The question that has come to one’s mind by now is, in how far it could be true that 
two different forms of recursion exist: Two forms in the sense that there is one form 
that produces embedded sentences which show “complex” structures and are 
sometimes hard to understand, and another kind that occurs in every sentence, even 
in simple root sentences like “She sleeps”, but which, like the complex embedded 
form, can theoretically produce sentences of infinite length: More than two forms, or 
rather types, of recursion could exist in the sense that the different methods of 
forming an “embedded” or “coordinated” sentence are differentiated even closer, like 
Karlsson’s differentiation in Chapter 1. To prevent confusing the two ideas of having 
different forms or types of recursion, the former is referred to as the different forms of 
recursion while the latter will be referred to as the different types of recursion. 
One theory about this is the one pointed out by Luuk et al. (2011) who claimed that 
there is a difference between recursive structures (self-embedding) and a recursive 
procedure. Furthermore he argues, as we have already seen in Chapter 1, that the 
embedding of phrase structures of the form NP(NP) does not yield recursion, since it 
is, like for a box in box, to use his words, no recursion is needed. This would mean 
that a merged phrase like “the book and the pencil”, which in turn can be merged with 
the merged phrase “are on the table” is not recursive and does not need a recursive 
device to be understood or produced. The thing here is, that it seems unlikely that 
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these phrases are not recursive since they are, like already pointed out in 2.3, big 
items that are divided into smaller ones in order to understand it, which is 
characteristic for recursion. 
Another explanation for these seemingly different forms of recursion is that they differ 
from each other in terms of degree. This means that they basically are the same form 
of recursion, but at a distinct level, such that the weaker form yields simpler 
structures and the strong form yields more complex structures (Russo et al. 2011), 
which contain center-embedding or tail-recursion.  
A further observation is that while embedding of all phrases, except CPs, into each 
other seems to yield the weak form of recursion, while embedding of CPs seems to 
produce the complex strong form. 
   
 (12)  a. weak form of recursion 
 [CP Mary likes [NP apples] and [NP oranges]] 
   
b. strong form of recursion 
[CP Mary likes [NP apples] [CP that are red]]     
 
 
2.6 WHAT IS RECURSIVE IN SYNTAX? 
 
According to the differences between types of recursion, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
four kinds of sentences in the sense of their recursiveness can be distinguished: 
(1) The “most recursive” sentences are such that contain what is referred to as “true 
recursion” or “specific recursion”. This is, according to Karlsson, center embedding. 
Center-embedding embeds multiple CPs within each other and is considered 
recursive, because the more CPs are embedded into each other the more complex 
the structure gets in terms of subordination. 
(2) Sentences that are recursive in a broader sense are sentences that contain tail-
recursion, but are not “truly recursive” according to Karlsson, and thus are what is 
called “general recursion”. 
(3) Sentences that contain embeddings of a constituent within a constituent of the 
same type (e.g. VP within a VP) do not hold for “true recursion”, since they do not 
fulfill the properties “involving embedded CPs” nor “being center-embedded”. Such a 
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kind of embedding is what Luuk et al. compared to a box within a box and thus being 
not recursive. This kind of constituent-embedding often is referred to as repetition. 
(4) The fourth kind contains all other simple sentences that do not involve any of the 
above properties. However, the sentence “Mary is eating an apple” does indeed 
involve embedding, since a TP is always embedded within a CP, a VP within a TP 
and so forth, but here, in contrast to sentences that belong to (3), this sentence does 
not involve embedding of the same type of phrase. 
Within the framework of recursion types, as presented in Chapter 1, sentences of the 
type presented in (3) are accepted as recursive in a general sense or at least as 
iteration or repetition, but simple sentences such as in (4) are not. Nevertheless, I will 
argue that also simple sentences as in (4) are recursive for reasons of how 
sentences are considered to be created within the framework of Generative Grammar 
and for reasons of formal properties of recursion, that were presented in Chapter 1. 
Furthermore, to repeat itself in a self-similar way does not necessarily mean that the 
same constituent has to be embedded to yield recursion, since the concept of 
repeating itself in a self-similar way means that the same function calls itself up again 
and again, which is due to a syntactic operation like Merge concerning the build-up of 
a syntactic structure clearly the case. 
One thing that could possibly have led to the controversy about, what recursion 
precisely is, is, that Chomsky, when talking about recursion, used the term self-
embedding. While Chomsky used this term as referring to phrase structure rules and 
the general property of language to embed constituents into each other, the term 
self-embedding is often used with respect to what is called center-embedding, 
namely embedding of CPs into each other, such that the embedding yields a 
structure like the following: 
 
(13) 
 
 
http://biolinguistics.eu/index.php/biolinguistics/article/view/170/214 
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Fitch defined the term recursion as a rule “which has the property of self-embedding, 
that is, in which the same phrase type appears on both sides of a phrase structure 
rewrite rule” (Fitch 2010:78), which does not exclude structures beyond center-
embedding as being recursive. 
One attempt to the controversy about the term recursion and the concept behind it 
could be the misunderstanding about what I called forms and types of recursion. I 
propose that there are two different ideas behind these two terms which are 
important two differentiate. Distinguishing the two forms of recursion seems to be 
useful in the sense that it helps not only to clarify why both simple sentences and 
complex sentences are recursive, but it also could be important for examining 
cognitive systems and brain structures that underlie the concept of recursive 
processing. It is also important to note that the distinction between the two forms of 
recursion is rather a distinction of degree and not of kind.  
It can be said that recursion is playing a major role in both the human ability to 
process natural language and in the generative theory of language as well. 
Recursion is considered an elegant possibility to generate strings of infinite length by 
finite means.  
Recursion also plays an important role within the Minimalist Program, since Merge 
and Move basically are both kinds of recursive operations. That these basic 
operations occur in every sentence of every natural language, suggests that 
recursion does not only occur in sentences where CPs are embedded into each 
other, but also in simple sentences with only one CP. 
The general assumption that sentences are represented in a hierarchical rather than 
in a flat structure, leads as well to the assumption that recursion and hierarchical 
dependencies are present in each sentence. 
Concerning the issue of the controversy about recursion, I come to the conclusion 
that, taking into account phrase structure rules (e.g. that a DP contains an NP),  the 
general property of language to be recursive leads to the possibility of embedding all 
kinds of phrases into each other, yielding countable infinity.  
The term ‘general property’ here, is not referring to the universal property of language 
being recursive in the sense that all natural languages show recursive properties, but 
rather to a property that is present in every sentence of natural language and not only 
in those kinds of sentences shown as examples for the different types of recursion, in 
Chapter 1. Every sentence shows a recursive structure since it is generated by 
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recursive rules, which make it possible for a speaker of a language to be able to 
create and understand new and never heard utterances. Sentences that show 
hierarchical dependencies in the sense of center-embedding, and are mostly 
considered to be the kind of sentences that are recursive, are as recursive as all 
other sentences in a particular natural language. The difference is that these 
sentences all show an embedding of CPs into CPs, instead of other phrases. 
Bickerton (2009) claims that Merge could be understood as recursive itself when 
adopting a looser definition of what recursion stands for (Bickerton 2009:6). But 
according to my argumentation a looser definition is not even needed, since merging 
in the simplest sentences also seems to require the properties from the concept of 
recursion as a complex sentence with CP-embedding does, except the higher 
demands on working-memory. 
A phrase structure grammar has recursive rules that make it possible to generate an 
infinite number of possible grammatical sentences in a language from a finite set of 
rules. These rules are recursive, because the rule for a particular constituent that is 
created by combining smaller constituents may contain itself, such that the outcome 
in turn evokes the same rule applying again. 
 
(3) VP⟶V, VP⟶V, VP⟶V, VP⟶V, VP⟶V, VP⟶V, … 
 
Combining single constituents to form a linguistic utterance, Merge is considered to 
be the operation that makes this process possible. According to this assumption, 
Merge is the operation that makes it possible for natural language to be infinitive, 
since it makes PSRs recursive. Merge per se is recursive, because when two 
constituents are combined and result in a bigger constituent, and this bigger 
constituent in turn can be combined with another constituent, which can be combined 
with another constituent and so forth, until a complete and grammatical sentences is 
created, recursive principles are applied. What stops the recursive process in 
language is the outcome of a complete sentence, which is analog to the ending 
condition of a recursive process in the formal sciences. This speaks for Merge being 
the recursive process in syntax of natural language, thus forming recursive 
structures. Since every sentence uses the combining mechanism, called Merge, 
every sentence must be recursive. Furthermore, phrase structure rules show also to 
be recursive in constituents that are not CPs. A CP within a CP is generated by the 
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same rules as a VP within a VP and thus a CP within a CP is in principal the same as 
a VP within a VP. One thing that distinguishes recursion in CPs is that whole clauses 
are embedded within each other, which makes it more evident for the speaker, 
yielding what is referred to as subordination. Furthermore, because of the long-
distance dependency, more working-memory load is caused which makes this kind of 
recursion more difficult to process, because working-memory space is limited. 
If it is the case that only embedded CPs yield recursion, these must show a structural 
or computational property that sentences without CP-embedding do not show. 
Furthermore, it has to be argumentatively shown that only center-embedded 
sentences are recursive. Thus, these in turn must have a property that neither CP-
embedded sentences without center-embedding, nor all other sentences have. This 
is examined in the following more closely. 
Corballis, in his book from 2011, “The recursive mind”, claimed that a sentence like 
“And it rained and it rained and it rained and it rained” is not recursive, because it 
only expresses the idea that it is raining a lot. His further argumentation is that this 
sentence is not recursive, because each addition of “and it rained” is not driven by 
the previous one, but simply added (Corballis 2011:10). Here, the first question is 
what it means in the case of a recursive sentence to be driven by a previous 
constituent or phrase.   
According to my explications, a sentence like the one pointed out by Corballis to be 
non-recursive, must also be recursive, because of the recursive properties of Merge 
and the fact that phrase structure rules are recursive and thus generate recursive 
structures. Furthermore, to gain meaning from such a sentence, it is necessary to 
understand the previous phrase as related to the following one, since otherwise the 
meaning of a sentence like “It rained and it rained and it rained…” would be that it 
simply rained and not that it rained a lot. Additionally, one could go that far to claim 
that without any recursive device, only the meaning of one word of the sentence “It 
rained” could be understood, since through a recursive operation like Merge, the 
different constituents in this sentence are combined with each other to gain the 
meaning of the whole sentence. Thus, it can be said that recursion is responsible for 
the generativity of natural language. 
Something near to my assumption that every sentence has to be recursive can also 
be found in a review article by Lobina (2011:166). 
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Perhaps the difference between a sentence like the one by Corballis and a sentence 
that is considered “truly” recursive can be explained by the distinction between the 
weak and the strong form of recursion.  
Luuk et al. (2010) in this case argued that a distinction has to be drawn between 
recursive structures and recursive processes. He takes as example that an NP within 
an NP can be compared with a box within a box and is thus not recursive. Thus, 
according to Luuk et al.’s argumentation, a CP within a CP must be something 
entirely different to be in contrast to an NP within an NP, recursive. 
Simple sentences like “Mary is eating an apple” have to be considered recursive, 
because such sentences are generated by the same recursive rules as complex 
sentences with multiple CP-embedding or even center-embedded sentences. 
Structurally, a CP within a CP is the same as a VP within a VP and an NP within an 
NP. Whether there is reason to believe that there are differences between CP-
embedding and embedding of other phrases has to be considered. 
A difference between CPs and other phrases is that a CP is a clause which 
distinguishes from other phrases in that it contains a main verb and other 
constituents that depend on the verb. Thus, a verb within a clause distributes its own 
theta roles. Furthermore, a clause presents the smallest unit that can be a 
proposition.  
The embedding of CPs perhaps yields a kind of ‘special’ form of recursion if you will. 
It is special in the sense that it involves several other factors that make them 
complicated to understand, but these factors do not have anything to do with  the 
‘recursiveness’ of a sentence per se. 
Since simple sentences also follow recursive rules, they are distinct from any 
sentence within a finite state language. Moreover, the argumentation, that only 
center-embedded sentences are recursive, because they project a structure that gets 
more and more complex, cannot hold, because a sentence that is not center-
embedded and not even CP-embedded, also yields a structure that gets more and 
more complex the longer the utterance grows. 
Lobina (2011) criticizes that self-embedding is used as a synonym for recursive 
structures (p.156), since even if there was a language that did not exhibit self-
embedding this language still would be infinite, as long as it contains conjunctions, 
such that the conclusion to draw from this fact has to be that these two “aspects” of 
recursion (structure and process) must be separated, because the former relates to a 
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structure that the syntax of a language manifests (or not), as he puts it, while the 
latter relates to the algorithm that generates all natural language structures. However, 
according to my argumentation, such a separation is not necessary, nor adequate, 
since every sentence seems to be recursive both in structure as well as in its 
generating process. Furthermore, these two “aspects” seem to depend on each 
other, since a recursive process should result in a recursive structure. 
 
 
2.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
As has been discussed throughout the chapter, Merge seems to be the core element 
of syntax that yields recursion. Furthermore the discussion has lead to the 
assumption that recursion is not only present in CP-embedded, or center embedded 
sentences, in particular, but also in simple sentences.  
One apparent property of CPs, that other phrases don’t have, is that CPs contain a 
main verb that makes it a clause that can stand as a proposition. Moreover, only CPs 
seem to provide the possibility to yield center-embedding. The fact that some 
researchers only acknowledge center-embedded structures as self-embedding and 
thus recursive, leads to the assumption that the term embedding does represent 
different concepts. The first concept expressed by this term is the one known from X’-
Theory, namely that a constituent is embedded into another constituent until a 
sentence is completed. The other form concerns a figure like shown in (13), which 
displays center-embedding, not in X’-Theory, but in a kind of sequence structures of 
sentences.  
It often is argued that “simple sentences”, in contrast to complex sentences, are 
generated by an iterative process, while complex sentences are generated by a 
recursive process. This assumption, as I argue, seems to be due to the fact that 
iteration needs less working-memory load, since less information has to be 
maintained during the process (Lobina 2011). Since “simple sentences” need less 
working-memory than complex ones, it is assumed that the less demanding 
sentences are generated by another device than the more demanding ones. The 
failure here lies in the definition of what actually is demanding: Although “simple 
sentences” in fact need less maintenance of linguistic material within a memory 
device, this doesn’t have to mean that they are that simple that a simpler method of 
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processing is needed. In fact, also simple sentences are considered rather complex 
in its representations. 
Furthermore, I find the terms simple and complex sentences quite problematic since 
there are different ideas available to be meant by these: In syntax, the term complex 
sentence is often used to describe a sentence that needs some additional syntactic 
operations, like Movement, to be processed in order to understand it (e.g. Kaan 
2002), while simple sentences don’t need these additional operations. On the other 
hand, in morphology, the term simple rather refers to a constituent that cannot be 
divided further, while complex refers to a constituent that consists of two or more 
simple (undividable) constituents (e.g. Ullman 2004). Thus, it is not always clear, 
particularly when a finite state grammar comes into consideration, what is referred to 
by the term simple here. Furthermore, the term complex in syntax refers both to 
sentences that yield subordination of clauses (e.g. Friederici 2011) as well as it refers 
to such sentences that involve movement or non-canonical word-order (e.g. Kaan 
2002). 
But nevertheless, Merge is clearly recursive and does create recursive structures, 
such that simple sentences are recursive and yield embedding in the form of X’-
Theory. But it also seems plausible that both center-embedded CPs, as well as CPs, 
that are not center-embedded, can be distinguished from other phrases that are 
embedded: Phrases other than CPs in turn can be differentiated in phrases that 
embed the same kind of phrase and phrases that embed another kind of phrase, for 
example an VP that contains another VP compared to a VP that contains an NP. All 
these forms of embedding show different “graduations” of recursion, which of both 
forms of CP-embedding belong to the strong form of recursion and the two other 
forms belong to the weak form of recursion, forming sub-kinds of weak and strong 
recursion. Furthermore, it appears to be the case that only CPs show the property of 
being able to yield center-embedding. But, nonetheless, all phrases as well as CPs 
are generated by the same rules and mechanisms, and thus both yield recursion. 
Both the rules of phrase structure grammar and the operator Merge show that 
recursion is a general property of syntax in natural language and thus not only 
present in center-embedded sentences for the following reasons: Phrase structure 
grammar has recursive rewrite rules, where the same constituent stands on both 
sides, and in terms of Merge, syntax in natural language is recursive, for the reason 
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that a big problem (the whole sentence) is divided into smaller problems (phrases 
and even smaller constituents), in order to gain meaning.  
The next chapter concerns the brain areas that are considered to be involved in 
recursive processing, both within and without the linguistic domain. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
THE BRAIN AND RECURSION:  
NEURONAL STRUCTURES OF RECURSIVE 
PROCESSING 
 
 
Before looking at brain processes and brain areas that are considered to support the 
processing of recursive structures in particular, we will take a look at syntactic 
processing in general. 
 
 
3.1 SYNTACTIC PROCESSING IN GENERAL 
 
Syntactic processing in the brain can be examined by different methods. Most 
commonly, two methods are chosen. The first one is EEG, which can state 
information about the temporal relations in syntactic processing, while, by using the 
second method, which is fMRI, researchers can examine the spatial relations of 
syntactic processing by hemodynamic investigations. 
Brain responses differ with respect to whether they are related to semantic or 
syntactic processing. Regarding syntactic processing, two different responses can be 
observed. These two responses seem to be related to two different types of syntactic 
processing (e.g., Kaan et al. 2009; Friederici 2009). 
Regarding temporal relations, the first stage of processing takes place very early, 
namely 150ms after onset. The polarity of this response is negative and can be 
approximately localized at the anterior portion of the left hemisphere. Because of its 
early onset, its localization and polarity, this brain response to early syntactic 
processing is called ELAN (early left anterior negativity). It is mostly associated with 
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an early build-up of local phrase structure, relying on lexical information. During this 
stage of processing, the phrase structure is checked and compared to the phrase 
structure rules of the particular language (Friederici 2009:242). 
A violation to phrase structure processing would be the sentence The man has eaten 
the laugh because there isn’t any phrase structure rule in English, which says: 
 
(1) * DP⟶D,V 
 
At 600ms after onset, another brain response associated with syntactic processing 
can be observed. The polarity of this activity is positive and it is observed to take 
place at the centro-parietal portion of the left hemisphere. This late positivity can be 
elicited by syntactic anomalies, including syntactic violations and ambiguities and by 
syntactically complex sentences as well (Friederici 2009:243). Mostly, this 
component of linguistic processing is taken to be involved in relating the different 
constituents of a sentence with each other, in integrating syntactic and semantic 
information and in revising syntactic information, if necessary, as well (Friederici 
2009:243). 
Another crucial factor in interpreting ERPs concerning syntactic processing, is the 
theoretic model on which the interpretation is based. Generally, two different models 
play a role here. The first one is a model which is often called syntax-first model, 
because it assumes that syntax is processed independently from semantic 
information and comes first in sentence processing. This model is compatible with 
assumptions from Generative Grammar (Sprouse et al. 2012). The other model is 
called Unification Model and does not grant a special status to syntactic processing 
(Hagoort 2009). 
According to the generative theory of syntax, syntactic information is processed via 
structure building operations, which are based on complex syntactic rules underlying 
a mental model of syntactic processing. During sentence processing the structures 
are combined with each other, using these syntactic rules (Sprouse et al. 2012). This 
model is well suited for the ERPs observed in syntactic processing. ELAN is held to 
reflect the first stage of processing where the local phrase structure is built up by 
lexical information. Friederici et al. (2004) argues that there are at least three factors 
which suggest this: First, ELAN takes place very early at a time where only parts of 
the syntactic information can be processed and second, the ELAN is elicited by local 
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phrase structure violation more likely than by complex syntactic hierarchy processing 
and third, it is not affected by any task-level factor, which suggest that it is a rather 
automatic process (Friederici et al. 2004). The late P600 component reflects, in the 
context of Generative Grammar, the integration of semantic information, which has 
been processed at 400ms after onset, with syntactic information, which explains why 
P600 can be elicited by both syntactic violations and Garden-Path sentences 
(Sprouse et al. 2012). 
Besides the temporal order of the related ERPs, which suggest this order of events, 
Friederici and colleagues found a way to test the syntax-first hypothesis directly. This 
was done by a sentence which violates phrase structure rules and semantic 
expectations at the same time (Friederici et al. 2004). 
 
(2) Das Buch wurde trotz verpflanzt von einem Verleger, den wenige empfahlen. 
     The  book was   despite replanted      by      a      publisher    who    few  recommended. 
  
The critical word verpflanzt violates both syntactic phrase structure and semantic 
expectations. According to Syntax-First theory, an ELAN effect and a P600 effect but 
no N400 effect is expected, because successful integration of the syntactic 
information should be required for semantic processing to emerge (Sprouse et al. 
2012, Friederici et al. 2004). If the N400 response was also visible during processing 
such a sentence, this would mean that a successful build-up of syntactic information 
is not needed for semantic information being processed, which would contradict the 
syntax-first theory. Friederici and colleagues observed that during this experiment 
both ELAN and P600 were observable, but N400 was not (Friederici et al. 2004). This 
suggests that the assumption about a theory where syntax is processed before 
semantic information is plausible. 
However, observations against this view are from brain lesion studies where patients 
with Broca’s aphasia were able to understand sentences like The boy ate the cake 
because syntactic processing was not needed due to canonical word order. The fact 
that patients who suffer from problems with syntactic processing can understand this 
kind of sentences means that semantic processing should also be possible without a 
successful build-up of syntactic information. An example of non-canonical word order 
where processing of the syntactic structure is not needed either, and semantics alone 
can serve the understanding is the following example:  
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 (3) Den Kuchen hat der Junge gegessen. 
         The  cake-Acc has the  boy-Nom   eaten. 
 
This sentence is thought to be understood without syntactic structure building, since it 
is unlikely that the cake ate the boy. 
The Unification Model of parsing predicts that syntactic processing has no special 
role in sentence processing. Under the Unification Framework, words are stored in 
the lexicon as part of a structural frame that contains the syntactic environment for 
the particular word (Sprouse et al. 2012). Sentence processing then takes place as a 
single step on the syntactic, semantic and phonological level simultaneously. 
Assuming this architecture of processing, the major ERP components have to be 
interpreted differently from the generative view. Under this view, the different brain 
responses do not show different stages of sentence processing but rather different 
aspects of it. The ELAN effect then, is a brain response that occurs when there is an 
impossible unification due to an absent ability of connecting two nodes that can be 
combined between two structural frames. The LAN which also plays a role in this 
framework is elicited by a morpho-syntactic mismatch, after two syntactic frames 
have been combined. In the end, the P600 component, under this view, occurs if a 
sentence is difficult in being unified, which can explain why this component also 
occurs when a sentence is neither structurally ambiguous nor syntactically complex 
(Sprouse et al. 2012). 
One issue with respect to violation paradigms in ERPs for syntactic processing is, 
that it is not possible to tell whether the activation pattern is due to syntactic 
processing or more likely to error detection (Kaan 2009). 
Although ERPs show that there must be different mechanisms within the brain, which 
are responsible for language processing and syntax processing in particular, they do 
not tell us whether these brain responses are truly due to language processing or 
due to more general mechanisms like error detection or working memory nor are they 
informative about the possibility of these effects being not uniquely responsible for 
syntactic processing (Kaan 2009:123). Kaan therefore concluded that “to determine 
the relation between syntax and the brain, it may be more informative to examine to 
what extend different types of syntactic violations or syntactic processes elicit 
different types of brain responses. If indeed different brain responses are obtained for 
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different syntactic phenomena, we can assume at least a coarse relation between 
syntactic theory and brain processes” (Kaan 2009:123). 
Relating different types of syntactic processing with brain responses is also of 
interest for the study of how recursive processes are related to the brain. 
To examine this idea, Kaan (2009) discussed the relation between the brain and 
syntax by using three different syntactic operations among others: Local 
dependencies, anaphora and wh-movement. 
 
 
3.1.1 Local dependencies 
 
Syntactic local dependencies are characterized by being close to each other in 
hierarchical tree structure. An example taken from Kaan (2009) to illustrate this 
dependency is the following sentence: 
 
 (3) We admired John’s sketch of the landscape/ *John’s of the landscape. 
 
The sentence marked with the asterisk represents a violation to phrase structure 
rules in English since the rule N⟶P doesn’t exist. This kind of violation elicits two 
different ERP components, the ELAN/LAN component and the P600 component, 
which suggests that this type of violation is perceived very quickly, and that it is 
involved in two different processes, which are reflected by these two ERPs. (Kaan 
2009:124) Another type of local dependency is agreement: 
 
(4) The boy throws/*throw the ball. 
 
It is possible to assume that agreement violations differ from phrase-structure 
violations insofar that agreement violations occur at a point, when a phrase-structure 
is already established. ERP responses are though very similar as they contain a LAN 
component and a P600 component. That in this condition a LAN and not an ELAN 
occurs could cohere with the assumption that agreement is processed after phrase-
structure building (Kaan 2009:124). 
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3.1.2 Non-local dependencies 
 
The next condition Kaan has investigated is anaphoras, which involve non-local 
dependencies. Regardless of whether sentences contained a violation of Binding 
Principle 1 or 2, the same ERP component had been observed, namely the ELAN 
and P600 component, which had also been observed during the other syntactic 
violations described above (Kaan 2009:126). 
 
Since all these yet examined syntactic structures contained a violation paradigm to 
be visible, observing wh-movement provides a helpful syntactic structure for EEG 
studies, because it doesn’t need to contain a violation to elicit an ERP. Therefore, this 
kind of syntactic operation is well suited to examine syntactic processing, since meta-
linguistic repair processes can be excluded to disturb the outcome (Kaan 2009:127).  
 
(5) Emily wondered who the performer had imitated __ for the audience’s 
amusement. 
 
Compare to the sentence without wh-phrase: 
 
(6) Emily wondered whether the performer imitated a pop star for the 
audience’s amusement. 
 
The wh-phrase is the object of imitated although it doesn’t appear in the expected 
position, which means that it has been moved to the position where it appears at 
spell-out. When processing this sentence, various processes occur. One of those 
processes is detecting that after the who in this sentence the following the violates 
phrase structure rules of English. This process is followed by the storage of the wh-
phrase which cannot be integrated in the syntactic structure at this moment in 
working-memory, which is associated with a LAN response. The occurrence of this 
ERP component can be seen as a temporary violation, since it elicits a brain 
response which is normally achieved by phrase structure violation except that it 
occurs not as early as ELAN, which is perhaps due to the occurrence of a wh-
element, which is in turn associated with syntactically more complex sentences. Next, 
the wh-phrase or some placeholder must be kept in working-memory until it can be 
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integrated in the syntactic structure and assign a theta-role, which had been 
observed to release a slow negative wave which is associated with working-memory 
demands. This negative wave chronologically starts to occur at the point, when it 
becomes clear that the wh-phrase cannot be integrated at this point. Finally, the wh-
phrase has to be retrieved from working-memory, so that it can be inserted at the 
matching spot of the sentence where it can be integrated in syntactic and thematic 
structure. This operation is associated with the P600 brain response. Additionally, a 
LAN component has been reported to follow the gap, where the wh-phrase has been 
integrated (Kaan 2009:127). 
Given this, it can be summarized for non-local dependencies that three ERP effects 
can be observed: First, a LAN for local syntactic violation, second, a P600 for general 
syntactic difficulty and third, a slow negative wave for maintenance in working-
memory (Kaan 2009:127). 
It seems that there are different brain responses with respect to different syntactic 
operations. Though not every syntactic operation has a unique brain response, three 
different responses can be observed for more general classifications of syntactic 
processing: 
First, there is the ELAN/LAN component which is associated with local dependencies 
like build-up of phrase-structure, second, there is the P600 response, which is 
associated with non-local dependencies and reconstruction of canonical word order, 
and third, a negative wave could be observed in sentences involving movement. 
 
 
3.2 LOCATING SYNTACTIC PROCESSING IN THE HUMAN BRAIN 
 
Regarding syntactic processing, many researchers think of it as individual module 
which works independently from general cognition and other modules like memory, 
for instance. They propose an independent syntactic processing mechanism which is 
insensitive to other cognitive functions. Assuming this, a single brain area which 
supports syntactic mechanisms only would be necessary (Kaan et al. 2002:350). But 
recent studies reveal information about syntactic processing taking place in not only 
one area, but in a network with other brain areas. 
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3.2.1 Neuronal structures underlying syntactic processing 
 
Neuroimaging studies for this purpose can be conducted with different conditions with 
respect to the language material. Kaan et al. (2002) conducted neuroimaging studies 
with complex versus simple sentences, sentences versus word lists, Jabberwocky 
(e.g. The mumphy folofel fonged the apole trecori) and syntactic prose and with 
syntactic violations to specify the brain areas involved in syntactic processing. By 
using sentences versus word lists they additionally aimed to show whether the 
activated brain areas during sentence processing were also active during single word 
processing which would suggest that they are not exclusively specialized for syntactic 
processing (Kaan et al. 2002). 
In the simple versus complex sentence condition they used sentences like The 
reporter who attacked the senator admitted the error as simple sentences and 
sentences like The reporter who the senator attacked admitted the error as complex 
sentence because the latter sentence involves additional syntactic operations to be 
processed to reconstruct canonical word order. Areas which are additionally activated 
in the complex condition are assumed to be involved in higher syntactic processing. 
The participants had to decide whether a simple and a complex sentence had the 
same meaning, because to perform this task, it was assumed that the participants 
had to reconstruct the canonical word order, which should lead to the additional 
syntactic activation, which could show where complex syntactic processing takes 
place.  
 
Brodmann areas: 
 
Left hemisphere      Right hemisphere  
      
  http://www.class.uidaho.edu/psyc372/lessons/lesson03/lesson3_brodmann_area.htm 
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By performing this task, in most studies an enhanced activation of Broca’s area (left 
BA 44/45) can be observed. Sometimes this activation extends to BA 47, 6 and 9. 
Occasionally, additional activation is found in the left or bilateral superior and middle 
temporal gyri which belong to BA 21/22, in the left angular and supramarginal gyri 
which belong to BA 39/40 and in the cingulated gyrus, which belongs to BA 
23,23,31,32. While processing both simple and complex sentences, activation could 
be observed in a wide range of brain areas. Left BA 44 and 45, which are assumed 
to be highly involved in complex syntactic processing (Friederici 2009) showed an 
enhanced activation during complex sentence processing. Kaan et al. argue that this 
activation has not necessarily to be involved only in a syntactic process but could 
also have to do something with memory load, because complex syntactic processing 
does not only differ from simple syntactic processing in terms of syntactically more 
complex structures but also in terms of activated working memory due to longer 
dependencies and reconstructing processes where information has to be retained 
(Kaan et al. 2002). The strongest support for this view comes from the finding that 
Broca’s area also shows an enhanced activation when sentences with canonical 
word order that contain low frequency words are processed. This suggests that 
Broca’s area is not alone specialized for syntactic processing, which does not mean 
that it hasn’t any role in processing syntactic dependencies (Kaan et al. 2002). 
Using neuroimaging and hemodynamic techniques, spatial distributions of local and 
nonlocal syntactic processing can be investigated by either comparing a sentence 
containing a syntactic violation to its grammatical counterpart or by comparing 
syntactic simple sentences to a list of unrelated words (Kaan et al. 2002). 
Regarding local dependencies, activation differences can be found in the left, and 
sometimes additionally in the right hemisphere in temporal regions, in particular, the 
anterior temporal areas (Kaan 2009:125). It could be observed that Broca’s area, 
which includes the left inferior frontal gyrus shows more activation for local 
dependencies like phrase-structure building and agreement, when a violation 
paradigm is built-in into the target sentence, or when the linear distance between the 
locally dependent elements increases which points out to the involvement of Broca’s 
area in working-memory tasks. Likewise, parietal and subcortical areas also tended 
to be involved in local syntactic processing. Strongly overlapping activation pattern 
have been confirmed for phrase-structure processing and the processing of 
agreement with a higher activation of the caudate nucleus and the insula in phrase-
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structure violations (Kaan 2009:125). Like it is assumed for general syntactic 
processing, also processing local dependencies involves not only one particular area, 
but rather a network consisting of spatial distributed brain areas (Kaan 2009). One 
issue about studying the processing of local dependencies is that it is likely to not 
provide much insight into how syntactic processing is processed in terms of 
computation, because local dependencies, notably if they are frequently used ones, 
are stored and not individually computed. That is why it is assumed to get more 
insight in the spatial distribution of syntactic computing by looking at non-local 
dependencies (Kaan 2009:125). 
Examining non-local syntactic processing suggests that Broca’s area is involved in 
retrieving not yet integrated structures from working-memory which also confirms its 
involvement in syntactic processing, and temporal brain areas of the left hemisphere 
of being involved in the processing of non-canonical word order and syntactic 
integration (Kaan 2009:128). 
According to Kaan (2009), Makuuchi et al. (2009) showed that the activation of 
Broca’s area and adjacent areas differs with respect to the kind of relations which 
have to be stored in working memory: The inferior part of the pars opercularis, which 
is a part of Broca’s area, seems to be more active the more wh-relations are needed 
to be stored during sentence processing. The left inferior frontal sulcus, which is 
more anterior and superior to Broca’s area, is more active when more words 
intervened between the subject and the clause’s finite verb (Kaan 2009:129). 
These two areas are connected with different parts of the superior temporal gyrus 
and could possibly be involved different aspects of syntactic processing.  
When comparing sentences with syntactically unrelated words, Broca’s area shows 
to be not significantly activated during such a task. This suggests that Broca’s area is 
not necessarily involved in any kind of syntactic processing but only when processing 
load increases (Kaan et al. 2002:353). 
Increased activation during processing sentences versus word lists was found in the 
anterior parts of the temporal lobe (BA 38), which was often observed bilaterally, 
another activation pattern is found in the superior and middle temporal gyri, which 
include BA 22 and 21. Working with Jabberwocky reveals an activation pattern in the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (BA22, 41/42) and some activation was found in 
the anterior superior temporal sulcus (BA 38,22). Thus, the medial part of Broca’s 
area was activated comparing Jabberwocky with normal sentences. Jabberwocky is 
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well suited for observing brain structures involved in syntactic processing, because it 
contains syntactic structures but no meaning which should mostly activate only parts 
of the brain which are involved in syntactic processing. The investigation by Kaan et 
al. suggest that Broca’s area is not necessarily involved in syntactic processing, but 
comes to play a role when memory load increases. Thus, it is not the only brain area 
activated during syntactic processing. Activated brain areas include the BA 38 and 
the anterior parts of BA 21/22, which include Wernicke’s area (Birbaumer et al. 
2010). 
The fact that parts of Broca’s area are activated when working-memory load 
increases could also be traced back to the possibility that Broca’s area is well suited 
for processing syntactic complex structures because of the close relation to working 
memory (see Fedor et al. 2009:301). 
Friederici and her colleagues examined which kinds of violations lead to which kind of 
brain responses. They found that syntactic phrase structure violations do not seem to 
activate Broca’s area (Friederici 2009:244). Broca’s area seems to come into play 
when syntactically complex sentences like object-first constructions or wh-questions 
are processed. Here also, more complex sentences are associated with higher 
working-memory demands and object-first constructions need to be reconstructed, 
since they contain a non-canonical word order. 
Friederici et al. also conclude from their fMRI studies that Broca’s area is recruited for 
more complex syntactic structures while local phrase-structures tend to be processed 
by another brain region, namely the frontal operculum (Friederici 2009:245). These 
two brain regions can be functionally segregated as we will see when examining the 
brain structures underlying recursive and complex-hierarchy- processing. 
Besides a functional segregation, Broca’s area can also be segregated structurally. 
The part of the brain classically known as Broca’s area consists of BA 44 and BA 45. 
Concerning their structure and their developmental features, one has to question 
whether it is justifiable to subsume these two areas under the heading Broca’s area. 
Cytoarchitectonically, these two areas differ from each other, since BA 45 has a 
granular layer IV, which means that BA 45 is granular, whereas in BA 44 layer IV is 
poorly developed, which means that it is dysgranular (Fitch 2011). BA 47, which is 
also adjacent to BA 45, on the contrary, shows a granular cortex, as well, since it is 
part of the heteromodal component of the frontal lobe (Hagoort 2009:281). 
Furthermore, BA 44 and 45 show clearly different patterns during postnatal 
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development and also a difference in their patterns of lateral asymmetry. For BA 44, 
a significant left-over-right asymmetry could be shown whereas this is not the case 
for BA 45. However, BA 44 and BA 45 are, concerning cytoarchitectonic features, 
more similar to each other than BA 44 and BA 6 or BA 45 and BA 6, for instance 
(Hagoort 2009:282). 
Studies concerning the receptor architecture indicate necessary divisions between 
BA 44 and BA 45 as well. A difference in receptor density can be observed 
concerning 5HT2 receptors for serotonin within BA 44. It can be said that there exist 
two different views of whether and how much these cytoarchitectonical features are 
relevant. The classical view assumes that these architectonic differences lead to 
functional differences (Hagoort 2009:283). According to this view the subsuming of 
these architectonically different areas can indeed be questioned. Another recent view 
comes from a computational perspective and assumes that cytoarchitectonically 
different brain areas can be very similar. According to this view, brain areas which 
support the same function are not necessarily so much determined by the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of brain tissue, but rather by the way in which its 
functional characteristics are shaped through input (Hagoort 2009:284). 
Furthermore, Hagoort concludes that from a computational perspective one cannot 
longer speak of Broca’s area from a classical point of view but has to extend the 
complex of syntax involved brain areas, which he calls Broca complex. Besides BA 
44 and BA 45, Broca’s complex involves at least BA 47 and the ventral part of BA 6 
in the frontal language network. These cytoarchitectonically different areas play a 
crucial role in language processing. The prefrontal cortex seems to be well suited 
perform post-lexical processing (Hagoort 2009). 
By examining temporal and spatial properties of syntactic processing it can be 
assumed that the brain is not capable of all differences that syntacticians make, but 
some general aspects can indeed be distinguished and used to examine syntactic 
operation processing. The distinction between general syntactic aspects suggests 
that some of these aspects are hardwired to the brain (Kaan 2009:129). 
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3.2.2 Other functions of “syntactic” brain areas 
 
Since the temporal and local structure of brain responses with respect to syntax is 
not unique to this domain, syntax is neither uniquely processed by the respective 
brain areas and temporal brain responses, it is interesting to mention processes with 
which syntactic operations share both brain areas and brain potentials. 
Regarding ERPs, it has been observed that there are also involved in difficulties 
related to discourse processing, violations of musical structure, sequencing and 
mathematical rules. This suggests that this brain response is responsible for 
structural integration, in general, or for solving conflicts during processing (Kaan 
2009). 
Violations of musical chord sequences elicit LAN, which does nonlinguistic symbol 
manipulation as well (Kaan 2009). 
The slow negative component which can be found in processing sentences 
containing wh-phrases can also be observed in tasks which involve retention of 
letters, colors, and locations with a varying distribution over the scalp with respect to 
the materials that have to be maintained (Kaan 2009:130). 
Concerning spatial distribution, brain areas that are active during syntactic 
processing are not unique to it. Broca’s area, for example, is involved in some non-
syntactic and even non-linguistic functions like working-memory, inhibition, and 
resolving conflicts among representations (Kaan 2009). The anterior temporal lobe is, 
besides syntactic processing also involved in semantic tasks and discourse 
processing, whereas parietal areas, which are in involved in syntactic processing 
seem to be involved in attention, reading, working-memory and semantics, too. 
Syntactically active areas like the subcortical region mentioned above are also active 
in a variety of other tasks (Kaan 2009).  
Furthermore, in an experimental study o find out about brain regions that process 
prosody, Mayer et al. (2002) found out that linguistic prosody is processed in the 
frontal operculum of the left hemisphere, where, according to Friederici et al., simple 
sentences are processed syntactically. 
After having looked at the brain processes considered responsible for syntax in 
general, we can now go on to brain areas and processes that are considered to be 
involved in processing recursive structures. In this part of the chapter the aim is to 
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show the distribution of recursive processes in the brain. For this purpose, we will 
look at both linguistic and non-linguistic recursion. 
  
 
3.3 RECURSIVE STRUCTURE PROCESSING 
 
For the purpose of determining to what extend recursion can be looked at as the 
crucial part of human language, and human syntax in particular, one can observe 
brain structures underlying processing recursion in its different domains. The whole 
section mostly refers to Friederici et al., since topic of recursive processing and its 
relation to the brain, as far as I am aware, has only been explicitly observed by her 
and her colleagues so far. 
Friederici et al. (2011)  investigated brain structures involved in recursive processing 
by looking at recursive artificial grammar processing, natural language processing 
with respect to processing CP-embedded structures and processing complex 
hierarchy in two non-language domains, namely visuo-spatial processing of recursive 
structures and embedded mathematical formulae. 
The linguistic structures, Friederici et al. worked with, were recursive in the respect 
that they involved center-embedded CPs. According to Friederici, the most important 
property, which qualifies a grammar for recursive structure processing, is self-
embedding (Friederici et al. 2011:88). 
In their experiments, Friederici et al. used a simple grammar, which they referred to 
as finite state grammar, for simple syntactic processing of the type (AB)n, while on 
the one hand and on the other hand a phrase structure grammar of the type AnBn 
was used to mimic complex syntactic hierarchy. These types of grammar were not 
only used in the artificial grammar processing task, but also used to mimic this kind of 
processing in testing the other domains of recursion. The rules for the recursive 
structure AnBn is derived from these two rewriting rules: 
 
 (1)  a. S⟶AB 
   b. S⟶ ASB 
 
 
AnBn then is derived for example like this: 
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(2) S⟶ ASB⟶ AASBB⟶An—1SBn—1⟶ AnBn 
 
 
3.3.1 Linguistic structures  
 
To examine the underlying brain structures of recursive structure processing, 
Friederici et al. conducted an experiment in which participants had to learn an 
artificial grammar containing recursion and an artificial grammar which, according to 
them, did not. They took a grammar which Gentner and colleagues (2006) used in an 
experiment to observe syntactic pattern learning in songbirds. Friederici et al. note 
that a disagreement or rather a accuracy respecting the term recursion had appeared 
concerning the AnBn grammar. They noted that this grammar in some situations had 
been taken as recursive and in some not (Friederici et al. 2011).  
The experiment was conducted using two different artificial grammars, namely the 
simple and the complex one, which has been described above.  
 
Assuming category A has the lexical items ge bi di and B tu po ko it would look like 
the following (Friederici et al. 2011): 
 
(9) “Phrase structure grammar”: [be[bi[di bu]to]ko] 
(10) “Finite state grammar”: [be ko] [bi to] [be ko] 
   
Furthermore, as already noted, Friederici notes, that the underlying structure of an 
AnBn grammar is responsible for it to be recursive or not. Insofar recursive structure is 
defined by its property of self-embedding, a grammar of the type AnBn would be 
sufficient (Friederici et al. 2011). A simply embedded grammar like [A[A[A[A B]B]B]B] 
goes, according to them, truly beyond a finite state grammar, but is not recursive, 
whereas an artificial grammar like [A1[A2[A3 B3]B2]B1] does fulfill the required 
properties of a recursive grammar, because it can’t be processed by a counting 
mechanism like the former one that does not show any indices (Friederici et al. 2011, 
Corballis 2007). 
In their experiment, participants were to learn the simple or the complex grammar. 
Brain activities were examined using correct and incorrect sentences according to the 
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two grammars in which the participant had to decide whether the heard sentences 
were grammatical or not. To avoid effects of learning by heart, sentences were used 
which did not appear during the learning session. 
The two different grammars showed different activation patterns (Friederici et al. 
2010:89). For the Finite State Grammar, syntactic violations lead to an increased 
activation of the frontal operculum (fOP), while processing the complex grammar, 
Broca’s area was recruited stronger compared with the simple grammar (Friederici et 
al. 2011:89). Though, it is not clear, as mentioned above, whether the participants did 
reconstruct a hierarchical embedded structure or whether they used a simple 
counting strategy with which the goal to process this kind of grammar can also be 
achieved. But because of the knowledge that Broca’s area is actually involved in 
complex grammar processing, it has been assumed that the participants did build up 
a hierarchical structure to process this grammar, since a strong involvement of 
Broca’s area could be observed. But to be sure about this, Friederici et al. conducted 
an additional experiment, because as we have seen before, activation of Broca’s 
area can also be due to working-memory load, since it has been shown that Broca’s 
area is also involved in task which are not linguistic ones but require working-
memory. The idea that stronger activation of Broca’s area is due to working-memory 
demands is indeed reasonable because it goes with the assumption that the 
structure, that is referred to as finite state by Friederici et al. (2011), needs less 
working-memory involvement. 
To test their assumption about the complex grammar, Friederici et al. designed 
another experiment with another complex PSG, but this time they built the sequences 
such that hierarchical processing for the AnBn structures was induced, because each 
subcategory had more than one member, to avoid item based learning. Instead of 
[A[A[A B]B]B], the new structure looked like that [A1[A2[A3 B3]B2]B1]. The critical 
relation between these depending elements was realized by distinctive phonological 
parameters, namely voiced – unvoiced counterparts. According to this pattern, a 
grammar would look like that:  
 
(11)  [be[gi[de to]ku]pu] 
(12)  [be pu][gi ku][de to] 
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Examining the underlying brain structures involved in processing the PSG compared 
with processing FSG showed that processing the more complex PSG strongly 
involved BA 44, which is part of Broca’s area (Friederici et al. 2011:91). According to 
Friederici et al. (2011), these results supported the data obtained from the first 
experiment and attested the assumption that the processing of the PSG was 
processed by reconstructing hierarchy rather than by counting and additionally 
keeping track of n. 
To differentiate between working-memory load and syntactic processing, which is, as 
noted above, both located in Broca’s area and seems to interact there, Friederici et 
al. conducted another experiment. Here they did not work with artificial grammars but 
with natural language. 
They used German, since it allows multiple embeddings, like the artificial grammar 
used in the previous experiment (Friederici et al. 2011:91).  
For this purpose, Friederici et al. used subject-verb dependencies of the type 
[S1[S2[S3 V3]V2]V1]: 
 
 (13) The dog the cat the rat bit chased escaped. 
 
To test the implication of working-memory load and syntactic processing 
independently from each other, Friederici et al. created a 2x2 factorial design with the 
factor syntactic hierarchy, which manifests itself in the number of embeddings and 
the factor verbal working-memory which manifests itself in the distance of the 
dependent elements, such that they got four conditions: Hierarchy & long distance, 
hierarchy & short distance, linear & long distance, linear & short distance. (Friederici 
et al. 2011) Linear in this sense, means that there exists only one dependency 
between two items, while hierarchical means more than one dependency that yields 
center-embedding. 
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(14a) linear & long distance    (15a)  hierarchical & long distance  
            
     
 
 
(16a)  linear & short distance   (17a)  hierarchical & short distance 
     
          (Friederici 2011) 
 
These structures correspond to the following sentences: 
 
(14b) hierarchy & long distance: 
…, dass [Maria, [die Hans,[der gut aussah], liebte], Johan geküsst hatte. 
     That     Maria      who  Hans    who  good  looked         loved      Johan  kissed        had 
 
(15b) hierarchy & short distance: 
…, dass [Maria,[die weinte], Johann geküsst hatte], und zwar gestern Abend. 
 That    Maria    who  cried   Johann     kissed     had     namely      yesterday  evening          
 
(16b) linear & long distance: 
…, dass [Achim den großen Mann gestern am späten Abend gesehen hatte.]        
  Achim  the-Acc tall  man   yesterday  at    late   evening   seen      had 
 
(17b) linear & short dsitance: 
…, dass [Achim den großen Mann gesehen hatte und zwar gestern Abend.] 
         That Achim      the-Acc tall    man    seen       had     namely          yesterday evening 
 
          Friederici et al. 2011 
 
Processing of these sentences showed that syntactic hierarchy, here defined by the 
number of embeddings, activated Broca’s area in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and 
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additionally the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the superior temporal sulci 
(STS). The additional activation of STG and STS indicates that these regions are 
also part of the language network. Examining Broca’s area revealed that the effect of 
processing linguistic hierarchy is most active in BA 44. In contrast, working-memory 
load, here defined as distance between two related elements, activated the left 
inferior frontal sulcus, which is located dorsally to Broca’s area. Furthermore, a 
functional connectivity analysis showed that these two indentified areas strongly 
interact during processing multiple embedded sentences (Friederici et al. 2011:93). 
By this experiment, processing of syntax and working-memory could be segregated 
into to subareas, which involve BA 44 for syntactic complex processing and IFS for 
working-memory load, which is in line with other studies, examining this issue 
(Makuuchi 2009). Thus, the data suggest a functional subdivision of the inferior 
frontal cortex, which makes it possible to process syntactically complex recursive 
structures by these computational different sub-components (Friederici et al. 
2011:94). 
 
 
3.3.2 Nonlinguistic structures 
 
To test processing hierarchical relations in a non-language domain, Friederici et al. 
used mathematical formulae. It has been proposed that recursion as used in linguistic 
processing is also underlying mathematical structures (Friederici et al. 2009). It is 
assumed that people who are familiar with the respective rules can make 
grammaticality judgments about the correctness of those formulae. Therefore, 
experts in mathematics acted as participants in this experiment. Either linear or 
hierarchical structured formulae were presented and the participants had to judge 
whether they were correct or incorrect. To avoid brain activation of numeral 
processing, such as calculating, only formulae without numbers were used (Friederici 
et al. 2011:97). 
 
 (18) linear structure:   {a+c, x * υ, φ ˄ ψ, x=a, u˂y} 
 (19) hierarchical structure:   (a=c+u) ˄ (υ*x ˂ u+y) 
          Friederici et al. 2011 
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Illustrating the syntactic structure of these formulae would look like this: 
 
(20) linear structure:   [a+c][x*y][ φ ˄ ψ][x = a][u˂y] 
(21) hirarchical structure :  [[a=[c+u]˄[ υ *x]˂[u+y]] 
         Friederici et al. 2011 
 
It has to be noted that mathematical structure varies from linguistic structure insofar 
as linguistic relations are asymmetrical whereas mathematical relation do not 
necessarily have to (Friederici et al. 2011:96). The formulae were presented visually 
during the experiment. 
Activation patterns, associated with mathematical structure processing were found to 
be located in BA 47, BA 44/45 and in the parietal cortex.  However, only a part of BA 
44 was involved in the processing of hierarchical complex formulae, whereas the 
crucial part of processing these was located more anteriorly in BA 47, next to BA 45. 
As we have seen in the previous part of the chapter, BA 47 seems also to be 
involved in linguistic syntactic processing, since it belongs to the Broca’s complex, 
but the crucial brain area for linguistic syntactic processing is assumed to be BA 
44/45, such that there seems to be at least a slight difference between processing 
complex hierarchical formulae and complex hierarchical linguistic structures. Though, 
Broca’s complex as a whole seems to be involved in both tasks, but activation of the 
different brain areas which are part of Broca’s complex differ in its intensity with 
respect to the tasks including recursion (Friederici et al. 2011:97).  
 
Another nonlinguistic domain has been examined with respect to recursive structures 
by using sequence structures in the form of visual stimuli. The type of underlying 
structure was again the same as in the artificial grammar processing experiment with 
category A and category B members. The membership of these elements was 
indicated by shape and texture, whereas all the stimuli were abstract to avoid item 
based learning. The dependency between these two categories was encoded by 
rotation of the respective shape: 
For a whole brain analysis, the main effect of processing these hierarchical structures 
was found to occur in the left pre-central gyrus which corresponds to BA 6.  
Analyzing the region of interest (ROI), an increase of activation could also be found in 
BA 44. Together with the brain areas which are generally involved in visual 
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processing, BA 6 and BA 44, these brain areas constitute a processing network, 
which is responsible for the processing of recursive structures in the visuo-spatial 
domain.  
This and some other studies dealing with this aspect of hierarchical processing seem 
to show that two parallel systems deal with hierarchical structures from the linguistic 
and non-linguistic domain. Interestingly, one domain, which is located the IFG and 
includes BA 44 and the posterior part of BA 45 seems to be responsible for recursion 
in natural language only, and the other domain, which is located at PFG and includes 
BA 47, the anterior part of BA 45 and BA 10, seems to be responsible for hierarchical 
structures in all other cognitive domains, with no further yet observable distinctions 
(Friederici et al. 2011:101).  
In all experiments here referred to, an activation of BA 44 could be observed, leading 
to the assumption that BA 44, which is the posterior part of Broca’s area, is involved 
in processing hierarchical structures in all domains, which is, as Kaan (2009) notes, 
possibly related to a higher working-memory load. 
 
 
3.4 THE RELATION TO MODULARITY 
 
A module is a hypothetical entity that is encapsulated and immune from other 
sources. According to Fodor (1983), modules have additionally to their immunity the 
following properties: They are localized, which means that they correspond to neural 
architecture. Furthermore, they are not only immune to information from other 
domains, but they also can be selectively impaired, and they are autonomous. A very 
important characteristic of modules is that they operate fast and thus can generate 
outputs very quickly. But they are also shallow, which means that they have simple 
outputs. Concerning biological development, modules are considered determined, in 
the sense that they develop in a characteristic way. Modules are domain specific and 
encapsulated and furthermore, modules are less accessible for higher function 
systems (Fodor 1983). 
The current view, including Fodor himself, is that not all cognitive functions are 
modular, but rather that some functions are and others are not (Prinz 2006). 
Language is often considered to form a module. Pinker for example states that the 
Faculty of Language is a module (Pinker 2005). 
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Besides, modularity can be distinguished into anatomical modularity and functional 
modularity, such that anatomical modularity predicts that modules correspond to the 
anatomical distribution of neural substrates whereas functional modularity refers to a 
functional distribution where a single module can correspond to different brain 
regions (Prinz 2006). 
Concerning modularity, there seems at least to be a consensus about the fact that a 
module is a specialized entity or device.  
Identifying the neuronal correlates of recursive processing, raises questions about 
the status of recursion in human cognition, which will be looked at more closely in the 
next chapter. 
The question now is whether recursion is a module or not and whether linguistic 
recursion should be separated from recursion in other cognitive domains as the 
examples above. A crucial role within this issue, however, is played by working-
memory. 
 
 
3.5 HOW IS WORKING MEMORY RELATED TO PROCESSING RECURSION IN 
THE HUMAN BRAIN? 
  
Concerning the closeness of the brain region responsible for working-memory and 
the region which is considered responsible for syntax and recursion in particular, and 
additionally, the debate about whether recursion only refers to center-embedded 
CPs, the question arises, how working memory and recursion are related to each 
other. Furthermore, the closeness of the processing of syntactic complex sentences 
and working-memory also raises the question of its relation. One option is that some 
of the activation in Broca’s area is not due to syntactic processing, but rather to 
general working memory load, as already mentioned, while another possibility is that 
all of the activation in Broca’s area during syntactic processing is specific to 
processing syntactic structures. According to Santi et al. (2007), the latter possibility 
nevertheless does not rule out working-memory load. Santi et al. conducted an 
experimental study to observe the relation between different syntactic operations and 
working-memory. To do so, they did both an fMRI-study and an aphasic-lesion study. 
They used Movement and Binding as the two different syntactic conditions to observe 
brain responses with respect to working-memory. In both conditions, working-
Chapter 3  The brain and recursion 
63 
 
memory is required to process the sentence, but syntactically they are governed by 
distinct rules (Santi et al. 2007). The activation of Broca’s area was shown to be 
stronger in a sentence with movement that causes a filler-gap dependency, than it 
was in sentences which did not contain such a dependency. According to Santi et al., 
this finding supports the view that there is a highly specialized region within Broca’s 
area which is underlying syntactic Movement.  
But Santi et al. also state that it is less clear, how this region is related to working-
memory.  One possibility is that there is a working-memory specialized for 
Movement, another possibility, however, is that there is a working-memory within 
Broca’s area that is specialized to syntactic processing, but not to Movement 
particularly, and the third possibility is that there is a working-memory within this 
region that has a more general cognitive character (Santi et al.  2007). 
Santi et al. found that these two kinds of dependency showed activation in distinct 
brain areas, namely in the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left middle temporal 
gyrus, in which the former is considered a part of Broca’s area. 
The analysis of the fMRI data suggests that different brain regions were activated for 
Movement and Binding. While Binding activated BA 45/47 stronger, Movement 
showed a stronger activation within BA 44 (Santi et al. 2007). The finding that 
Binding also showed activation in the right hemisphere leads to the assumption that 
there is neither evidence for one syntactic working-memory, nor for a general working 
memory, but rather working-memory in different regions of the brain (Santi et al. 
2007). 
Since Movement causes a long-distance dependency, it could be indeed the case 
that the stronger activation of Broca’s area is due to the long-distance dependency 
that causes a higher working-memory load. The finding that the left inferior frontal 
gyrus was active as a result of embedding-depth and the left inferior frontal sulcus 
was activated as a result of distance, which should cause working-memory load, 
speaks for Santi et al.’s finding that the activation is not due to general working-
memory load, but rather specific to syntax. Since the region that is dedicated to 
processing embedding and the region dedicated to Movement happen to be the 
same, but e.g. Binding shows to activate another region, the question is, how 
Movement and embedding are related. The finding that working-memory activates 
the sulcus rather than the gyrus general working-memory to be the cause for the 
activation, is technically ruled out. Santi et al. mention that the shown specifity of BA 
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44 to Movement that was shown in this experimental study does not rule out other 
syntactic operations to take place there. Since this brain region is rather big, it would 
be possible that different processing modules are situated there (Santi et al. 2007). 
According to them, it would also be possible that there is both a general and a syntax 
specific working memory.  This would mean that none of the above possibilities is 
correct. The region of interest within Broca’s area seems to be specific to some 
syntactic operations, but not to Movement alone, since Friederici et al. also identified 
this region as being responsible for CP-embedding (Friederici et al. 2011). But since 
Binding seems to activate another area, this region doesn’t seem to be responsible 
for syntactic processing in general (Santi et al. 2007). 
Ullman (2004) argues that there are commonalities between language and non-
language domains. He further assumes that the declarative-procedural model of 
language processing also can account for this. The DP-model relies on the 
differentiation between declarative memory, which is capable of facts and events, 
and the procedural memory which is capable of motor- and cognitive skills (Ullman 
2004). In terms of modularity, procedural memory belongs to the implicit modules that 
lead quickly to an output, while declarative memory belongs to explicit processing 
that takes longer to get an output. Concerning linguistic abilities, declarative memory 
seems to be responsible for lexical processing while procedural memory seems to be 
responsible for computational aspects of grammar (Ullman 2004) by which lexical 
items are put together to form a grammatical utterance. Hence, procedural memory is 
capable of generative aspects of natural language. 
The procedural memory consists of a network of brain structures, including basal 
ganglia and cerebellum, but also parts of Broca’s area belong to the neural substrate 
of procedural memory (Ullman 2004).The basal ganglia are considered to be involved 
in implicit procedural learning and especially in learning of sequences as well as the 
maintenance in working-memory (Ullman 2004:238). The basal ganglia receive 
information from cortical areas in the frontal portion of the brain which is also 
associated with procedural memory, but also with declarative memory, especially 
Broca’s area (Ullman 2004:238). According to Ullman, Broca’s area in terms of 
procedural memory is particularly important for learning sequences containing 
abstract and hierarchical structures (Ullman 2001:240). Furthermore, there seems to 
be a close link between processing sequences and working-memory (Ullman 2004). 
The cerebellum also subserves procedural memory, especially in terms of motor 
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sequencing (Ullman 2004:242).  The procedural abilities ascribed to Broca’s area 
seem to stand in close relation to the declarative abilities ascribed to this brain area 
(Ullman 2004:240). The relation to non-linguistic cognitive domains can be seen in 
the fact that the two memory systems used in language, namely the procedural and 
declarative system, play a similar role in multiple other cognitive domains. 
 
 
3.6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
The findings from the studies dealing with recursive structures or respectively self-
embedding sentences are compatible with the findings from experiments dealing with 
syntactic structures, in general, with respect to underlying brain structures.  
Concerning the processing of hierarchical recursive structures in different domains, a 
domain specificity of Broca’s area as a single unit could not have been observed. 
Instead, it seems like Broca’s area receives its domain specificity in this respect from 
the interaction with other parts of the brain, which differs from domain to domain 
(Friederici et al. 2011:99).  
Accordingly, Broca’s area interacting with the posterior superior temporal cortex 
combines these parts of the brain into a network, which deals with hierarchically 
complex sentences is natural language, Broca’s area in a network together with the 
pre-motor cortex, the pre SMA and parietal regions makes up a network for non-
linguistic visual-spatial event sequences. Also in mathematics BA 44 partly supports 
processing hierarchical structures, but with a main effect observed in BA 47. Hence, 
it seems like BA 44 is part of the responsibility of recursive structure processing, 
although it needs to be involved in a network with other parts of the brain to build up 
the entire area of processing. This means that in language processing, Broca’s area 
is part of another network than in other domains. Models of processing in the 
prefrontal cortex suggest a posterior-to-anterior gradient which means that more 
complex processing should take place in the anterior part of the prefrontal cortex. 
However, language processing undoubtedly belongs to complex human behavior, but 
is processed in the more posterior parts of the prefrontal cortex. So it seems like the 
finding that processing complex syntactic hierarchy takes place in these posterior 
brain portions is not compatible to this model of hierarchy in the prefrontal hierarchy. 
Friederici et al. propose one possibility which would make up for this, namely that 
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mathematical formulae need more cognitive control, since language is a largely 
automatic process. Moreover, the nodes of the mathematical structures contain 
logical operators which would make it also plausible that this requires more cognitive 
or rather computational control (Friederici et al. 2011:100). This proposal grants a 
special role to recursion in language, because of the finding which suggests that 
language though very complex is being processed in a region located more posterior 
than mathematically embedded structures. It seems to be plausible that there are two 
parallel cognitive systems dealing with recursive structures. One system which is 
responsible for all other recursive structures than language and which follows the 
posterior-to-anterior gradient and another one which is a single system uniquely 
responsible for language. At this point the question arises, if there are different 
cognitive systems for recursive structures other than syntactic recursion or if these 
are the same. This question is justified insofar that as we have seen in the first part of 
this chapter BA 44/45 are largely responsible for complex syntactic structures such 
as long distance movement and embedding and, however, in other linguistic domains 
which deal with recursion are not likely to show such structures. 
Processing syntactic recursive hierarchies seems to involve some of the brain areas 
also seen to be involved in complex syntactic processing despite recursion, namely 
BA 44. 
Since the brain areas concerning recursive structure processing are similar to those 
involved in processing syntactic complexities, the ERP response should be the P600 
component. Possibly, also the negative wave, observed during processing sentences 
containing Movement, could also be observed during processing syntactic recursive 
hierarchies, because lexical items have to be stored and retrieved while 
reconstructing word order, too. 
When looking at the brain areas that are responsible for the processing of center-
embedded structures the question arises, in how far these can be representative for 
what is often titled “recursive processing”. This question is important, since it is 
crucial for the understanding of what is recursive in syntax and why this is the case. 
According to the view that the brain areas that correspond to what is called complex 
syntactic processing represent what is recursive in syntax, sentences with only one 
CP are not recursive, since processing these does not activate the associated brain 
areas. This assumption, however, seems to be rather implausible, since these brain 
areas do not only correspond to center-embedded sentences, but to other syntactic 
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operations that have higher working-memory demands, as well. Although Friederici et 
al. showed that for center-embedding and long-distance dependencies different brain 
parts are required, this does not mean that the activity in these areas is not due to the 
higher working-memory load, but suggests that different kinds of working-memory, 
corresponding to different kinds of syntactic operations, are available, like Santi et al. 
assumed (Santi et al. 2007). Ullman (2004), further suggests that linguistic and non-
linguistic material could require the same brain areas, such that the particular brain 
areas may represent certain kinds of working-memory load that is perhaps not 
specific to language, but to something like complex hierarchy in general. If this is the 
case, it is questionable, which role the fact that the gradient, which Friederici et al. 
(2011) observed, does not hold for linguistic complexity, plays within this matter. The 
fact that simple sentences do not show this activity though being recursive through 
Merge and their general hierarchical representation and general complexity, could in 
turn be explained by the assumption that increased working-memory load plays a 
crucial role, as well. When assuming that working-memory plays primarily a role, a 
further question is how this could be explained in terms of modularity. Given the 
assumption that every natural language sentence is recursive, there is not 
necessarily need for a recursive module within syntax, since syntax itself would be 
this recursive module. Nevertheless, a recursive module could exist somehow, since 
syntax is not the only domain in language that makes use of recursive rules. 
Moreover, the use of recursive rules is not only evident in language, but also, as we 
have already seen in this chapter, it makes use of in processing mathematical 
formulae and processing visual sequences.  However, these are by far not the only 
non-linguistic cognitive domains that show to use recursive computations. Recursion 
seems to play a crucial role throughout human thinking, which is a topic of the next 
chapter. Furthermore, the next chapter deals with recursion not only in human 
cognition, but also with the potential ability in some non-human species to process 
recursive structures. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RECURSION AND COGNITION: 
RECURSIVE STRUCTURE PROCESSING IN 
HUMANS AND NON-HUMAN SPECIES 
 
 
In this chapter, recursion is considered in other cognitive domains than language. 
The aim of this chapter is to show, in which cognitive domains recursion is present, to 
compare it to recursion in natural language and be able to draw some possible 
conclusions from it. 
Further, this chapter concerns probable abilities of recursive structure processing in 
some non-human species to determine further, what makes human cognition unique 
with respect to language. 
 
 
4.1 EVIDENCE FOR RECURSION IN HUMAN THINKING 
 
Recursion in cognition does not only require the principles that recursion as a formal 
issue does, but also needs some additional abilities in the cognitive domain that 
make an individual able to think recursively and use this ability in several fields of 
cognition. Recursion, from a cognitive point of view, has certain demands on 
cognition that have to be fulfilled to be able to think recursively. One aspect is being 
able to think in an abstract way. Another requirement is being able to process 
hierarchical structures, which is all possibly related to working-memory, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter. 
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4.1.1 Memory and mental time travel 
 
Humans can easily remember past events, imagine possible future events and also 
think of fictional events. All these abilities are possible for human-beings, because 
they are capable of recursive thinking (Corballis 2011). Thomas Suddendorf called 
this cognitive ability mental time travel (Corballis 2011). Another example for 
recursive thinking like mental time travel is possible-world-semantics (Lewis 1986). 
Both thinking about past events and thinking about future events and fictional ones 
requires constructive elements. The memory device for thinking of episodes, whether 
past, future or fictional, is the so called episodic memory, which belongs, together 
with semantic memory to the explicit memory (e.g. Eysenck et al. 2010). The 
semantic memory stores knowledge of facts, like names of cities and persons or 
mathematical formulae and things like that. Contrary to explicit memory stands 
implicit memory, which consists of a procedural memory device, which includes 
actions like walking or riding a bike (Eysenck et al. 2010). Retrieval from implicit 
memory happens unconsciously and fast, while retrieval from explicit memory is 
conscious and takes more time. Applying to the use of language, one can say, that 
the use of the grammar, or rather I-language, every speaker of language has in his 
mind, namely intentions about what is grammatical in a language, is stored in 
procedural or implicit memory (Corballis 2011). A speaker without any knowledge 
about how his mother tongue works can judge whether a linguistic utterance is 
grammatical or not, without ever having heard it before. The lexical items of a 
language, namely words, are stored within semantic memory, like facts are (Corballis 
2011), and have to be learned.  
It has been observed that episodic memory is not present in infants before an age of 
four or five years. It is suggested that with approximately four years the concept of 
self begins to emerge. This is the beginning of memory as a recursive phenomenon, 
where previous experience is inserted into present consciousness (Corballis 
2011:83). 
The psychologist Endel Tulving distinguishes between noetic and autonoetic, in that 
autonoetic is what can be paraphrased with remembering or self-knowing and refers 
to episodes from one’s own life, and noetic which means knowing without self-
reference, like knowing that the boiling point of water is 100° Celsius, as Corballis 
pointed it out (Corballis 2011:84). Mental time travel is connected to symbolic 
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representation in the form of displaced reference, for instance, where, a person 
points in a direction to point at an object that has been in this place before, but is no 
longer available at the time of pointing. Experiments with displaced reference have 
been conducted with some animals, for example, chimpanzees and also with birds. 
Here, birds do better than chimpanzees (Corballis 2011). In one study, 12-month-old 
infants were compared to chimpanzees. In the setting that was shown to both infants 
and chimpanzees, a person placed desired objects on one platform and undesired 
objects on another platform. Then, the desired object was hidden under the platform, 
so that it could not be seen by the participants. Both the majority of infants and 
chimpanzees pointed to the platform where the desired object was hidden. In another 
condition, the platforms were left empty and it was observed that the human infants 
unlike the chimpanzees still pointed to the platform where the desired object had 
been before (Corballis 2011). 
Episodic memory, then, is recursive, since past episodes can be inserted into present 
awareness. According to Corballis (2011), this is comparable to embedding of 
sentences within sentences or phrases within phrases. Also, in terms of episodic 
memory, embeddings of higher degree than one can be accomplished, in that one 
imagines that he imagined yesterday an event that took place in the past, before 
yesterday, or that someone remembers that he imagined yesterday, what would 
happen next week. Further, Corballis suggests that this kind of recursive thinking has 
set the stage for the recursive structure of language (Corballis 2011:85). 
Regarding the brain structures that underlie mental time travel, in fMRI studies can 
be seen that both remembering past events and imaging possible future events 
activates the same brain regions (Corballis 2011). 
 
 
4.1.2 Theory of Mind 
 
Theory of Mind is, roughly speaking, the ability to read mental states of others, 
namely what they know, think or feel like. In human communication, it is striking, not 
only to infer from what a person actually says, but also from what the listener knows 
that the speaker thinks or knows. This is, like mental time travel, a recursive cognitive 
ability. It is recursive, in it requires the insertion of a belief into a belief, namely of 
what you believe that another person believes. While most animals can detect 
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emotions of their fellows, for example, mothers that can detect physical desires of 
their offspring, inferring mental states goes beyond this ability (Corballis 2011:134). 
Not only can humans understand what another individual knows or believes, but also 
what another individual sees or rather not sees, when looking from another place. 
More complex than knowing what another person knows is what another person 
believes about a certain situation. To test this ability, known as false believe, different 
test conditions are being used, like the Anne-and-Sally-Test (Wimmer et al. 1983), as 
certainly the most famous example. In this condition, the participant watches how two 
other persons are together in the same room and one person (Anne) has an object, a 
ball, for example, and puts it into a basket. After having done this, she leaves the 
room. While Anne is not present, Sally takes the ball from the basket and puts it into 
the cupboard. Then, Anne comes back. At this point, the presentation stops and the 
participant is asked, what he believes, where Anne will look for the ball. Participants, 
who understand the theory about the false belief, are considered to say that she will 
look in the basket where she left the ball and people, who do not understand the 
false belief, will say, that she is looking in the cupboard, where the ball actually is 
located. This is, because they don’t understand that Anne, who was not present while 
the ball had been dislocated, has other knowledge than they do themselves and 
therefore are not capable of the concept of Theory of Mind, which requires the 
cognitive ability of processing recursive structures (Perner 1983). It had been 
assumed that children by the age of 3-4 years acquire the ability to solve these tasks, 
since they give the right answer while younger children fail. But these tests that are 
conducted under the conditions that not yet speaking infants are taken into account, 
most participants of lower age pass the test. These tests are conducted such that the 
participants see the scene with Anne and Sally on a monitor and it is recorded, where 
they look, after Anne comes into the room again. Recently conducted experiments 
with seven-month-olds revealed that even they are capable of the thoughts of others. 
(Kovács et al. 2010) The babies’ behavior could be observed, because in this case 
Theory of Mind had been tested non-linguistically, meaning that no language had 
been involved. Instead, the ability was tested based on the babies’ eye-movements. 
This study revealed crucial assumptions about the cognitive abilities of babies and 
young infants, especially for the evidence of recursive thinking, leading away from 
Piaget’s assumption that children have only the cognitive abilities about things they 
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can express verbally, such that linguistic expressions provided an insight into 
children’s way of thinking (e.g. Gerrig et al. 2008). 
According to what Kovács et al. found in their study, recursive thinking seems to be 
evident already in infants and babies. 
Theory of Mind is thought to have evolved, because of humans’ complex social lives, 
in terms of cooperation and social intelligence (Corballis 2011). 
The given examples of Theory of Mind are recursive in the sense that thoughts, or 
rather beliefs, are embedded into each other which involves embedding something 
like a constituent in another constituent of the same type. Roughly speaking, Theory 
of Mind is about a belief about a belief. The embedding of thoughts into each other 
can be illustrated by linguistic utterances for such believes: 
 
 (1) I believe that you believe that the sky is blue 
 
These beliefs can have different degrees of embedding, as the following examples 
shows: 
 
 (2) a.  I believe that you believe that I believe that the sky is blue 
b. I believe that you believe that I believe that you believe that the sky is 
blue 
 
The embedding of beliefs into each other can go on infinitely. However, these 
examples of Theory of Mind are, even in their linguistic representation, not center-
embedded, but nevertheless considered recursive, which as I claim, shows, that 
center-embedding, is not a crucial part of recursion in human cognition. 
Concerning Theory of Mind, the question gets evident in how far Theory of Mind 
depends on language.  
 
 
4.1.3 Action planning 
 
Action planning also requires the cognitive ability to process hierarchical 
dependencies and furthermore is considered to be part of the evolution of syntax in 
human language (Greenblatt 2011). 
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When planning an action, above all complex actions that require multiple steps of 
planning, the output from the previous step has to be used as the input for the next 
step until the actual action is executed. Action planning means to divide a big 
problem, namely the whole action that is necessary to achieve the goal, into smaller 
problems that can be processed in stages. 
Furthermore, action planning also requires a certain degree of working-memory 
capacity to be able to keep track of the first level of the process of action planning. 
Action planning is considered to have played a role in the evolution of syntax, which 
means that it also plays a role in linguistic recursion, or rather the ability to process 
such structures (Greenblatt 2011). 
 
 
4.1.4 Tool manufacturing 
 
The cognitive ability of humans to combine different objects in a recursive way is also 
considered to have lead to the fact that humans have the most complex tools of all 
living kinds. Other animals, like chimpanzees also use tools, which consist of 
combined objects, but human beings are the only species that has ever used a tool 
to make another tool (Corballis 2011), which usage of recursive means. 
According to Corballis (2011), John F. Hoffecker, sees the origin of recursion in 
combinatorial tools. 
But when looking at the manufacture of tools, it appears that tools differ from culture 
to culture, while the principles of language don’t (Corballis 2011:204). 
Making and using tools is recursive because two single items are combined in a way 
that a bigger single item is created. The new object is also seen as a whole and not 
as something that has been created by two other items. For example, when a stick is 
combined with another one, the new object is not two short sticks but a long stick. 
Even better suited two illustrate this, is a tool which does not look anymore like the 
parts it had been constructed from. Take a saw. It is combined from jagged metal and 
wood, but the whole item is not taken as wood and metal, but as the whole new 
object, namely the saw. The process of combining as well as the structure of 
combined tools remind of Merge in syntax.  
As described so far, tool making seems to be different from tool use in the sense that 
tool making requires the kind of combination that is also used in syntax. 
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Tool use is recursive, since it needs the cognitive abilities that allow processing 
hierarchical structures, because tool use requires hierarchical structured behavior in 
two senses: First, when a tool is used the user needs to plan what he wants to 
achieve by using this tool as he would need even without any tool, and second, the 
user needs to be aware of what the tool is good for when he wants to be able to use 
it for certain purposes and not only for such ones that he discovered by chance. 
Concerning tool making, the assumption that it shows recursive properties by its 
required method of combination and its comparison to syntax in natural language 
leads to the assumption that Merge in syntax really is the mechanism that makes 
language recursive. This in turn would also mean that not only sentences with CP-
embedding but also simple sentences are recursive since they all contain the 
syntactic operation Merge. 
 
 
4.1.5 The need for recursion in natural language 
 
If recursion is crucial for language and is furthermore the property that sets apart a 
complex grammar from a finite state grammar and thus distinguishes human 
language from any other communicative system, it supposedly exists among all 
human languages. Since recursion is thought to be a human universal, it should be a 
language principle and thus exist in every natural human language. A principle, 
however, does not have to be represented in every language by the same method, 
but rather as a parameter that differs between languages. However, several years 
ago, Daniel Everett, who lived among an indigenous people, namely the Pirahã, 
challenged this assumption by arguing that the members of this people do show 
certain constraints thought to be due to their cultural environment: Everett claimed 
that members of the Pirahã lack cognitive abilities, or rather show constraints on 
them what he considered to be due to cultural constraints (e.g. Corballis 2011). 
Besides non-linguistic abilities, like living in the here and now and having no folklore 
and lacking the ability to imagine these, also some linguistic abilities are thought to 
be included, most prominently recursion.  
The non-linguistic cognitive constraints were also considered to be due to absence of 
certain linguistic abilities, following the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Corballis 2011). 
Thus, Everett supports the view that cognitive abilities result from language, which 
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means that if a linguistic item, or structure does not exist in a particular language, 
speaker of this language do not develop the cognitive ability that, from this viewpoint, 
results from the linguistic structure (Everett 2005). 
Everett has claimed, for example, that the Pirahã are not able to distinguish between 
different numbers of items, since they do not appear to have any more words for 
quantity than one and several. Furthermore, Everett claims that the language of the 
Pirahã lacks recursion, since he believes that this language does not have any CPs 
and thus shows strict parataxis, or rather any embedding of multiple CPs. As 
evidence for this, Everett takes examples like this: 
 
 (1)  ti ga´ i -sai ko´ ’oı´ hi kaha´ p -iı´ 
I say -nominative namehe leave -intention 
“I said that Ko´ ’oı´ intends to leave.”  
(lit. “My saying Ko´ ’oı´ intend-leaves.”) 
           (Everett 2005) 
 
Everett claims that clausal complements here are expressed without embedding and 
that verbs that are analog to verbs like “think”, “believe” and so forth, which are 
followed by embedding, are expressed in Pirahã without embedding (Everett 2005). 
But even if CP-embedding does not exist in Pirahã, it is not plausible that this 
language lacks recursion. Thus, it is more likely that recursion is indeed a human 
universal and thus also Pirahã does show recursive structures. This argument is 
based on several pieces of evidence, or at least indications, which are both based on 
linguistic and general cognitive argumentation: If there was a language without 
recursion, this would mean that something within the mind and thus in the brain of the 
Pirahã is crucially different from other human beings, since all languages are 
considered to develop according to the same principles and that only the parameters 
differ from language to language. Only if recursion indeed was a cultural 
phenomenon, it would be plausible that there exist cultures, which lack this cognitive 
mechanism. But the far I am aware, this is rather unlikely, at least because of the fact 
that it seems to be a hallmark of human cognition in multiple domains. 
If the members of this people are able to think recursive, which is reasonable, they 
would probably use it in language, since the general phenomenon of natural 
language is considered to work equally in every human culture. 
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The only question, to look at, is whether recursion really is a human cognitive 
universal that naturally is present in human cross-culturally or whether it depends on 
the cultural environment. 
Since Merge is responsible for linguistic constituents to be combined within language 
processing and thus seems to be involved into recursive processing, the existence of 
a language without recursion would mean a language without Merge. And this would 
not only mean that Pirahã is lacking something that is considered universal in human 
language and thinking, but also that their language is not what is considered as 
natural language, since in that case it would not follow its principles. I claim that this 
is much unlikely. 
Sakel et al. argue that cognitive complex structures in Pirahã are expressed via verb 
constructions. According to them, in Pirahã, there are several suffixes that are 
attached to the verb and have adverbial character, meaning things like maybe, 
definitely and so forth. These adverbial suffixes are held to express what in 
languages like English is expressed through an additional CP and Verbs like I think, I 
doubt and so forth (Sakel et al. 2009). 
It could be the case that instead of an overt structure showing complementizers that 
introduce the new CP, this construction in Pirahã is covert. Additionally the 
constituent that displays the Verb from the first CP is attached to the main verb. 
 When assuming that also Merge is an operation that creates recursion in syntax, 
then there is good reason that Pirahã is recursive. 
Even if the structure of Pirahã does not show any recursive structure, expressing 
recursive thinking seems to be possible. 
Uli Sauerland, however, claimed that embedding also exists in Pirahã, namely in the 
form that the suffix –sai is pronounced differently, depending on the context 
(Sauerland 2010). According to Sauerland, the lower pitched –sai is a conditional 
marker, while the higher pitched –sai is considered to mark nominal clauses 
(Sauerland 2010). 
In a paper from 2009, Nevins et al. take Everett’s claims and show, how these can be 
falsified, especially, because Everett himself, in a paper from 2009 invalidates his 
earlier claims. However, he does this in favor to show that Pirahã still is not recursive 
and doesn’t exhibit any embedding (Nevins et al. 2009, Everett 2005).  
Nevins et al. 2009 take different syntactic conditions from Pirahã syntax, which they 
argue to function differently from what Everett had claimed. To take only one 
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example, they looked at the suffix –sai. The starting point for the argumentation that  
–sai yields recursion is that many clauses in Pirahã that would be analyzed as 
containing embedding in English, show this suffix. They further notice that Everett in 
his paper from 2005 claims that clauses containing this suffix are nominalized and    
–sai represents the nominalizer (Nevins et al. 2009:673). Everett (2005) sees this 
nominalizer as argument against embedding in Pirahã. His first argument comes from 
word order: Since Pirahã is considered an SOV language, and a –sai clause is 
nominalized and thus can serve as a verb’s complement, it should precede the verb 
in an SOV language as, according to Everett, other nominal complements do. 
However, the fact that a nominal complement containing –sai follows the verb is an 
argument for Everett that Pirahã indeed is non-recursive (Nevins et al. 2009:673). 
The second argument against embedding in Pirahã using –sai, comes from clitic 
agreement (Nevins et al. 2009). Everett (2005) claims that clauses with –sai, since 
they are nominal, should trigger clitic agreement like other nominal complements, but 
since they don’t, Everett considers them to be independent utterances, which he 
takes as an argument against embedded, recursive structures in Pirahã. However, 
Nevins et al. (2009) note that in a later paper from 2009, Everett argues that –sai is 
no nominalizer, but instead he claims that it marks old information and is, in contrast 
to what he has argued before, compatible with verbal inflection (Nevins et al. 
2009:673). Nevins et al. (2009) argue that the revise of the assumption that –sai 
clauses are nominal, makes his arguments that are bound to this assumption, not 
holding. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that Everett’s as well as Nevins et al.’s explanations 
concern multiple CP-embedding and do not concern the general property of 
language to embed constituents within each other. However, when assuming that 
Merge is recursion and that this operation forms embedded structures, and thus the 
embedding of an NP within an NP or the embedding of an NP within and VP is the 
same as embedding CPs within each other, Pirahã of course is recursive, and of 
course exhibits embedded structures as well. Assuming that Pirahã holds the same 
generativity as other languages, which would be only natural, and thus contains a 
mechanism of concatenation like Merge, then the syntax of this language should be 
represented within the speaker’s mind the way it is assumed for other languages, 
namely via embedded representations, and thus the embedding of all constituents 
within each other should be possible. Even if CP-embeddings were perhaps rather 
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rare or even almost never used in Pirahã, this language would be recursive, anyhow. 
I claim that there isn’t any reason at all to assume that Pirahã is not recursive or that 
it doesn’t show embedded structures as long as it is generative, such that its 
speakers can produce and understand never heard utterances. 
 
 
4.2 ANIMAL COGNITION 
 
After having examined the ability of processing syntax and particularly hierarchical 
structures in humans, and having looked at evidence for recursion in non-linguistic 
domains, the interesting point now is, whether humans are the only species which is 
capable of recursion, or whether the cognition of animals covers the ability to handle 
recursion and whether some of them also use it in communication.  
To investigate this issue, the abilities of animals both in the field of general cognition 
as well as in the field of communication are considered throughout this chapter. 
Looking at possible recursive abilities in animals shall help to find out about the 
relation between recursion, cognition and syntax in humans. 
For this purpose the neuronal differences between humans and non-human animals 
related to recursive processing and some possible genetic influences on the 
recursive human language ability are also taken into consideration to shed some light 
on the question of the role of recursion human cognition and the syntax of natural 
language. 
 
 
4.2.1 Animal cognition with respect to recursion 
 
Many vertebrates have cognitive abilities in the same cognitive fields as humans do. 
These cognitive abilities are also considered critical for language in humans. 
Concerning categorization and learning, some animals are capable of generalizing 
from past experience. In one experiment, pigeons were tested for this, and it was 
observed that they are able, when trained on photographs, to learn concepts like 
“tree” and apply it on other “individuals” of this kind. This means that they can 
recognize pictures of other trees which they have never seen before and also 
silhouettes of trees as well as concealed trees. This paradigm works even well with 
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kinds, pigeons would never see in their natural environment, like underwater 
environments or abstract objects, like shapes of letters. The application on non-
natural environments suggests that the ability of pigeons to perform these tasks is at 
least not purely innate, but learned to a certain extent (Fitch 2010:150). According to 
Fitch (2010), this ability can be seen as some precursor for language in non-human 
species, since it requires reference of the same type as it is required in language 
learning and processing. This ability is shared among all vertebrates (Fitch 2010). 
Regarding memory, it has been shown that apes and monkeys are able to remember 
under which of several cups, food has been hidden and pigeons are able to 
remember more than hundred scenes for the time of at least a year (Fitch 2010). And 
it also had been recently shown that ravens have a well developed long-term 
memory, since they are able to recognize other ravens for a long period. Evidence for 
this is the fact that they reacted on befriended conspecifics friendly and on enemies 
not friendly, which suggests that these animals have an episodic memory which 
enables them to remember individuals from their past (Boeckle et al. 2012). 
There is also evidence that animals are able to plan future behavior, which is in 
humans associated with recursive structure processing. 
Also, animals have the ability to plan the future, which implies that they have an 
understanding of time in a more complex way than instinctively knowing the time of 
the day or which season it is. For example are they able to predict where a rotating 
clock hand must be after it has disappeared (Fitch 2010:150). In nature, 
hummingbirds remember where nectar-rich flowers are located and also keep track 
of how long it had been since they got there the last time. There are also food-
hoarding birds that have not well enough olfaction and thus need to remember the 
places, they hid their food. To get to the food again, before it has rotten, they 
accordingly need a sense of time, which tells them how long it has been, since they 
cached the food. These data show that animals, contrary to what Corballis (2011) 
postulates, must have some kind of mental time-travel, like humans do (Fitch 
2010:151). 
In the cognitive field of numbers, three types of concept about these can be 
distinguished. The first concept has the name “small exact”, the second “large 
approximate” and the third “large exact”. While both humans and animals have the 
capacities for the first and the second type of numeral concepts, humans can as well 
handle the third type. Nonetheless, animals are capable of numerals and can reliably 
Chapter 4    Recursion and cognition   
81 
 
distinguish between different small numbers. Rhesus macaques also have an 
understanding of basic arithmetic (Fitch 2010:132). The cognitive difference between 
humans and non-humans then, seems to rely on human’s ability to recursively 
produce any number in an accurate way (Fitch 2010). Non-human primates actually 
learn numbers in quite different ways: While apes can only learn numbers by explicit 
instruction, which means that they have to learn them piece by piece, human children 
learn numbers by instruction approximately only the first four years of their lives. 
From this age on, they learn them automatically through the underlying successor 
function (Izard et al. 2008). This indicates that humans but not non-human primates 
understand the rules that underlie the concept of numbers, which is, as we have 
seen in Chapter 1, recursive.  
Cross-modal matching is a cognitive ability that was long time claimed to be uniquely 
human, but it has been found that apes can match felt objects to their visual 
counterparts (Fitch 2010), which means that they are able to transfer knowledge to 
another modality, which in turn requires a certain degree of abstractness.  
And concerning another cognitive ability which is closely tied to recursive processing, 
namely serial order, animals are not able only to manage tasks with serial order, but 
also when processing hierarchical orders is necessary (Fitch 2010:153). 
Thus, Fitch claims that some of the data suggests that “some aspects of language 
are built upon ancient cognitive capabilities, widely shared with animals” (Fitch 
2010:153). 
Animals also show cognitive abilities more specialized fields like social cognition and 
tool making, which are held as possible primate precursors of human language (Fitch 
2010). This suggests that it could also have been present in pre-linguistic hominids, 
and also many authors have claimed that tool use in pre-linguistic hominids has been 
a crucial factor for the emergence of language (Fitch 2010:153). Chimpanzees have 
established at least two kinds of tool use, namely leaf sponging to gain drinking water 
and insect fishing, using a modified stick to get insects from a place which would be 
out of reach without this tool. The stick has to be shaped such that it has the right 
width and length to fit into the hole, where the insects are suited. This requires the 
cognitive ability to plan behavior in order to reach a certain goal. Even if a 
chimpanzee has discovered this behavior by trial and error, reproducing it requires 
action planning, because it is unlikely that they get to their goal by trial and error 
every time they do it. And even if another chimpanzee uses this method because he 
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is imitating another individual’s behavior, something like action planning is necessary, 
because this behavior is rather complex and involves multiple steps. Furthermore, 
chimpanzees are able to use stones to crack nuts by using second stone as underlay 
(Fitch 2010). Although this ability seems to be less complex and more likely to 
happen accidently, some things show that it is more complex than that. First, the 
chimpanzees have to take the stones from the forest, where they find them to the 
place where they want to crack nuts, which makes it rather unlikely to happen 
accidently and second, the transportation of the rocks requires spatial orientation and 
planning behavior (Fitch 2010). 
These behaviors in animals suggest first, that they are capable of specifying and 
executing sub-goals to reach a goal, which has been planned to be reached and 
second, it shows, because of the complexity of the method, that these animals get a 
causal model of the task they perform (Fitch 2010). This indicates that they are 
capable of managing some kind of hierarchical structures in order to reach a goal and 
thus, it is possible that also in our ancestors these abilities were present without 
language (Fitch 2010:156). 
Besides this knowledge about physical objects in their environment, which they seem 
to be able to use for specific goals, many animals also have the ability to live in 
complex social groups. This so called social intelligence might also have been a 
crucial predisposal for language development in humans. Social animals need to 
fulfill certain properties, like identifying the individuals that belong to their group, and 
remembering interaction which have taken place both between itself and other group-
members and between other group members. And further such an animal has to be 
able to abstract the behavior of other group members at such a level that it can infer 
how to behave in the future, which demands some processing at an abstract and 
recursive level, as well (Fitch 2010). Furthermore, primates do have things like 
coalitionary behavior within and also sometimes in non-kin groups, which means that 
several subdominants gang together to be able to defeat one dominant individual and 
according to this ability, they also have conciliation after fights. This complex 
behavior has been considered as not being trivial, since information has to be 
combined an integrated into own behavior (Fitch 2010). These cognitive abilities can 
be considered as evolutionary relevant, since they can have major effects on 
reproduction, which can have lead to achieving the emergence of language in 
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humans. According to Fitch, social cognition in primates is directly relevant to 
pragmatic inference (Fitch 2010:157).  
Concerning social intelligence, many animals are capable of social learning by 
observation in the form of enhancement or even imitation. Marmosets, for example, 
seem not only to be capable of social learning, but also of imitative learning. But they 
seem to show even more sensitivity to social learning than that: Dell’mour et al. 
(2009) also observed social learning behavior in marmosets and in the course of this, 
paid particular attention in the two questions, (1) how social learning affects task 
acquisition in infant animals and (2) whether the mother augments the behavior by 
enhancing the infant’s behavior (Dell’mour et al. 2009:503). The two tasks, the 
marmosets had to solve, involved killing a big insect on the one hand, and getting 
artificially embedded food from a box on the other hand (Dell’mour et al. 2009:504). 
Dell’mour et al. aimed to observe the marmosets’ behavior under two conditions: 
First, they let the mother and the infant marmoset being together at the scene, where 
the mother solved the task and the infant observed her behavior and second, they let 
the infant be at the scene alone, with the mother watching from behind a wire-mesh 
fence. They observed that the mother’s behavior seemed to show signs of active 
provision of information to the offspring, which, very interestingly, also showed 
communication which at the first sight reminds of natural pedagogy in humans. 
Indeed, the communicative act seemed to refer to the infant solving the task. 
Dell’mour et al. recorded the vocalizations of all subjects during the experiment and 
analyzed these afterwards with respect to the interaction between mother and infant. 
The recordings also included tests with the mother in presence of their offspring as 
well as without them. According to Dell’mour et al.’s findings, the mother’s 
vocalizations differed depending on the presence as well as on the age of the 
offspring (Dellmour et al. 2009:506). In the presence of 11-15-week-old infants, she 
always emitted food calls after opening a can, if the infant was not already 
manipulating it. She did not show this behavior when the infant did already 
manipulate the same or another can. During trials with infants aged 19-23 weeks the 
mother did not emit any food calls at all, regardless of whether the infant manipulated 
the can or not. Additional observing of the mother alone in the trail situation revealed 
that she did not emit any call when being without an infant, either (Dellm’mour et al. 
2009:507). 
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Another interesting observation was that when the infants obtained the food the 
parents did not directly take it from them, which also strongly reminds of teaching the 
offspring a certain behavior (Dell’mour et al. 2009:504). When the accompanying 
infants were 11-15 weeks old, the mother left food-containing cans that she had 
opened unattended by moving away from it. She hardly left cans unattended when 
she was in the cage with the older infants and she never left them alone before 
having emptied them when she was alone. Furthermore, the mother behaved also 
differently according to the age of the infants with respect to the food from the cans. 
When being together with the younger infants, the mother gave some of the 
mealworms directly to the children and let them obtain some of them by leaving the 
can after having opened it. In contrast when being with the older infants, she did not 
give any of the mealworms to her offspring and showed signs of aggression when 
they came close to her when she had some of the food (Dellm’mour et al. 2009:507). 
Additionally to this behavior, Dell’mour et al. could also observe that the infant 
observers in contrast to the non-observers could solve the task faster, whereas the 
behavior in juvenile marmosets did not depend on the observer/non-observer 
condition (Dell’mour et al. 2009:508). These observations suggest that marmosets 
are not only able to learn from a conspecific’s behavior, they are also able to imitate 
the observed actions and furthermore learning by observation is an important part of 
raising their offspring with the mother teaching them. Although marmosets show a 
special sensitivity to social learning, they are not the only non-human species which 
learns by observation. Even non-social red-footed tortoise which do not live in 
permanent social groups and also are not parental care givers, are capable of 
learning by observation. This was observed in an experimental study using a detour 
task, where the non-observing tortoise was not able to solve the task, but the 
observing tortoise was (Wilkinson et al. 2010). 
Many non-human species show a lot of cognitive abilities which are rather 
impressive. But since primates and also other non-human animals seem to provide 
cognitive abilities, which have led to language development in humans, the question 
arises, why only humans were set ready for language. For this purpose we shall look 
at the communication systems of some animals to get an idea of what distinguishes 
them from human language. 
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4.2.2 The general difference between animal communication and human language 
 
Although all animals communicate, not every communication system is language: 
There are crucial differences between human communication and animal 
communicative systems, which are topic of this part of the chapter. Communication is 
not only available in cognitively higher developed beings, but also present even in 
one celled organisms. One celled amoeba, for example, use chemical substances to 
attract other amoeba in order to reproduce sexually (Fitch 2010). Different species, 
including birds, squirrels, dogs, spiders and chimpanzees, use communicative 
signals to warn members of their own species, to attract mates, or to inform about 
food that has been found. These communicative signals do not necessarily involve 
verbal behavior, but can also contain signals like using urine to mark territory, or the 
vibrating pattern of male spiders on the net of a female to attract her (Fitch 
2010:173). Animal communication, in contrast to language, only refers to the here 
and now, whereas language can refer both to past and future events as well as 
possible worlds (see Lewis 1986, Corballis 2011). Humans also make use of these 
non-linguistic communication signals: Although it is in many cases verbal, it is not 
language. Take for example laughter: It conveys the communicative message that 
the producer of this verbal behavior is happy, but does not involve language, since it 
does not involve any arbitrary signal, nor does it use any form of syntactic structure 
(Fitch 2010). And furthermore, a communicative signal like laughter always has the 
same meaning, no matter, which exact structure it has, if there is an observable 
structure at all. Of course, different kinds of laughter can indicate different state of 
minds, but this has to do more with the tone of the laughter than with its structure 
(Fitch 2010). Another example of this kind of non-linguistic communication is crying: It 
transfers the message that the producer is sad, but does not involve language 
(Corballis 2011). 
A crucial point about this non-linguistic communication is the fact that it is not 
intentional like language. Language is intentional, since the individual that produces 
language can decide whether or not he or she will utter a sentence. Other than 
language, non-linguistic communication does not depend on the will of an individual. 
Of course cultural “rules” have influence on this behavior such that emotions like 
laughing and crying can be hold back, but this is at any rate more difficult than 
holding back a linguistic utterance (Corballis 2011). Furthermore, non-linguistic 
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communication, like emotions in humans, is innate and can be both produced and 
comprehended from birth on. Although human emotions, as well as most non-human 
communication, are innate, some animal species are vocal learners like humans 
(Fitch 2010). In how far other linguistic properties, particularly syntax, are available to 
some a non-human species, is topic of the following part of this chapter. 
 
 
4.3 SYNTAX AND RECURSION IN DIFFERENT NON-HUMAN SPECIES 
 
Since it seems not parsimonious that syntax appeared suddenly and in toto as a 
mutation in one human individual, it is a possible assumption that a precursor of 
syntax exists in now living non-human species. Species that come into question are 
vocal learners which include marine mammals, bats elephants and songbirds, which 
of songbirds are looked at closer and compared to the abilities of non-human 
primates with respect to producing syntactic structures in communication, since they 
are the closest relatives to humans.  
 
 
4.3.1 Birds 
 
Regarding birds, there is a difference between vocal learning birds and those who do 
not learn their song, but have it innate. We are now looking at vocal learning birds, 
which are considered to show some similarities to syntax in humans. 
The vocal learning of songbirds is experience-dependent, and requires the ability of 
coordinating fast and precisely complex sequential movements of lingual, vocal and 
respiratory muscles in order to create the appropriate sounds (Hilliard et al. 2009). 
Here again, this ability is related to syntax in the way that syntax also requires fast 
sequential processing, both in production and comprehension. 
Birdsong shows some parallels to human speech: Within the number of vocal 
learning birds, which include not only songbirds, but also hummingbirds and parrots, 
songbirds are the easiest to investigate in laboratories, and thus most is known about 
their song learning and the underlying neuronal substrates (Hilliard et al. 2009:163). 
Like speech, songs can be divided into smaller units. The smallest units are notes, 
which can be combined to syllables, which in groups of two or more can yield a 
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phrase. A motif is a sequence of notes and/or syllables which are repeated in a 
specific order. Motifs or phrases put together with an interval of silence between them 
build up a song. Syntax in birdsongs is constituted by the temporal order of the above 
mentioned features (Hilliard et al. 2009). 
Learning speech and song shares some key features, like listening and social 
interaction. Moreover, a critical period also exists for birds, where they have to learn 
their songs. Another key feature is that songbirds go through a period which is 
analog to human babbling phase, where young birds utter sounds that are not 
understandable to adult birds and by which the young birds try out their phonological 
repertoire. It had been shown that songbirds which had been kept away from their 
tutors during the critical period of song learning never were able to learn their songs 
appropriate, in they lacked precision (Hilliard et al. 2009). 
Except babbling phase, other phases during speech and song development are very 
similar. Before babbling, the acquisition begins with only listening to adults both in 
songbirds and humans, while the adult’s speech/song is memorized. After this, in a 
phase called sensorimotor learning, also known as babbling, helps the young to 
practice and refine their own vocalizations in order to mimic adult sounds. What 
distinguishes some songbirds, for example mocking birds, is the ability to learn new 
songs throughout life (Hilliard et al. 2009:163). Concerning this, it is interesting that 
FOXP2, a gene that is related to language ability in humans, is expressed in the 
brain of vocal learning birds but not in the brain of pigeons which are not vocal 
learners (Haesler et al. 2004).  
Besides parallels in acquisition, the neuronal structures underlying speech and song 
also show parallels. Except the cortical areas known as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s 
area, which are uniquely human, songbirds show a circuit, including basal ganglia, 
cerebellum, thalamus and the cortical-like pallium, which interestingly are 
interconnected only in male songbirds. The song circuit of songbirds functions in a 
rather analogical way. First, auditory input enters the song circuit at the so-called high 
vocal center (HVC). These neurons contribute to two pathways, namely the vocal 
motor pathway and the anterior forebrain pathway. The circuit in songbirds is analog 
to human association cortex.  What is important in this case, is the assumption that 
the pathway, which is relevant to song modification in vocal learning birds, like zebra 
finches, is responsible for planning and execution of complex sequential movements 
in humans (Hilliard et al. 2009:164). The brain of songbirds differs from the brains of 
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non-singing birds in so far that songbirds have a network of interconnected forebrain 
nuclei that form an interface between the auditory input and the vocal output, while 
other birds don’t have such a circuit. They indeed also have field L and they are also 
able to produce vocalizations using their syrinx, but are lacking the specific network 
(Bolhuis et al. 2006:351). 
Lesion studies in both young and adult songbirds have provided an insight into the 
function of the songbird’s brain. It has been found that a distinction between two 
pathways exists, namely the caudal pathway and the rostral pathway. The former is 
thought to be involved in song production while the latter is considered to be involved 
in song learning (Bolhuis et al. 2006:352). 
Songbirds provide an example of non-human vocal learners which have a syntax that 
is structural rather complex and which also express FOXP2 in the brain.  
The structure of songs in mockingbirds is even hierarchical showing hierarchical 
structures of phrases which constitute of syllables. This hierarchy provides a parallel 
to phonological and syntactic phrases in humans (Hilliard et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, the syntax in songs of these avian animals are considered 
meaningless. The meaning of such a song is restricted to a simple meaning like 
uttering to be a male of a certain species which is ready to mate (Fitch 2010:183).  
 
 
4.3.2 Monkeys and apes 
 
Primates are able not only to utter single calls but also sequences of calls. Though, 
they are not capable of processing complex structures like songbirds and whales are. 
But strikingly is that while the complex structures produced by songbirds and whales 
are syntactic meaningless, primates seem to be able to interpret calls, which are 
socially created by two or more vocalizers, in a cognitive complex way, which 
involves important aspects of syntax (Fitch 2010:185). Evidence for meaningful call 
sequences in primates comes from Klaus Zuberbühler who worked with the alarm 
calls of several species of African forest monkeys. These monkeys typically use an 
alarm call which is preceded by a low-pitched “boom” when the danger is not as 
immediately. In more dangerous situations the alarm call is produced without the 
preceding “boom”. Zuberbühler used playbacks of these calls in another closely 
related species and observed that these monkeys seemed to understand the boom-
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sound as modifier to the alarm call. The important thing here is that the monkeys 
which listened to the playback did not react to the boom-sound in own alarm calls, 
which can rule out the possibility that the low-pitched boom only has a calming effect 
on these monkeys. Furthermore, these monkeys have distinct calls for distinct 
predators (Fitch 2010:185). Zuberbühler argues that the modifying “boom” can be 
compared to linguistic combination in a compound of two words, which change 
meaning when they are put together, like hot and dog in the compound hotdog. The 
difference to human language, nevertheless, is that the alarm calls in monkeys are 
innate and do not contain rules that are learned and applied to certain calls (Fitch 
2010). But nevertheless, this can be designated as some kind of learned syntax 
which has been suggested to have occurred in pre-grammatical hominids, too (Fitch 
2010).  
Fitch (2010) in contrast, claims that the alarm calls of African forest monkeys do not 
provide any evidence for precursors of syntax in the last common ancestor, since this 
kind of behavior which combined simplexes into complex sequences is only known to 
occur in this particular species (Fitch 2010:185).  
 
 
4.4 NEURONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMANS AND NON-HUMANS WITH 
RESPECT TO RECURSIVE STRUCTURE PROCESSING  
 
Besides the two classical language areas within the brain, of which Broca’s area 
seems to be highly involved in syntactic processing, the cerebellum and basal 
ganglia are also an important neuronal component of the human language network. 
Since cerebellum and basal ganglia seem to play a role in the processing of songs in 
songbirds, it seems to be interesting to look at possible neuronal differences between 
humans and non-human which possibly help to explain the cognitive difference 
between those which can account for the existing language faculty in humans being 
absent in non-human animals. 
The large part of the brain, which goes beyond Broca’s and Wernicke’s area, and 
sustains language in humans, does not exist in apes (Fedor et al. 2009:26). 
Locations as well as the size and number of certain regions in the brain differ among 
species, also in dependency to overall brain size and body size. Evolution of the 
vertebrate brain shows an increase of the size of cortical regions and also of cortical 
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circuits (Fedor et al. 2009). Notably, cortical layers II and IIIb and IIIc of the chimp 
differ from these cortical regions in humans respectively. Furthermore, analyses of 
the macaque monkey brain show that in these animals the prefrontal cortex is not 
primarily connected with temporal regions like in human brains and the relative size 
of the homolog to human BA 44 is smaller in macaques. And also this brain region, 
which is dysgranular in humans, is agranular in macaque monkeys and thus is 
cytoarchitectonically more comparable to human BA 6. The macaque BA 44 is 
involved in using orofacial musculature, whereas human BA 44 is used for 
processing grammatical structures. In turn, orofacial movements in humans are 
controlled by BA 6 (Friederici 2009). 
Differences between non-human primates and humans, concerning language, can be 
found in both macroscopic differences and microscopic differences in the brain as 
well. The microscopic differences could involve differences in neurotransmitter 
systems due to cytoarchitectonically different conditions. Moreover, the evolution of 
the “syntactic brain” in humans is considered in Chapter 5. Now, we take a look at 
some possible genetic influences on human language ability.   
 
 
4.5 GENETIC INFLUENCES ON THE HUMAN ABILITY TO PROCESS SYNTAX 
 
4.5.1 The FOXP2 gene 
 
FOXP2 (Forkhead box protein P2) is a protein that is encoded by the FOXP2 gene 
and is located on chromosome 7 in humans. It contains a forkhead box protein DNA-
binding domain which makes it a member of the forkhead box (FOX) group of 
transcription factors, which in general are involved in the regulation of gene 
expression (Vargha-Khadem et al. 2005). These proteins are critical for proliferation, 
cell growth and cell differentiation. Many of the members of this group are also 
involved in embryonic development. They have a monomeric binding domain 
consisting of 80 to 100 amino acids. This binding domain has hardly changed during 
evolution. Many different types of FOX proteins have already been found, which 
FOXP2 belongs to (Vargha-Khadem et al. 2005). 
The FOXP2 gene is the most famous gene that has been considered of being 
involved in language ability. The gene has been discovered to be critical for language 
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acquisition for the first time in a family where some of the members showed an 
inability to use language appropriately. It was shown that the family members, who 
suffered from this condition, had a deletion at one end of this gene. At the time, this 
was found, the gene was considered to be “the language gene”.  All affected 
members of this family show a language disorder. This language disorder is not 
particularly syntactic, but has a morphosyntactic component. Mainly this condition is 
a speech disorder, which manifests itself in verbal dyspraxia due to deficits in 
sequencing of orofacial movements, which are required in speech (Hilliard et al. 
2009:165). For the purpose of looking at what influences syntactic abilities this 
orofacial deficit also seems to be relevant, since syntax consists of the capacity to 
generate complex sequenced movements (Hilliard et al. 2009:166). Since the 
deletion at this gene also occurred in an individual not relates to this particular family, 
it was suggested that it might be crucial for the use and acquisition of language 
(Hilliard 2009). Concerning the brain, affected individuals show bilateral abnormalities 
in the basal ganglia and cerebellum. Furthermore, they also show abnormalities in 
cortical areas including Broca’s area. Also, altered amounts of grey matter can be 
observed, which is accompanied by underactivation during tasks involving verbal 
fluency. These findings suggest that FOXP2 in humans is involved in brain 
development and a mutation of this gene leads to a malformation of brain structures 
that are at least crucial for the control of orofacial musculature (Hilliard et al. 2009). 
Homologues of this transcription factor have been found in many mammals and also 
in songbirds. 
Chimpanzees, mice and zebra finches have a version of the FOXP2 gene, which 
differs only in a few amino acids from the human version (Hilliard 2009). The version, 
zebra finches have, differs in seven amino acids, the version of mice in three amino 
acids and the version of chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys only differs in one amino 
acid.  
Studies conducted with mice and songbirds, which have an induced knock-down of 
the FOXP2 gene, indicate that this gene is important for modulating plasticity of 
neural circuits (Hilliard 2009). In mice and songbirds, this protein is also expressed in 
the cortex, which corresponds to the pallium in songbirds. Additionally it is also 
expressed in these mammals in the striatum and the thalamus during development, 
which is consistent with the role of forming these structures in humans (Hilliard et al. 
2009). Studies with songbirds, which got injected a virus that causes a knock-down of 
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the FOXP2 gene, suggest that this gene is crucial for the development of speech, 
since their song lacked precision in adulthood in these individuals, which is consistent 
with the finding that humans with SLI show an abnormality in syllable structure 
(Hilliard et al. 2009). 
In mice it had been observed deficits in motor skill learning had been observed. 
These knock-down mice furthermore showed an abnormal development of synapses 
in the dorsal striatum implicated in motor skill learning (Hilliard et al.2009:168). 
Both the findings from studies with mice and from studies with songbirds suggest that 
the FOXP2 gene is playing a developmental role of motor skill learning.  
The FOXP2 gene does not influence the brain growth and thus the ability to learn the 
motor skills for language ability directly, since it belongs to the group of transcription 
factors. Instead, networks consisting of signaling molecules, receptors and regularity 
factors, like FOXP2, which interact in these networks, seem to be crucial for the 
specification of behavior and cognition. The human version of FOXP2 affects the 
target genes it influences differently than the chimpanzee version does for example in 
this species. The FOXP2 gene is considered to down-regulate the expression of 
other genes, which of CNTNAP2 is known as critical for language. 
 
 
4.5.2 CNTNAP2 
 
The CNTNAP2 gene (contactin-associated protein-like 2) is a gene which also is 
considered to be involved in the human ability to acquire language. It is related to the 
FOXP2 gene, by which it gets regulated. It encodes a neurexin protein, called 
CASPR2, which is directly repressed by FOXP2 (Hilliard 2009). This assumption is 
supported by the observation that the expression pattern of CNTNAP2 and FOXP2 
are opposite, in that where FOXP2 levels are high, CNTNAP2 levels are low and vice 
versa. (Hilliard et al. 2009) Neurexins are presynaptic proteins which are involved in 
gluing together neurons and synapses. In the brain, together with postsynaptic 
neuroligins, this protein is thought to be important for synaptogenesis (Abrahams et 
al. 2008). The expression of CNTNAP2 during development is enriched in cortical 
areas, which is involved in the ability to be able to process language, while in rodents 
the expression of this gene in cortical areas is diffuse. (Hilliard et al. 2009) The 
assumption that FOXP2 is not directly involved in language is supported by findings 
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of language impairment caused related to CNTNAP, but not related to FOXP2 
(Hilliard et al. 2009:171). 
The differences in learning motor abilities are possible not only to be critical for the 
learning of motor skills themselves, but can also be related in a broader sense to the 
ability of processing sequences like syntax involves. When identifying the brain 
regions where FOXP2 is active and which regions are impaired in SLI and how they 
are, it possibly could be investigated in how far working-memory with respect to 
processing structural relations plays a role.  Furthermore, sequence learning can also 
be associated with syntax learning or rather learning the underlying rules of syntax, 
since learning these rules depends on processing the structures the child hears 
during language acquisition, as it also is the case in other vocal learning species. A 
generalization via induction has to be made in order to learn and apply the rules. If a 
human individual is not able to process the sequences he hears, it seems difficult to 
make an inductive conclusion about them. Since people with SLI seem not be 
impaired in syntax per se, but in the field of morphosyntax, it seems to be necessary 
to observe the particular brain regions that are considered to be a target of FOXP2 or 
CNTNAP2 expression and set them in relation to the function they are thought to 
serve in the language network. Another possibility would be that people with SLI not 
only suffer from orofacial deficits but also from deficits in either language planning or 
a deficit in the step that lies between planning and articulation, which seems also to 
be related to syntax in a broader sense, but nevertheless, it is important for the 
question why humans are ready to process language and syntactic structures, in 
particular, but animals are not or merely in a downgraded way. The next chapter 
deals with the syntax-like abilities of some animals, which could have been 
precursors of human syntax. 
 
  
4.6 LINEAR AND HIERARCHICAL PROCESSING IN NON-HUMANS  
 
Some animals show cognitively complex behavior or even make the use of complex 
sequences in communication, which, in the case of songbirds, has to be acquired by 
imitation and learning. This chapter deals with the question whether non-human 
animals are able to handle hierarchical structures. 
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To compare these findings with non-human abilities of hierarchical syntax 
processing, we will look at experiments with artificial grammar learning in apes, 
monkeys and songbirds. 
Concerning sequential learning, which shows similarities to human syntax, 
experiments have been conducted by Conway and Christiansen (2001). They 
focused on three areas, namely learning of arbitrary, fixed sequences, statistical 
learning and learning of hierarchical structures. 
Gentner et al. (2006) did an experiment with songbirds, namely European starlings, 
where they exposed these birds to grammatical forms of sounds. They distinguished 
between context free grammar and finite state grammar, like Friederici et al. (2011) 
used, in which the finite state grammar was considered to be paraphrased by a linear 
structure while a context free grammar needs more computational power, since it 
contains embedded structures. These structures were of the same type as the 
structure provided in the experiments concerning hierarchical processing by humans, 
namely a finite state grammar of the type AnBn and a context free grammar of the 
type (AB)n. Gentner et al. observed that the starlings were not only able to process 
the linear finite state grammar but also the more complex context free grammar 
(Gentner et al. 2006). Corballis argued that the ability of starlings to process this type 
of grammar could have depended on the fact that they did not have to process a 
grammar of the type [A1[A2[A3 B3]B2]B1], but only the easier type [A[A[A B]B]B], which 
was claimed to be able to process by a simple counting mechanism (Corballis 2007).  
Using sequential structures, studies concerning syntax-like processing have also 
been done with non-human primates by Conway et al. (2001). The ability to learn and 
encode sequential structures is critical to language acquisition and human 
communication. But not only humans are considered to be capable of processing 
sequences. Conway et al. observed in how far non-human primates are able to 
process both linear and hierarchical sequences. They tested humans and apes as 
well as monkeys and apes. Concerning linear sequences, primates seem to be able 
of encoding, storing and recalling these. Humans and chimpanzees showed 
evidence of planning their movements before planning while monkeys did not. 
Regarding hierarchical sequences, limitations seem to be evident in non-human 
primates. Reasons for this, other than the inability of non-human primates to process 
these structures could be, first that human children have more previously acquired 
experience with such structures and second, it could also be possible that the 
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experiments have not been sensitive to the hierarchical ability of apes and monkeys 
(Conway et al. 2001). However, this inability of non-human primates can also be the 
step which distinguishes humans from non-human primates and accounts for the 
absence of language in these species. 
 
 
4.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
The collected data lead to the assumption that some of the cognitive abilities needed 
for processing syntax in humans, is also to a certain extend available in some non-
human animals, including monkeys, apes and different avian species. 
It is possible that some of these abilities can be seen as precursors of human syntax, 
and those which cannot be seen as precursors, nonetheless can provide an insight in 
how syntax could have evolved. One example is the possibility of learned syntax as a 
precursor of real syntax: While some animals have the ability to process these 
structures and also show some syntax-like elements in their communication, like 
compounded call in one monkey species, it is no learned system but rather an innate 
one.  
One interesting thing here is the relation between FOXP2, processing complex 
sequences and vocal learning. While songbirds, which express a variant of FOXP2, 
which is distinct in 6 amino acids, in the brain, like humans, and are vocal learners, 
apes have a variant of FOXP2 that distinguishes from the human form in only one 
amino acid, and are no vocal learners. The interesting point is that birdsong, although 
structural complex only conveys simple meanings, what makes the syntactic 
structures rather meaningless, while apes have no structural complex structures in 
their communication, but show complex social interactions. This implies the 
possibility that FOXP2 influences not only motor learning, which is evident, since 
songbirds and humans are both vocal learners, but also the ability of structural 
complexity, while cognitive complexity, which manifests itself otherwise than in overt 
structures, is controlled by some other factors, which are more narrowly related in 
humans and apes than in humans and songbirds. 
Comparing brain tissue from humans and monkeys with each other reveals that the 
homologues of the brain areas involved in complex syntactic processing in humans, 
namely BA 44 and BA 45 show the cytoarchitectonic properties of human frontal 
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operculum which is rather capable of simpler structures in humans and thus seems to 
be phylogenetic older than BA 44/45. 
Humans are able to process complex hierarchical structures both in the linguistic and 
non-linguistic domain.  
Even if some animals seem to be able to handle a “human ability”, like apes seem to 
be able to handle the concept of numbers in some way, it is still possible that the 
“animal form” of this ability relies on an entirely different system. Regarding syntax in 
some vocal learning animals, this could mean that these indeed have the ability to 
produce syntactic complex structures, which can also be indeed related to the 
FOXP2 gene, but it is possible that these abilities in animals rely on another system 
than in humans, which then in humans indeed is a uniquely human system. 
Concerning Merge, working memory is also required, such that even a simple 
sentence, cannot be processed due to lacking working-memory capacity. Working 
memory is required, since Merge combines binary, and thus previously combined 
structures have to be kept in mind until the next constituents are combined and so 
forth. 
At least one crucial difference between humans and other vertebrates and even 
mammals that could have lead to the fact that any other species despite humans has 
language, seems to rely on a difference in working-memory capacity. When looking 
at chimpanzees, despite their inability to articulate language sounds, they are able to 
learn words by intensive training and even are able to combine words in a Merge-like 
fashion (e.g. Corballis 2011). However, there are at least two factors that distinguish 
these abilities in chimpanzees from linguistic abilities in humans: First, imitation 
linguistic sounds or signs and thus words in humans occurs automatically, while in 
chimpanzees it does not, such that chimpanzees have to learn it by intensive training, 
which is not the case in humans. And second, humans can Merge infinitely, at least 
in theory, while chimpanzees only master two-word-utterances (e.g. Corballis 2011). 
This infinity seems to be related to working-memory and thus explains the possibility 
of CP-embedding in humans. This of course doesn’t mean that chimpanzees have 
the ability of recursion, since it seems to be a crucial factor of Merge to be able to go 
on ad infinitum, which is obviously not the case in any non-human primate. 
In contrast, some animals show better developed skills in other cognitive domains, 
where working-memory is also required. This could be related to the possibility of 
different kinds of working-memory, for syntax and other cognitive domains. 
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The role that recursion might have played in the evolution is the topic of the next 
chapter and will be observed more closely there. 
 98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
RECURSION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
LANGUAGE 
 
 
5.1 EVOLUTION – A BRIEF PRIMER 
 
After the concept of evolution had been discovered by Lamarck in the beginning 19 th 
century, Darwin, a couple of years later, postulated a concept on how evolution 
works, namely through natural selection (Darwin 1859): Individuals from a certain 
species that fit better in their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce. 
Within this concept, three logical consequences can be drawn from the way how 
living things are and what they do: The first consequence is the one of variation, 
which means that individual organisms differ from each other, the second 
consequence is inheritance, namely that organisms resemble their parents and 
finally, differential survival, which means that not all individuals from a species, that 
are born, survive and breed (Fitch 2010). 
Natural selection itself can be split up into at least three subcategories, which are 
sexual selection, kin selection and group selection (Fitch 2010:39). 
Natural selection can be understood as a way of natural selection which doesn’t 
manifest itself directly through the survival of an individual, but more indirectly 
through the competition between males to get a mate for the purpose of reproducing 
(Fitch 2010). The second subcategory of natural selection, namely kin selection, 
manifests itself in what is called altruistic behavior: An individual sacrifices its life or 
its time to help other individuals from its species. The purpose of this behavior is to 
help the own genes (Fitch 2010).  
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Fitch suggests that kin selection of the type kin communication played a critical role 
in language evolution by driving humans’ propensity to share knowledge (Fitch 
2010:42). 
Within the theory of evolution there has been some controversy, which is also playing 
a role in the field of language evolution. In the field of theories about how evolution 
processed, broadly speaking, a distinction can be made between gradualism and 
discontinuity. In the theory of gradualism, evolution moves in small steps acting on 
continuous variation in a population (Fitch 2010). Discontinuity on the other side, 
which can be caused by mutation, for instance, means a sudden change in one 
individual of a species, which is because of this mutation better suited for its 
environment. But the change in one individual is not sufficient to fit into the term of 
evolution. Evolution appears when the individual mates and its offspring make an 
entirely new species, because evolution occurs in populations rather than in 
individuals. This concept of sudden change is also called saltation (Fitch 2010). 
These two series do not have to be in conflict with each other, since both variants of 
variation can appear, on the one hand gradual speciation and discrete mutation, 
which explain evolutionary change at two distinct levels. But although the cause of 
evolution can appear sudden, population change will always be gradual, since the 
birth of a novel mutant is not the birth of a new species (Fitch 2010). 
In the case of language evolution, this displays an interesting question of whether the 
emergence of language in humans is caused by gradual evolution or by a mutation in 
an individual which again caused the emergence of language in a new species (Fitch 
2010). 
Another distinction with respect to how a new mechanism evolved can be captured 
by the two terms adaptation and exaptation. Adaptation means that a mechanism 
has directly evolved for the purpose it serves, while exaptation means that a 
mechanism originally evolved for another purpose than it does actually serve at the 
time of interest. This means that a function shift has taken place. A former name for 
the concept of exaptation has been preadaptation, but the term exaptation refers 
both to the process of function shift and to the end product of this process (Fitch 
2010). An exaptation thus, is an evolutionary trait that fulfills another role than it had 
originally evolved for (Gould et al. 1982). More narrowly, an exaptation only stays an 
exaptation during the time of the function shift. Because of this, according to Fitch, 
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exaptation only refers to the assumption of a new function, since otherwise, most 
adaptive traits would be exaptations (Fitch 2010:64). 
Particularly for language, the evolution of behavior is of special interest. This 
evolutionary direction bears the problem, as language does equally well, that no 
fossils or something equivalent exists. What is important about behavioral 
development in a species is that it not only drives evolution but can also inhibit 
evolution due to a certain behavior that made a morphological evolution unnecessary 
(Fitch 2010:71). The only fossils that can help determining this, are founds of tools 
and other artifacts, which help to infer about the cognitive abilities of their inventors. 
This method, called cognitive archeology (Sacket 1977), of course, only gives indirect 
insight to the cognitive abilities of our ancestors. 
In the field of the evolution of behavior, four terms are of special relevance. The first 
term deals with the question of mechanism. This means for instance, that a songbird 
sings because “it has a vocal organ which produces complex song, because it has 
specific neural mechanisms devoted to controlling that song, and because hormone 
levels at certain times of the year activate these mechanisms” (Fitch 2010:69). On 
the other hand there is the question of function: Birds sing to attract mates or to 
defend territories and of course, not to forget, because their ancestors sang (Fitch 
2010). Another distinction can be made in the case of the two terms ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic. Ontogenetic questions refer to the matter of how an individual being 
develops and learns behavior. The matter of the phylogenetic level is how a species 
as a whole evolved.  
Concerning the role that recursion plays within the issue of language evolution, 
language evolution has to be observed within the framework of evolutionary theories, 
which is the topic of the next part. 
 
 
5.2 LANGUAGE AND EVOLUTION - LANGUAGE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES 
 
Putting language into the framework of evolutionary theory, the first question that 
arises is whether language was an adaptation or an exaptation. Thus, one question 
to address is whether language evolved for the purpose of communication, or 
whether it actually evolved for other purposes. Here, it is important to note, that it isn’t 
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helpful to regard language as a whole, but the different abilities that make up 
language, or better saying what made us ready to develop language, namely the 
language faculty. Here, the main focus will lie on the abilities, necessary for the 
evolution of syntax, which is especially recursion. The second question of interest is, 
whether the abilities that lead to the language faculty emerged continuously or due to 
a mutation in one individual.  
Concerning language evolution, it is not only important to look at the question, how 
language evolved, but also which factor or factors caused language to emerge 
(Bickerton 2005). Concerning this issue, some theories focus on tool-making or co-
operation in hunting to be the cause of language emerging in humans, while other 
theories, for example, focus on social interaction to be the crucial factor. Another 
theory focuses the avoidance of inbreeding as being the original factor that has lead 
to the onset of language-like utterances. Since the depression of inbreeding is a 
crucial factor in evolution, but genetic relatedness cannot be observed directly 
(Lieberman 2000), many species have mechanisms that support this avoidance. In 
fact, language-like utterance as such a mechanism in humans seems rather 
plausible, since humans don’t have a well trained olfactory system, which would 
make it possible to recognize family members without having seen them before 
through olfaction. In this case, recognizing never seen members through language-
like utterances, which differ from group to group, could possibly have served the 
avoidance of inbreeding in pre-historic humans. 
Bickerton, however, comes to the conclusion that, since animals with advanced 
social intelligence and animals that hunt co-operatively exist, these factors cannot 
have been that crucial for language to evolve in humans but not in any other animal. 
Instead, he claims that there must have been some selective pressure on humans 
that did not occur in any other species (Bickerton 2005:515). 
 
 
5.2.1 The evolution of syntax   
 
One of the most central issues in language evolution is, besides the evolution of 
symbolic units, the evolution of syntax, since these two capacities are, according to 
Bickerton, the only real novelties in human communication (Bickerton 2005:511). 
Furthermore, Bickerton claims that it is not much likely that these two abilities 
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emerged in humans neither simultaneous, nor for the same reason and possibly 
under different selection pressures (Bickerton 2005). 
Symbolic units are considered to have evolved earlier, since they form a prerequisite 
for syntax to emerge (Bickerton 2005). Bickerton also mentions that Chomsky has 
made a differentiation between the conceptual and the computational aspect of 
language, where, with respect to the evolution of language, the emergence of 
symbolism belongs to the conceptual aspects of language, while the emergence of 
syntax rather belongs to the computational aspect of language (Bickerton 2005:511). 
An evolutionary theory, furthermore, must be able to explain why syntax only 
emerged in humans, but did not, not even rudimentary, in any other species 
(Bickerton 2005:519). 
The evolutionary theory of exaptation seems to be important in the case of syntax 
evolution. There is some consensus about that syntax emerged through exaptation of 
nonlinguistic capacities (e.g. Corballis 2011, Bickerton 2005). As mentioned in the 
previous section, an exaptation is an adaptation that has gone to fixation in some 
specific environment and then turns out to be useful in another one and then serves 
for this ability. It has been suggested that the more complex a certain phenomenon is 
the greater is the possibility that it can be explained by exaptation having taken part 
in it (Számadó et al. 2009). When being involved in this new function the exaptation 
gets more refined through genetic evolution by natural selection. Számadó et al. 
suggest that functionally different exapted modules played an important role in the 
evolution of language, and particularly syntax. 
A possible setting for this is that the ability of tool manufacturing precedes the 
emergence of language. It is possible that hierarchies were first processed by 
humans in the field of tool making and then language began to evolve, where the 
hierarchical abilities of tool making were refined, which in turn reflected on the 
manufacturing and use of tools, which was refined by the hierarchical abilities learned 
through language use (Számadó et al. 2009:223). The cognitive phenotype of being 
able to process hierarchical structures could be a possible cognitive subtype of the 
suite of complex cognitive function, humans a capable of. Furthermore, Számadó 
and colleagues propose that language functions like syntax are the product of a 
synergy between distinct cognitive abilities and to find out which these synergies are 
leads to solving the puzzle of how syntax evolved (Számadó et al. 2009). 
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Since humans are social beings and language is inter alia a social phenomenon, 
which is also a rather complex one, looking at a coevolution of genes and social 
transmission in the regard of syntax is necessary (see Dunbar 1996). 
There has been the suggestion that language emerged in humans because of a 
single mutation in one individual as a lucky accident, which has been considered to 
be implausible by most biologists (Számadó et al 2009). Instead the assumption that 
it had been possible for language to evolve in humans is due to many changes which 
occurred in genetics and thus also in neurology. The emergence of cultural 
conditions in human language evolution makes it more complex than other 
evolutionary processes which occurred without cultural influence, which is another 
parameter to be paid attention to. It had been proposed in recent years that it is 
possible that “a Darwinian variant of something like a Lamarckian process might have 
been involved” in language evolution (Számadó et al. 2009:223). This means that 
there might has been something like “learned syntax” in the first place, which then 
evolved with means of extracting rules, which led to a more complex language which 
in turn led to the usage of induction to learn the more complex language via its rules. 
This could have led to a scenario where beings, who were capable of not only 
handling hierarchical structures, which made it possible to understand the language, 
but were also capable of  imitation, motor-learning and more importantly of the 
language faculty in the form of universal grammar, were best adapted to this 
environment and thus the fittest. Then, by natural selection, the fittest survives and 
transmits his abilities genetically to his offspring. Cultural transmission plays a role 
with means to the surroundings and situations where language can be used and later 
becomes necessary. This scenario also supports the view that the bare 
understanding of hierarchical dependencies and the ability to produce an infinite 
number of utterances by finite means are closely related. 
Besides tool use and manufacturing, action planning has recently been considered 
important for the evolution of language, too. In a paper, published in 2011, Richard E. 
Greenblatt emphasizes the role of action planning in syntax evolution, as already 
mebtioned in Chapter 4.. He suggests the possibility that action planning could be the 
link between linguistic and non-linguistic cognition and further, that tool-use and 
linguistic abilities coevolved from simpler motor cognition (Greenblatt 2011). 
Summarizing these ideas about syntax evolution in humans the interaction of genetic 
evolution and cultural transmission, as Számadó et al point it out, “can have a 
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profound effect on the nature of genetic contribution to the acquisition and neural 
processing of syntax” (Számadó et al. 2009:229).  
These findings about which cognitive abilities were present in humans when they 
began to acquire syntactic language, and what could have been precursors of 
syntactic language, like learned syntax or pre-syntactic proto-language, can help to 
find out, to what extend animal communication or the ability of animals to perform 
tasks that require hierarchical thinking, are linked to human cognition and language 
ability. The ability of animals to process complex structures like the singing of vocal 
learning birds, in turn can provide an insight in what can be possible precursors of 
human syntax.  
 
 
5.2.2 Possible precursors of syntactic language: Evidence from Pidgin-speakers, pre-
grammatical children and agrammatic aphasics 
 
Pidgin speakers, pre-grammatical children and patients with Broca’s aphasia do at 
least a little insight in what precursors of syntax could have looked like: 
 
 
 a) Pidgin: and then, ey, Japan go school see? 
 b) Child language: Baby ball. 
 c) Aphasic patient:  
 I had stroke…blood pressure…low pressure…period… 
 
          (Examples taken from Givón 2009) 
 
Pidgin speakers, pre-grammatical children and agrammatic aphasics, who all 
produce pre-grammatical language, are able to produce and comprehend a coherent 
linguistic discourse which also is multi-propositional. In contrast to “syntactic” 
language, this discourse is slower and has higher error rates. While grammar is 
processed with a high speed and mostly subconscious, pre-grammatical 
communication is slower, which can be associated with its mostly conscious 
processing. Furthermore, morphology is absent in pre-grammatical speech, 
construction are rather simple, conjoined and non-hierarchic than complex, 
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embedded and hierarchical and word order follows pragmatic rules. Pauses while 
speaking are longer, which also points to more conscious processing. Besides this, 
mental effort is less in grammatical speech, due to automatic processing, while 
context dependence is higher in pre-grammatical speech (Givón 2009). 
 
 
5.4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYNTACTIC BRAIN 
 
When looking at what makes humans ready to process language, the remaining 
question is what in the brain is distinct from other vertebrates, other mammals and 
other primates, in particular, and how the cognitive abilities in humans evolved after 
the split-up from the last common ancestor with chimpanzees. A solid point of 
reference, according to Fitch is to look at the differences between human brains and 
the brains of primates, concerning brain anatomy and brain function, as well. By 
doing this, for the purpose of identifying which traits are uniquely human, it is sought 
for human autapomorphies. This term refers to the traits which differentiate humans 
from the last common ancestor with chimpanzees (Fitch 2011:1). But despite 
neurobiological features that set humans apart from chimpanzees, there is much 
more to find that humans have in common with chimpanzees, so called 
synaptomorphies. Synaptomorphies are traits that a species shares with a relative 
species, by common descent (Fitch 2011:2). Synaptomorphies with humans are not 
only found among chimpanzees, but also with other vertebrates, humans share all 
aspects of neurotransmitter chemistry, neuronal morphology, brain stem circuitry, and 
also many aspects of neural processing. (Fitch 2011) With other mammals the 
similarities are even bigger: All mammals have a six-layer neocortex. And eventually 
with chimpanzees, humans share all known aspects of neuroanatomy, despite size 
(Fitch 2011). 
Fitch (2011) points out two different theories on the evolution of the syntax specific 
regions, namely BA 44, BA 45, BA 6 and the frontal operculum. Both theories use the 
functional differences between these areas, which are due to differences of 
granularity and affect connectivity of these areas respectively. The first theory 
focuses mostly on BA 45 and thus assumes the origins within premotor functions of 
this area. This theory assumes that the underlying computations of syntax in natural 
language are related to motor control and motor planning with relations of the 
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hierarchical nature of syntax to the hierarchical nature of motor planning (Fitch 
2011:7). 
Here, analogously to the finding that less complex sentences lead to a stronger 
activation within BA 6 and the deep fOP, while complex sentences activate BA 44 
and BA 45 stronger, the assumption is that the premotor functions of the deep fOP 
served as a precursor for linguistic computations. BA 6 and the deep fOP, being 
agranular, lead through a gradual granularization of gray matter and strengthened 
pre-existing connections to other regions of the cortex (Fitch 2011). 
The other theory concerns binocular vision, which is shown to exist in chimpanzees 
and macaques. Furthermore, these also have trichromacy, which is the property of 
possessing three independent channels for conveying color information (Fitch 
2011:7). 
This leads to an increased importance of the visual system relative to the olfactory 
and sound system. Thereby, these species have heightened awareness of the gaze 
of others which plays an important role in social behaviour and understanding (Fitch 
2011). Movement of the eyes is a motor function while controlling this function 
requires intracortical communication. Fitch assumes that when a species depends on 
the visual system and this is combined with strong social pressure, then this might 
lead to a computation of eye movements that have a more abstract component than 
limb or hand movement. Fitch (2011) furthermore suggests that, since in the 
macaque one portion of BA 45 is closely linked to eye movements, while social 
cognition requires intracortical connectivity, the amodal computations of language 
had a pre-adaptation in the visual and social aspects of gaze, which, according to 
this hypothesis, are subserved by a portion of BA 45 (Fitch 2011). 
Fitch notes that these two different theories could be complementary, such that the 
abilities that evolved from BA 6 and the fOP, and the abilities that evolved from BA 45 
represent a kind of fusion, as Fitch puts it, in BA 44, which anatomically lies between 
the former and the latter area. This would have lead to a more abstract computational 
process than only hierarchical motor planning, namely “an operator that can combine 
and unify pre-existing conceptual units” (Fitch 201:7), called Merge. Fitch, 
furthermore, characterizes the features that such an operator must have, like follows 
(Fitch 2011:8): 
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Whether during comprehension or in production, such an operator must quickly retrieve items 
from memory (e.g., retrieve the phonological form of words from the lexicon), combine them in 
a context–relevant fashion (e.g., using background information and current context) into 
flexible, temporary, goal-relevant structures that can be parsed semantically (in 
comprehension) or produced motorically via some serialization process (during production). 
As emphasized by Hagoort, such an overarching computation is consistent with both the 
neuroanatomy of Broca’s area, as discussed above, and a wide variety of brain imaging 
results focused on language comprehension. 
 
The next part of this chapter focuses on the ability that makes humans able to 
process recursive structures: Different theories on what is responsible for this ability 
are looked at more closely and then, recursion within the theory of language 
evolution is considered. 
 
 
5.4 DIFFERENT THEORIES ON THE ABILITY IN HUMANS TO PROCESS 
LANGUAGE/RECURSIVE STRUCTURES 
 
Concerning the source for the human ability to process recursion, different theories 
are available. These are now presented and discussed in this part of the chapter. 
 
 
5.4.1 The Grammar Gene Theory  
 
The Grammar Gene Theory assumes that the human ability to process language is 
due to our human version of the FOXP2 gene. This theory was first introduced by 
Chomsky and finds its evidence inter alia in both brain lesion studies and in studies 
about developmental disorder, like Williams syndrome and Down syndrome. Bishop 
(2009) notes that according to Chomsky’s rejection of the Big Brain Theory, it would 
be of special interest to study language abilities, or rather syntactic abilities in 
particular, in children with primary microcephaly, since people who suffer from this 
genetic disorder, show dramatically reduced brain size. If someone could attest 
syntactic abilities in someone with such a disorder which causes brain size to be 
approximately like in chimpanzees, the theory about human brain size being 
responsible for recursive abilities could reliably be rejected (Bishop 2009:186).  
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5.4.2 The Recursive Brain Theory 
 
This theory, however, assumes that the human Language Faculty comes from the 
fact that the human brain, in contrast to the brains of other species, contains a 
special mechanism that makes it possible for humans to comprehend and produce 
recursive structures. Since recursion is thought to need more than any memory 
device that is just big enough to save data while processing a long-distance 
dependency, human working-memory is considered by a number of researchers not 
being able to serve as this special mechanism. What is it then that could be this 
special mechanism assumed in the Recursive Brain Theory; and how does this 
theory distinguish from the Grammar Gene Theory that also assumes a special 
mechanism for recursion in the form of a special form of a particular gene. The 
Recursive Brain Theory is, if you will, an alternative to the Grammar gene theory, 
which refers to innate principles due to a special form of a gene, which causes the 
human specialization to recursive structure processing. Within this theory, it is rather 
the computational ability that makes human able to process this kind of structure than 
innate knowledge of principles and this is what makes the theory more acceptable to 
neurobiologists (Bishop 2009:189). However, this theory does not contradict a theory 
where working-memory plays a major role, since, as we have seen in Chapter 3, 
working-memory in humans is considered to contain different structures for 
processing different kinds of data, even for different kinds of syntactic processing. 
 
 
5.4.3 The Big Brain Theory 
 
The Big Brain Theory, in contrast to the two above discussed theories about what 
makes the human brain ready for recursion and thus for language, emphasizes the 
importance not of a special mechanism or special form of a gene as cause for the 
human ability of being able to process recursion, but overall brain size of humans to 
have caused this special human ability (Bishop 2009). 
Roughly speaking, this theory claims that humans have bigger brains and thus more 
computational power, which makes them able to compute things and use abilities 
which are reserved to human beings. This early theory, however, was already 
rejected by Chomsky, who argued that syntax crucially differs from other cognitive 
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abilities. With respect to the theory of modularity in the human mind, this means that 
there is a separate module which is responsible for linguistic computation and can 
thus be separated from other cognitive functions. This separate module then, 
however, needs not only a different module, but also a qualitatively different neural 
substrate, rather than only a quantitative difference in the form of more computational 
power. Chomsky then proposed that there must have been occurred a change in the 
human genome that made the processing of syntax, and thus recursion possible. 
This theory is known as the Grammar Gene Theory, discussed above. 
Calvin (2000) suggests that a large number of neurons is needed to maintain the 
signal fidelity needed for syntax in natural language, which means that the number of 
neurons is at least beside other factors crucial for the transmissions of signals within 
the brain. This speaks for the necessity of a “big brain” to process complex structures 
like recursive ones are. This assumption, however, does not reject the Grammar 
Gene Theory, not the Recursive Brain Theory, since additionally to a bigger brain in 
general being at least one of multiple factors, another factor, or even more than one, 
could have played a critical role in language evolution. 
 
 
5.5 RECURSION AND LANGUAGE EVOLUTION 
 
After Chomsky in the 1950s had written about the generative capacity of the 
language system and dealt with recursion in the forms discussed in the first and 
second chapter of this thesis, it had not been examined much further until 2002 when 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch published the article with the name “The language 
faculty – What is it, who has it and how did it evolve?”, where they discuss the role 
recursion might have played in the evolution of language. This article, however, 
unleashed an upcoming debate about recursion in the evolution of Homo sapiens 
and of natural language evolution and human cognition, in particular. In this part of 
the chapter HCF’s article is presented and afterwards discussed including the article 
published by Pinker and Jackendoff (2005). 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch in their article discuss what sets humans ready for 
language. Since other species, even those which are closely related to the human 
species, fail to develop language, it must be something that is present in humans but 
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lacks in all other species. For this purpose, they look at the properties of the 
Language Faculty and at different cognitive properties relevant for language. 
Roughly speaking, Hauser et al. distinguish between the Faculty of Language in a 
broad sense (FLB) and in a narrow sense (FLN). While the former contains 
everything that is needed for language but is also found in other domains and/or in 
other species, the latter does only contain things that are exclusively needed for 
language, and are only present in humans (Hauser et al. 2002). With this distinction 
Hauser et al. aim to find out what sets human language apart from other 
communicative systems in other species and also what sets it apart from other 
cognitive domains. 
Their conclusion is that there is something like a Language Faculty in the narrow 
sense that distinguishes from general linguistic abilities that are shared among other 
domains and other species and that this faculty at least contains recursion. Roughly 
speaking, Hauser et al. claim that recursion is at least what makes language uniquely 
human, or rather that recursion is what makes humans ready to have evolved a 
communicative system like natural language. They further argue that recursion is this 
special feature, since it is, according to Hauser and colleagues, a cognitive property 
that is both uniquely human and unique to the language ability (Hauser et al. 2002). 
After the publishing of this article a big debate about what recursion is, what it is 
needed for and if it is what sets human natural language apart, started. Pinker and 
Jackendoff (2005), for example, argued in their article that some of the evidence, 
Hauser et al. brought up, is not good enough to sustain. They discussed in their 
article what is special to language and brought up several arguments against the 
“recursion only” hypothesis. But as pointed out by Corballis, recursion is not 
considered the only property that distinguishes language, but the minimum (Corballis 
2006). 
According to Pinker et al. (2005), Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch maintain that recursion 
is the mechanism which is responsible for everything that distinguishes language 
both from other human capacities and from the capacities in animals (Pinker et al. 
2005). This does not necessarily mean that recursion, as a property of syntax in the 
sense of Merge or center-embedding, is the core mechanism or property that 
distinguishes language from any other communication system and lead to language 
emerging in humans. More likely, it is the case that recursion as a property of human 
cognition has lead to the emergence of language, since it makes humans able to 
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process recursive structures, and thus made it possible for a generative grammar, 
that is able to create infinity by finite means, and create and understand hierarchical 
structures, including center-embedding, to evolve. For example, Pinker et al. argued 
that “There are good adaptive reasons for a distinct level of combinatorial 
phonological structure to have evolved as part of the Language Faculty” (Pinker et al. 
2005:212). 
Of course, the principle known as Speech is special is also important for language, 
but in contrast to what Pinker et al. claim, it is not necessarily the case that Hauser et 
al. neglected this property of language as being a hallmark in its evolution, but rather 
that they did not include it in their theory, because it is not a part of the FLN in the 
sense that it could be responsible for the evolution of the Faculty of Language as a 
single property. This is plausible, because this phonological principle that describes 
the fact that humans when hearing language sounds categorize them, such that they 
hear either the one sound or another but never a mixture, is unique to language and 
does not count for non-linguistic sounds, but it seems not to be unique to humans, 
since chinchillas are able to make the same distinctions between sounds. This is 
what makes the theory of Speech is special indeed not unique to language, because 
language itself is unique to humans. This means that Speech is special is unique to 
humans in the language domain but not the concept of sound distinction behind it. 
A further question is, whether recursion has directly evolved for a linguistic purpose 
or rather for another non-linguistic purpose. 
One possibility, however, is that recursion evolved from the cognitive basis of 
grouping. Hunyadi (2006) argues that the same principles underlie visual, abstract 
prosodic and linguistic grouping. 
Furthermore, he argues that from the evidence that both new-born humans and 
tamarin monkeys are able to recognize speech in natural order, one can suggest that 
new-borns as well as tamarin monkeys have the general ability to receive the 
hierarchical organization of elements. This in turn, according to Hunyadi, indicates 
that also tamarins possess the general cognitive mechanism of recursion (Hunyadi 
2006:111). Hunyadi considers grouping as a cognitive basis for recursion in 
language, because combining phrases via Merge is a kind of grouping and requires 
the cognitive prerequisites to do this. Hunyadi conducted an experimental study 
where he tested the mechanisms underlying different kinds of grouping to observe 
the correlation between them. He came to the conclusion that, since the same 
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principles were identified to underlie both linguistic and non-linguistic grouping, 
syntactic recursion in language did not evolve specifically for language, but rather as 
a more general cognitive mechanism (Hunyadi 2006:67) 
One possibility is that recursion in syntax is language specific in the sense that it 
derived from the more general ability to process recursion in other domains, in the 
first place, but then, as an exaptation, developed separately within the Faculty of 
Language, such that recursion in language differs from recursion in general cognition 
and thus belongs to something like a Faculty of Language in the narrow sense. 
Recursion in the syntax of human natural language can be seen as the ability 
humans needed to be able to process something like syntax, which in turn made it 
possible for natural language with its syntactic infinity to emerge.   
 
 
5.6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION     
 
Since recursion is assumed to be a hallmark, or at least one of the hallmarks of 
human language, the evolution of this ability has to be considered. Applying the 
concepts of evolutionary theory to language seems to be rather problematic, since no 
fossils can serve as direct evidence in contrast evidence for early stages of human 
language ability is exclusively indirect. Evidence in this case is such as evidence from 
cognitive archeology and other findings that allow conclusions about brain size and 
cognitive abilities. Moreover, there appear to be different general questions 
concerning the evolution of human language and syntax, in particular. Different 
theories exist about how and especially why language evolved. Concerning the 
question why language evolved in humans, it is of great interest why this only 
happened in humans and did not in any other species. Another question concerning 
this issue is whether language is an adaptation or and exaptation and whether 
language appeared gradual or as a saltation. In order to approach to this question, 
brain areas that process syntax/recursion and homologues in closely related animal 
species are considered.  
One possibility of the evolution of recursive language, which I want to illustrate here, 
is that several genetic changes caused the evolution of the nervous system by 
natural selection. The neuronal differences then, led to the ability in hominids to 
process more complex, hierarchical and recursive structures, which made them able 
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to use and manufacture tools and also able to interact socially in a more complex 
way. The complex social interaction could then have led to the need of a more 
precise communicative system, which can be provided by grammatical language. 
Since the hominid brain had been able to handle structures necessary for such a 
communicative system, syntactic complex structures in communications emerged by 
occurring in the form of learned syntax in the first place. Abstract thinking, particularly 
the emerging ability to learn and apply abstract rules then led away from learned to 
generated syntax, which in turn could have led to an even more complex syntax, 
since a grammar with a recursive generating system can create infinite number of 
sentences with a small amount of rules. And with the progress of syntactic language 
in humans a distinct module, specialized for language evolved, which can account for 
the neuronal differences between the processing of linguistic and non-linguistic 
hierarchical structures. Since some animals show a large number of the cognitive 
abilities, needed for grammatical language there must be a slight difference which 
made the big step for humans in evolution. One possibility is that humans both show 
motor skill learning and complex abstract thinking. Recursion or more particularly the 
concept of Merge could also be the possible step that made humans ready for 
language or at least pushed human cognitive abilities in the right direction. 
Experimental studies with animals seem to provide a helpful insight into the puzzle of 
how human language could have evolved and what distinguishes it from other 
communicative systems. But until now the question of how this happened remains, 
but again and again some pieces of this complex puzzle are solved and help solving 
this “hardest problem in science”. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In Chapter 1, a short introduction to the concept of recursion was given and different 
fields where recursion appears were illustrated. Furthermore, we have taken a look at 
some controversy about the term recursion and its concept with respect to linguistic 
syntax. I have come to the conclusion that a differentiation between recursion, 
iteration and “simple repetition” is not useful, or rather doesn’t make any sense, 
since, as I argued, recursion in natural language syntax is evident in every sentence, 
since recursion is represented by a combining operation like Merge, which is always 
recursion. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that a recursive process does not 
always yield a recursive structure, or rather embedding. Here again, I argued that this 
differentiation is not plausible, since, according to X’-Theory a sentence with more 
than one clause as well as a sentence with only one clause is represented 
hierarchical and thus yields an embedded structure. The example given by Luuk et 
al. (2011), who compare a box within a box with an NP within another NP, is not 
helpful, nor plausible in this sense, since a box within a box, which clearly is not 
recursive, does not have anything in common with a linguistic structure like an NP 
within an NP. Karlsson (2009) in his paper argued that only center-embedded CPs 
yield what he referred to as true recursion, which I claimed to be implausible, since 
every sentence shows embeddings and is combined by the recursive operation as 
well. 
 
Chapter 2 was concerned with recursion in linguistic theory, and thus recursion in 
different generative theories was presented. Furthermore, we looked more closely at 
the issue concerning the question what is recursive in natural language syntax. I 
argued that every sentence is equally recursive, since it is generated by the same 
rules, independent of whether multiple CP-embedding occurs or not. CP-embedded 
sentences seem to differ from other sentence in they need more working-memory to 
be processed. One claim about the differentiation between CP-embedded recursion 
and recursion on other phrases was made, which refers to what was called the strong 
and the weak form of recursion, where the strong form is related to CP-embedding, 
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with higher working-memory demands and the weak form is related to the embedding 
of other phrases, yielding simpler sentences and thus requires less working-memory. 
This, however, is considered to be a differentiation rather of degree than kind. 
Furthermore, Progovac argued that Root Small Clauses are not recursive, since they 
cannot be embedded within each other, and thus show the fact that Merge is not 
recursion, and these sentences display an earlier stage of human language 
evolution, which I again claimed to be not really plausible, since even if today’s 
human beings utter some sort of sentences that cannot be embedded within each 
other, the computational system from today’s humans is used and not the cognitive 
system of any pre-grammatic being and thus some other reason than the one pointed 
out by Progovac makes these sentences unable to be embedded into each other. 
 
The 3rd chapter was about the relation of recursive processing to the brain, both 
within the linguistic and the non-linguistic domain.  Moreover, the role of modularity 
and working-memory here was discussed. It seems to be the case that processing 
different kinds of syntactic structures activates different areas within Broca’s complex. 
BA 44 is considered to be responsible for processing what Friederici et al. (2011) 
referred to as complexity while BA 45/47 is rather activated when processing 
distance dependencies. When processing what is in general referred to as simple 
sentence only the fOP is activated. From these data, Friederici et al. (2011) deduce 
that recursive processing, reflected by “complexity”, is processed mostly by BA 44. I 
propose at this point that this activation reflects working-memory load, since complex 
sentence which have multiple clauses have higher working-memory demands than 
simpler sentences. The fact that different areas are activated with respect to syntactic 
structure (e.g. complexity versus distance) can be explained by Santi et al.’s finding 
that there seem to be different kinds of working-memory for different kinds of 
syntactic structure. This theory would also explain why in simple sentences these 
regions do not show such a great response: This leads to the assumption that BA 44 
is not active in simple sentence, because they are not recursive, but rather because 
they do not require working-memory to that extend. 
 
In Chapter 4, the role of recursion in human cognition and the probability of such 
ability in non-human species was looked at more closely.  Recursion is evident in 
multiple non-linguistic domains and seems to be a necessary ability to process 
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language. Concerning the debate about the indigenous language Pirahã which had 
been claimed to be not recursive by Daniel Everett, seems to be nevertheless 
recursive, in different senses. Despite the fact that it must be recursive, since it uses 
the same generative mechanisms like any other language and thus makes it possible 
for its speakers to create and understand new sentences, it seemingly as well yields 
multiple CP-embedding, at least in the form of conditionals as for example Sauerland 
(2010) found. When assuming that Everett is right with his claim, this would mean 
that recursion is not a human universal, which seems rather implausible, since it is 
not only evident in language, but also in multiple other domains of human thinking, as 
action planning, that are considered a hallmark of human cognition.  
It has been shown that songbirds, though having a more complex structure within 
their communicative signals, and are vocal learners like humans are, some non-
human primates show a more complex non-linguistic behavior, for example in the 
field of social interactions. 
Concerning animal cognition in general, these seem to be capable of cognitive 
abilities in the same domains as humans, like generalizing from past experience, 
planning future behavior and social cognition and social learning as well as learning 
by observation. The question then was, in how far humans differ from other species, 
especially from non-human primates, where a differentiation in neuronal structures 
gets evident. 
 
In the 5th chapter, finally, the concept of recursion in natural language syntax related 
to language evolution was discussed. Concerning the question why and how 
language evolved in humans, different theories are available, as it is for the evolution 
of syntax in particular. Moreover, there exist different theories on how the human 
brain evolved to be capable of syntactic language. One possibility is, however, that 
factors from different theories have interacted with each other, such that language-
like utterances, that probably did not serve communication, but rather the avoidance 
of inbreeding, made linguistic units, like words, to appear, which probably lead to 
social interaction, which in turn affected the development of the human brain and 
thus the emergence of language. Recursion plays a crucial role here, since it is the 
basic mechanism that makes it possible to combine linguistic units by abstract rules, 
such that they yield a concatenated new one, as well as it is basically responsible for 
the human ability to use language as not only referring to the here-and-now, but also 
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as referring to past, future and imaginary events. Moreover, the recursive ability in 
humans is probably also responsible for the complex social interactions in humans, 
which are often considered to be linked to the evolution of language in humans.  
One of the main questions within this concern is, of course, why only humans 
developed such a complex communicative system, like language, if some animal 
species show rather complex cognitive behavior, partly even within the same 
domains as humans. When assuming this, there could only be one rather small 
difference between humans and these animal species which makes such a big 
difference. Some of these abilities seem to exist both in humans and in non-human 
species at a distinct degree like the ability to abstract things. The question is, whether 
human cognitive abilities only differ in degree, or as well in kinds, which would mean 
that humans have some ability that all other species lack, and such made it possible 
for language to evolve in humans, but not in any other species. 
 
Open questions, however, are in how far and in what extend working-memory is 
involved in the observed brain activity while processing different kinds of complex 
sentences and thus plays a role in recursive structure processing, both in the 
linguistic and non-linguistic domain. The involvement of working-memory in 
processing recursion raises the question of how human working-memory capacity is 
critical for the processing of recursion, and thus language, in general. A rather strong 
claim here would be that working-memory alone makes humans able to process 
language, in that it can handle the complex structures language processing requires 
in the sense that humans have some special sort of working-memory that is 
responsible for syntactic operations, and thus also for recursion. One argument in 
favor of this hypothesis is that not only long sentences with multiple CP-embedding, 
or even center-embedded CPs need a well enough qualified working-memory, but 
short, simpler sentences with only one CP are rather complex structures that require 
a certain amount of working-memory load. However, independent of the question 
whether working-memory capacity is the only thing that makes humans able to 
process recursion, and thus language, working-memory seems to be a crucial part of 
it. 
A further question here is in how far working-memory is specialized to particular 
syntactic structure, or specialized to syntactic structure in general, or whether 
linguistic tasks are shared with more general working-memory function, where a third 
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possibility would be that this part of working-memory is not specialized to the 
language domain, but rather to a domain that is specialized to process syntax-like 
structures, yielding a specialized working-memory for recursive structures. 
 
When assuming that the big working-memory in humans is responsible for human 
language ability, it, however, is not necessary to assume a big brain to be the cause 
for this. Equally well, a genetic predisposition as well as structural predisposition in a 
hypothetical module sense is possible to be the reason. 
 
Of course, one crucial question is as well, whether Merge indeed is recursion and 
thus makes each and every sentence in a natural language recursive. Concerning 
this issue, the base question for this matter is whether a recursive process always 
yields a recursive structure or not. I argued that this in fact is the case, since, 
according to X’-Theory, every sentence is considered to be represented via a 
hierarchical structure, including domination of constituents through other constituents. 
The suggestion that phrase structure rules do not yield recursion, because they are 
linear, and thus not every sentence is recursive, to my knowledge, can be disproved 
rather easily by two arguments: The first argument is that the linear structure of 
phrase structure rules is just one possibility of representing these, such that they 
could also be represented via hierarchy. Moreover, according to Ullman (2004), 
hierarchical dependencies within phrase structure rules are achieved through the fact 
that one constituent contains another one.  
 
Concerning the controversy about the term recursion within linguistic frameworks, I 
propose that this is at least partly due to the confusion about different uses of the 
term embedding, where in claims that recursion is only present in CP-embedded 
sentences, recursive embedding is confused with subordination of clauses, yielding 
hypotaxis. Recursive embedding, however, does not only exist in hypotaxis, since 
embedding as linguistic term, exists, as I argued throughout this thesis, in every 
sentence. In this case, it has to be investigated why brain responses to recursive 
sentence processing are only evident in sentences with multiple embedded clauses 
or center-embedding and do not occur in simpler sentences with one clause and why 
the activated brain areas differ with respect to whether a distance, a center-
embedded structure or Movement is involved. Santi et al.’s suggestion that there are 
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different kinds of working-memory available for this seems rather plausible and also 
explains why such an activation is not observed when processing simpler sentences, 
since these need less working-memory load. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that 
all measurements of brain responses to cognitive tasks are highly indirect and thus 
cannot assure unambiguous results. 
Generativity in natural language goes hand in hand with recursion, both in a 
structural as well as in the sense of computational procedure. A further question here 
is whether in other domains than language, generativity is accompanied by recursion. 
Corballis (2011) made a distinction between a recursive I-Language and recursive E-
Language. Concerning Pirahã, he pointed out that it is possible that even lacking 
recursion in their E-Language, they might have a recursive I-Language, containing an 
operation like “Chomsky’s Merge” (Corballis 2011:35). He further notes that Merge 
indeed holds for I-Language, but does not for E-Language, since in order to get a 
sentence from I-Language to E-Language additional operations like Movement are 
needed, and thus these differ cross-linguistically, “Chomsky’s notion of unbounded 
Merge, recursively applied, is therefore essentially an idealization, inferred from study 
of external languages, but is not itself directly observable” (Corballis 2011:24). 
However, as I have argued, even if not observable directly, as a number of linguistic 
operations are, Merge is the mechanism that makes language recursive and applies 
equally for CPs as for all other phrases, with a difference in working-memory load.  
I suggest that the reason for the assumption that recursion is overtly apparent in CP-
embedded sentences, but not in sentences with a single CP, is that CP-embedding 
yields clausal subordination and thus is more clearly observable, since a clause 
contains a main verb and is thus easily observable. This, nevertheless, doesn’t have 
to mean that there appears to be a structural difference between these kinds of 
sentences, since they both are concatenated by the same mechanism. That is also 
why it is assumed by Corballis that Pirahã is recursive in I-Language, but probably 
lacks recursion in E-Language. Nonetheless, I suggest that every sentence in every 
natural language has to be recursive and so does its underlying structure, since the 
syntactic operation Merge combines linguistic units, such that we are able to 
theoretically create infinity by finite means, and thus yields embedding and moreover 
does this equally for all phrases, only that for embedded clauses working-memory 
load is higher. 
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When assuming that recursion is the basic cognitive distinction between humans and 
other species, this could be a distinction in kind as well as in degree. The assumption 
that there is a distinction only in degree can be supported by the findings that some 
animals show a quite good understanding of recursion in some domains as do some 
non-humans primates concerning Theory of Mind. On the other hand it seems to be 
more than a distinction of kind, since no other species seems to have a 
communicative system that is that complex both in structure as well as in meaning as 
human language is. I, however, come to the conclusion that working-memory has to 
play a crucial role concerning the issue of how humans and other species differ with 
respect to cognitive abilities and linguistic syntax, in particular. Further studies within 
this field of research could concentrate on the role that working-memory might play 
within this issue and also look more closely on brain responses concerning simple 
sentences, perhaps in the sense that longer sentences without any additional 
syntactic operations, nor long-distance dependencies or multiple CP-embedding are 
considered further.   
 
 
 122 
 
 123 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Abrahams, Brett S. & Geschwind, Daniel H. (2008) “Advances in autism genetics: on 
the threshold of a new neurobiology,” Nature Review, 9, pp. 341–355.  
 
Arsenijevic, Borban & Hinzen, Wolfram (2010) “Recursion as a Human Universal and 
as a Primitive,” Biolinguistics, 4, pp. 165-173. 
 
Bickerton, Derek (2007) “Language evolution: A brief guide for linguists,” Lingua, 
117, pp. 510-526. 
 
Bickerton, Derek (2009) “Syntax for non-syntacticians – A brief primer,” Biological 
foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 3-13). 
 
Bishop, Dorothy V. M. (2009) “What can developmental language impairment tell us 
about genetic bases of syntax?” Biological foundations and origin of syntax, ed. 
Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp.185-204). 
 
Boeckle, Marcus & Bugnyar, Thomas (2012) “Long-Term Memory for Affiliates in 
Ravens,” Current Biology 22, pp. 1-6. 
 
Bolhuis, Johan J. & Gahr, Manfred (2006) “Neural mechanisms of birdsong memory,” 
Nature Reviews, 7, pp. 347-357. 
 
Calvin, William H. & Bickerton, Derek (2000) Lingua ex Machina: Reconciling Darwin 
and Chomsky with the human brain (Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
Carnie, Andrew (2007) Syntax – A generative introduction (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd 
edition). 
  References 
124 
 
Chomsky, Noam (1959) “On Certain Formal Properties of Grammars,” Information 
and Control 2, pp. 137-176. 
 
Chomsky, Noam (2004) “Three Factors in Language Design,” Linguistic Inquiry, 36, 
pp. 1-22. 
 
Christiansen, Morten H. (1992) “The (Non)Necessity of Recursion in Natural 
Language processing,” Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, pp. 665-670. 
 
Christiansen, Morten H. & Chater, Nick (1999) “Toward a connectionist model of 
recursion in human linguistic performance,” Cognitive Science, 23, pp. 157-205. 
 
Comins, Jordan A. & Gentner, Timothy Q. (2010) “Working memory for patterned 
sequences of auditory objects in a songbird,” Cognition, 117, pp. 38-53. 
 
Conway, Christopher M. & Christiansen, Morten H. (2001) “Sequential learning in 
non-human primates,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, pp. 539-546. 
 
Corballis, Michael C. (2007) “Recursion, Language, and Starlings,” Cognitive Science 
31, pp. 697-704. 
 
Corballis, Michael C. (2011) The recursive mind – The origins of human language, 
thought and civilization (Princeton University Press). 
 
Darwin, Charles (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the 
preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life (London: John Murray). 
 
Dell’mour, Vera; Range, Friederike & Huber, Ludwig (2009) “Social learning and 
mother’s behavior in manipulative tasks in infant marmosets,” American Journal of 
Primatology, 71, pp. 503-509. 
 
  References 
125 
 
Di Sciullo, Anna Maria; Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo; Wexler, Kenneth; Berwick, 
Robert C.; Boeckx, Cedric; Jenkins, Lyle; Uriagereka, Juan; Stromswold, Karin; 
Cheng, Lisa Lai-Shen; Harley, Heidi; Wedel, Andrew; McGilvray, James; van 
Gelderen, Elly & Bever, Thomas G. (2010) “The biological nature of human 
language,” Biolinguistics, 4, pp. 4-34. 
 
Dunbar, Robin (1996) Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language (Harvard 
University Press). 
 
Erk, Katrin & Priese, Lutz (2008) Theoretische Informatik (Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, 3rd Edition). 
 
Everett, Daniel (2005) “Cultural Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã,” 
Current Anthropology, 46, pp. 621-646. 
 
Eysenck, Michael W. & Keane, Mark T. (2010) Cognitive Psychology – A student’s 
handbook (Psychology Press, 6th edition). 
 
Fedor, Anna; Ittzés, Péter & Szathmáry, Eörs (2009) “The biological background of 
syntax evolution,” Biological foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & 
Eörs Szathmáry (MIT Press, pp. 15-41). 
 
Fedor, Anna; Pléh, Csaba; Brauer, Jens; Caplan, David; Friederici, Angela D.; 
Gulyás, Balázs; Hagoort, Peter; Nazir, Tatjana & Singer, Wolf (2009) “What are the 
brain mechanisms underlying syntactic operations?” Biological foundations and origin 
of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (MIT Press, pp. 299-325).   
 
Fitch, W. Tecumseh; Hauser, Marc D. & Chomsky, Noam (2005) “The evolution of 
the language faculty: Clarifications and implications,” Cognition, 97, pp. 179-210. 
 
Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2010) The Evolution of Language (Cambridge University 
Press). 
 
  References 
126 
 
Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2011) “The evolution of syntax: an exaptationist perspective,” 
Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience, 3, Article 9: www.frontiersin.org 
 
Fodor, Jerry (1983) The modularity of mind (Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
 
Friederici, Angela D. (2004) “Processing local transitions versus long-distance 
syntactic hierarchies,” TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 8, pp. 245-247. 
 
Friederici, Angela D. (2006) “Broca’s area and the ventral premotor cortex in 
language: Functional differentiation and specificity,” Cortex, 42, pp. 472-475. 
 
Friederici, Angela D. (2009) “Brain circuits of syntax,” Biological foundations and 
origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
pp.  239-253).   
 
Friederici, Angela; Bahlmann, Jörg; Friedrich, Roland & Makuuchi, Michiru (2011) 
“The Neural Basis of Recursion and Complex Syntactic Hierarchy,” Biolinguistics, 5, 
pp. 87-104. 
 
Friedrich, Roland & Friederici, Angela (2009) “Mathematical logic in the human brain: 
Syntax,” PLoS One, 4, Issue 5. www.plosone.org 
 
Gentner, Timothy Q.; Fenn, Kimberly M.; Margoliash, Daniel & Nusbaum, Howard C. 
(2006) “Recursive syntactic pattern learning by songbirds,” Nature, 440, pp. 1204-
1207. 
 
Gerrig, Richard J. & Zimbardo, Philip G. (2008) Psychologie (Pearson Studium,  
Addison-Wesley Verlag, 18th Edition). 
 
Givón, T. (2009) “The adaptive approach to grammar,” Biological foundations and 
origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
pp.  89-117).  
 
  References 
127 
 
Gould, Stephen Jay & Vrba, Elisabeth S. (1982) “Exaptation – A missing term in the 
science of form,” Paleobiology, 8, pp. 4-15. 
 
Greenblatt, Richard E. (2011) “A computational study of action planning in syntax 
evolution,” http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/12/S1/P130 
 
Grodzinsky, Yosef & Friederici, Angela (2006) “Neuroimaging of syntax and syntactic 
processing,” Current opinion in Neurobiology, 16, pp. 240-246. 
 
Haesler, S. et al. (2004) “FoxP2 Expression in Avian Vocal Learners and Non-
Learners,”.Journal of Neuroscience, 24, pp. 3164–3175. 
 
Haftendorn, Dörte (2011) Mathematik sehen und verstehen – Schlüssel zur Welt 
(Spektrum Akademischer Verlag Heidelberg). 
 
Hagoort, Peter (2009) “Reflections on the neurobiology of syntax,” Biological 
foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp.  279-299).  
 
Harley, Trevor A. (2007) The psychology of language (Psychology Press, 3rd edition). 
 
Hauser, Marc D.; Chomsky, Noam & Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2002) “The faculty of 
language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?” Science, 298, pp. 1569-
1579.  
 
Hilliard, Austin T. & White, Stephanie A. (2009) “Possible precursors of syntactic 
components in other species,” Biological foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek 
Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 161-185).  
 
Hunyadi, László (2006) “Grouping, the cognitive basis of recursion in language,” 
Argumentum 2, pp. 67-114. 
 
Kaan, Edith & Swaab, Tamara (2002) “The Brain Circuitry of Syntactic  
Comprehension,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, pp. 350-356. 
  References 
128 
 
 
Isac, Daniela &Reiss, Charles (2008) I-Language – An introduction to linguistics as 
cognitive science (Oxford University Press). 
 
Izard, Véronique; Pica, Pierre; Spelke, Elizabeth & Dehaene, Stanislas (2008) “Exact 
equality and successor function: two key concepts on the path towards 
understanding exact numbers,” Philosophical Psychology, 21, pp. 491-505. 
 
Kaan, Edith (2009) “Fundamental syntactic phenomena and their putative relation to 
the brain,” Biological foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek Bickerton & Eörs 
Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 117-135).  
 
Karlsson, Fred (2009) “Syntactic recursion and iteration,” Recursion and human 
language, ed. Harry van der Hulst (De Gruyter Mouton, pp.43-67). 
 
Kovács, Ágnes Melinda; Téglás, Ernö & Endress, Ansgar Denis (2010) “The Social 
Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults,” Science, 330, 
pp. 1830-1834. 
 
Lasnik, Howard (2002) “The minimalist program in syntax,” Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 6, pp. 432-437. 
 
Lewis, David (1986) On the plurality of worlds (Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Lieberman, Debra; Tooby, John & Cosmides, Leda (2000) “The evolution of human 
incest avoidance mechanisms: an evolutionary psychological approach,” 
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/papers/Incest_avoid.pdf 
 
Lobina, David (2011) “A Running Back and Forth: A Review of Recursion and Human 
Langauge,” Biolinguistics, 5, pp. 151-169. 
 
Mayer, J.; Wildgruber D.; Riecker, A.; Dogil, G.; Ackermann, H.; Grodd, W.; (2002) 
“Prosody production and perception: converging evidence from fMRI studies,” 
Proceedings Speech Prosody, Aix-en-Provence, pp. 487-490. 
  References 
129 
 
 
Nevins, Andrew; Pesetsky, David & Rodrigues, Cilene (2009) “Evidence and 
argumentation: A reply to Everett,” Language, 85, pp. 671-681. 
 
Pinker, Steven & Jackendoff (2005) “The faculty of language: What’s special about 
it?” Cognition, 95, pp. 201-236. 
 
Jesse J. Prinz (2006) “Is the Mind Really Modular?” Contemporary Debates in 
Cognitive Science, ed. Robert J. Stainton (Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Progovac, Ljiljana (2009) “When clauses refuse to be recursive: An evolutionary 
perspective,” Recursion and human language, ed. Harry van der Hulst (De Gruyter 
Mouton pp. 193-211). 
 
Prusinkiewicz, Przemyslaw & Lindenmayer, Aristid (1990) The algorithmic beauty of 
plants (New York: Springer-Verlag). 
 
Russo, Eleonora & Treves, Alessandro (2011) “An uncouth approach to language 
recursivity,” Biolinguistics, 5, pp. 133-150. 
 
Sackett, James R. (1977) “The meaning of style in archeology: A general model,” 
American Antiquiry, 42, pp. 369-380. 
 
Sakel, Jeanette & Stapert, Eugene (2009) “Pirahã – in need of recursive syntax?” 
Recursion and human language, ed. Harry van der Hulst (De Gruyter Mouton, pp. 3-
16). 
 
Samuels, Bridget (2010) “The Evolving Science of Language Evolution,” 
Biolinguistics, 4, pp. 377-381. 
 
Santi, Andrea & Grodzinsky, Yosef (2007) “Working memory and syntax interact in 
Broca’s area,” NeuroImage, 37, pp. 8-17. 
 
  References 
130 
 
Sauerland, Uli (2010) “Experimental evidence for complex syntax in Pirahã,” 
http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/001095 
 
Sauerland, Uli & Trotzke, Andreas (2011) “Biolinguistic Perspective on Recursion: 
Introduction to the Special Issue,” Biolinguistics, 5, pp. 1-9. 
 
Sprouse, Jon & Lau, Ellen F. (2012) “Syntax and the brain,” 
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~jsprouse/papers/sprouse.lau.syntax.brain.pdf 
 
Számadó, Szabolcs; Hurford, James R.; Bishop, Dorothy V. M.; Deacon, Terrence 
W.; d’Errico, Francesco; Fischer, Julia; Okanoya, Kazuo; Szathmáry, Eörs & Ehite, 
Stephanie (2009) “What are the possible biological and genetic foundations for 
syntactic phenomena?” Biological foundations and origin of syntax, ed. Derek 
Bickerton & Eörs Szathmáry (Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 207-239). 
 
Schöning, Uwe (2009) Theoretische Informatik – Kurz gefasst (Spektrum 
Akademischer Verlag Heidelberg). 
 
 
Stabler, Edward P. (2011) „Recursion in grammar and performance,” 
http://www.linguistics.ucla.edu/people/stabler/Stabler10-Recurs.pdf 
 
Tomalin, Marcus (2006) Linguistics and the Formal Sciences – The Origins of 
Generative Grammar (Cambridge University Press). 
 
Tomalin, Marcus (2007) “Reconsidering Recursion in Syntactic Theory,” Lingua, 117, 
1784-1800. 
 
Ullman, Michael T. (2002) “Contributions of memory circuits to language: The 
declarative/procedural model,” Cognition, 92, pp. 231-270. 
 
van der Hulst, Harry (2009) “Recursion,” Recursion and human language, ed. Harry 
van der Hulst, (De Gruyter Mouton, pp. xv-3). 
 
  References 
131 
 
Vargha-Khadem, Faraneh; Gadian, David G.; Copp, Andrew & Mishkin, Mortimer 
(2005) “FOXP2 and the neuroanatomy of speech and language,” Nature Reviews, 6, 
pp. 131-138. 
 
Wilkinson, Anna; Kuenstner, Karin; Mueller, Julia & Huber, Ludwig (2010) “Social 
learning in a non-social reptile (Geochelone carbonaria),” doi: 
10.1098/rsbl.2010.0092 
 
Wimmer, Heinz & Perner, Josef (1983) “Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and 
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of 
deception,” Cognition ,13, pp. 103–128. 
 
Zwart, Jan-Wouter (2011) “Recursion in Language: A Layered-Derivation Approach,” 
Biolinguistics, 5, pp. 43-56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX A: ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
 
 
This thesis concerns the topic of recursion in human cognition with respect to natural 
language syntax.  
Since mostly only sentences with multiple CP-embedding, especially center-
embedding, and thus the embedding of clauses, are considered recursive, this thesis 
considers the question, what recursion in language exactly is, as well as the 
question, which role recursion plays within human cognition, such that language in 
humans could evolve. 
For this purpose it has to come clear in how far language differs from other 
communication systems and what exactly these mechanisms are, how they are 
processed in the brain, whether and where they appear in non-linguistic domains and 
in how far other species than humans are capable of these mechanisms.  
The 1st chapter introduces the term recursion and the concept that stands behind it, 
and moreover shows its application in different fields. Further, this chapter presents 
and discusses possible differences between recursion and other types of repetition, 
such as iteration. In the 1st chapter it is concluded that a differentiation between 
recursion, iteration and “simple repetition” is not useful, or rather doesn’t make any 
sense, since, as I argued, recursion in natural language syntax is evident in every 
sentence, since recursion is represented by a combining operation like Merge, which 
is always recursion. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that a recursive process 
does not always yield a recursive structure, or rather embedding. Here again, I 
argued that this differentiation is not plausible, since, according to X’-Theory a 
sentence with more than one clause as well as a sentence with only one clause is 
represented hierarchical and thus yields an embedded structure.  
Chapter 2 presents recursion in linguistic theory, particularly generative theories as 
phrase structure grammar and the Minimalist Program. Moreover, within this chapter, 
it is discussed, what the mechanism is, that makes syntax recursive, and whether 
there is good reason to believe that all sentences yield recursion, or if there are 
special properties that make only sentences recursive that contain subordinated 
clauses. In the 2nd chapter it is argued that every sentence is equally recursive, since 
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it is generated by the same rules, independent of whether multiple CP-embedding 
occurs or not. CP-embedded sentences seem to differ from other sentence in they 
need more working-memory to be processed.  
In Chapter 3, brain structures that are considered to represent the activation pattern 
during syntactic and recursive processing, within and outside the linguistic domain, 
are looked at more closely. Additionally, it is investigated which role has to be 
dedicated to working-memory, since it seems to play a crucial role within this issue. 
Chapter 4 is about recursion within human cognition and the cognition of non-human 
species. More particular, the first part of this chapter is concerned with the role 
recursion plays within domains outside language, and what this means for recursion 
in linguistic syntax and for the human language ability as a whole. Moreover, this part 
of the chapter also discusses the need for recursion in human language on the 
example of the language Pirahã, which had been considered by Daniel Everett to be 
a non-recursive language, which is, however, rather controversial. The second part of 
the 4th chapter is concerned with probable language-like processing and general 
cognition in non-human species. As an example for this, songbirds and non-human 
primates are looked at in particular.  
The 5th chapter investigates recursion within the framework of language evolution 
and especially the evolution of syntax. For this purpose, different theories on 
language evolution are discussed as well as the evolution of the human brain with 
respect to syntax. Moreover, the role of recursion for the human language ability is 
looked at more closely. Concerning the question why and how language evolved in 
humans, different theories are available, as it is for the evolution of syntax in 
particular. Moreover, there exist different theories on how the human brain evolved to 
be capable of syntactic language. One possibility is, however, that factors from 
different theories have interacted with each other, such that language-like utterances, 
that probably did not serve communication, but rather the avoidance of inbreeding, 
made linguistic units, like words, to appear, which probably lead to social interaction, 
which in turn affected the development of the human brain and thus the emergence 
of language. Recursion plays a crucial role here, since it is the basic mechanism that 
makes it possible to combine linguistic units by abstract rules, such that they yield a 
concatenated new one, as well as it is basically responsible for the human ability to 
use language as not only referring to the here-and-now, but also as referring to past, 
future and imaginary events. Moreover, the recursive ability in humans is probably 
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also responsible for the complex social interactions in humans, which are often 
considered to be linked to the evolution of language in humans. One of the main 
questions within this concern is, of course, why only humans developed such a 
complex communicative system, like language, if some animal species show rather 
complex cognitive behavior, partly even within the same domains as humans.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B: ABSTRACT (GERMAN) 
 
 
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema Rekursion, also der selbstähnlichen 
Wiederholung, in der menschlichen Kognition bezogen auf natürlich sprachliche 
Syntax.  
Da meist nur Sätze, die mehrfache Einbettung von CPs enthalten, insbesondere 
zentral-eingebettete CPs, als rekursiv angehsehen werden, da von diesen 
angenommen wird, dass sie eine immer komplexer werdende Einbettung von 
Konstituenten erzeugen, beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit ebenfalls mit der Frage, was 
sprachliche Rekursion tatsächlich ist und welche Rolle Rekursion in der 
menschlichen Kognition spielt, sodass sich Sprache beim Menschen entwickeln 
konnte. 
Zu diesem Zweck muss klar sein, inwiefern sich Sprache von anderen 
Kommunikationssystemen unterscheidet und zudem, was die Mechanismen sind, die 
diesen Unterschied hervorrufen, wie sie im Gehirn verarbeitet werden und ob sie 
auch in nicht-sprachlichen Domänen auftauchen und ob sie zudem von anderen 
Spezies kognitiv verarbeitet werden können. 
Das erste Kapitel ist eine Einleitung zu dem Begriff Rekursion und zu dem Konzept 
dahinter. Des Weiteren wird die Anwendung dieses Konzepts in verschiedenen 
Gebieten veranschaulicht. Dieses Kapitel zeigt und diskutiert ebenfalls mögliche 
Abgrenzungen von Rekursion zu anderen Mechanismen der Wiederholung, wie 
Iteration. Zusammenfassend wird in diesem Kapitel geschlussfolgert, dass eine 
Unterscheidung zwischen Rekursion, Iteration und „einfacher Wiederholung“, oder 
„einfacher Einbettung weder notwendig noch plausibel ist. Auch die Annahme, dass 
rekursive Prozesse und Strukturen voneinander zu trennen sind, ist nicht 
nachvollziehbar, da folgend der X‘-Theorie jeder Satz, auch wenn er nur eine CP 
enthält, eingebettet ist, und somit jeder Satz, der laut Phrasenstrukturregeln rekursiv 
durch seine Ersetzungsregeln ist, auch eine rekursive Struktur mit Einbettungen 
erzeugt.   
Kapitel 2 hat Rekursion innerhalb linguistischer generativer Theorien zum Thema. In 
diesem Kapitel geht es unter anderem darum, was der Mechanismus ist, der Sprache
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rekursiv macht, wobei die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass jeder Satz gleichermaßen 
rekursiv ist, dadurch, dass die Operation Merge rekursive Eigenschaften besitzt und 
für die Indefinitheit natürlicher Sprache sorgt. Des Weiteren wird begutachtet, ob es 
Gründe gibt, anzunehmen, dass nur Sätze mit mehreren CPs rekursiv sein können, 
wobei darauf geschlossen wird, dass der einzige wichtige Unterschied darin liegt, 
dass bei Sätzen mit mehreren CPs mehr Arbeitsgedächtniskapazität gefordert wird.  
In Kapitel 3 werden die neuronalen Mechanismen, die für Syntax, bzw. Rekursion 
verantwortlich sind, betrachtet. Dabei wird ebenfalls die Rolle, die das 
Arbeitsgedächtnis einnimmt, berücksichtigt, da es eine wichtige in diesem Belang zu 
spielen scheint. 
Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit Rekursion im menschlichen Denken außerhalb der 
Sprache und mit der Wichtigkeit, die Rekursion als menschliche Universal für 
natürliche Sprache hat. Dies geschieht am Beispiel der indigenen Sprache Pirahã, 
die laut Daniel Everett nicht rekursiv ist, was jedoch durchaus umstritten ist. Im 
zweiten Teil des Kapitels geht es um die Kognition nicht-menschlichen Spezies in 
Bezug auf Rekursion und Sprache. Hierbei werden Singvögel und nicht-menschliche 
Primaten als Beispiel näher betrachtet. 
Das fünfte Kapitel widmet sich der Frage, welche Rolle Rekursion bei der 
Entstehung der Sprache beim Menschen spielt, wobei festgestellt wird, dass 
Rekursion vermutlich eine wichtige Rolle gespielt, da die Fähigkeit, rekursiv zu 
denken nicht nur  zu der Möglichkeit geführt hat, abstrakte Regel anzuwenden und 
somit unendlich lange, immer neue Äußerungen zu produzieren, sondern auch die 
hauptsächliche Rolle dabei spielt, dass menschliche Sprache, im Gegensatz zu 
Kommunikationsformen anderer Tiere, dazu in der  Lage ist, sich nicht auf das Hier 
und Jetzt zu beziehen, sondern neben Vergangenheit und Zukunft auch auf mögliche 
Welten. Eine wichtige Frage diesbezüglich ist natürlich, wieso Menschen, nicht aber 
andere Spezies diese Fähigkeit der Kommunikation entwickelt haben, da einige Tiere 
gute kognitive Fähigkeiten sogar innerhalb der gleichen Domänen wie Menschen 
zeigen. 
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